Jorge J. E. Gracia

The discussion of the relation of levels of reality to categories is important because categories have often been interpreted as constituting levels of reality. This article explores whether this view is correct, and argues it is not. Categories as such should not be understood to constitute levels of reality, although particular categories may. The article begins with a discussion of levels of reality and then turns to specific questions about categories and how they are related to these levels.

This paper investigates the problem of numerical continuity in thomistic metaphysics and attempts to point out the principle of identity in material substances. it has three parts: the first clarifies the issue and presents the possible alternatives; the second rejects various solutions which have been proposed by interpreters of thomas aquinas such as matter, form, accidents, and substance; and the third part argues that within thomistic metaphysics it is only existence ("esse") that may be considered as an acceptable candidate for this ontological role

IF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY studies ideas from the past, as is generally accepted, then historians of philosophy face a serious problem concerning their object of study for two reasons. In the first place, like all history, the history of philosophy is concerned with the past and we can never have direct empirical access to the past unless that past is close to us and we have taken part in it. In order to know the past in which we have not participated we must rely on the testimony of those who had direct access to it and left records of what they witnessed. In the second place, the problem arises because the specific object that the history of philosophy studies is ideas and ideas are not things, events, or facts for which we can have direct empirical evidence even if we are contemporaneous with them. The most we can have is indirect empirical evidence. We do not perceive ideas; what we perceive are certain phenomena that suggest to us certain ideas. If I ask you, for example, "Do you approve of what the President did?" and you frown in return, I conclude that you do not. But it is altogether possible that you do in fact approve of the President's action, although you wish me to think that you do not and thus mislead me by making the frown. My conclusion that you do not, then, can be taken only as an interpretation of what you are thinking based on certain empirical evidence that is only indirectly related to what you think. Thus the study of the history of philosophy is very difficult, more difficult than the study of the type of history that relies on events for which there can be direct empirical evidence; for not only is direct access to the past impossible for historians of philosophy from the present, but even if they had it they would not have direct access to the ideas which are supposed to be the object of their study.

HISPANIC PHILOSOPHY. The notion of Hispanic philosophy is a useful one for trying to understand certain historical phenomena related to the philosophy developed in the Iberian peninsula, the Iberian colonies in the New World, and the countries that those colonies eventually came to form. It is useful for two reasons. First, it focuses attention on the close relations among the philosophers in these geographical areas; and second, other historical denominations and categorizations do not do justice to such relations. This becomes clear when one examines the standard general categorizations according to which the philosophical thought of the mentioned geographical areas is divided and studied: Spanish philosophy, Portuguese philosophy, Catalan philosophy, Latin American philosophy, Spanish-American philosophy, and Ibero-American philosophy.

Racism has been the subject of considerable attention in recent years, and although many varieties of it have been identified and discussed, most of the discussions take insufficient account of the differences between the racial, ethnic, and national elements that play roles in it. Nonetheless, the talk of racism against members of ethnic and national groups is quite common and gives rise to misunderstandings and confusions about what racism is and the various forms it can take when these differences are not explored. In this article, I explore racism in the contexts of race, ethnicity, and nationality in order to determine whether it makes sense in those contexts and, if it does, the differences and similarities between them. I argue that understandings of racism that pay insufficient attention to the differences that characterize racism arising from considerations of race, ethnicity, and nationality stand on the way of its eradication and prevention. I further argue that conceptions of race, ethnicity, and nationality that attempt to integrate them into mixed notions can make matters worse.

Comprised of thirteen articles by well-known authors, this book makes the case to philosophers that popular culture is worthy of their attention. Issues of concern include the distinction between high culture and popular culture, the aesthetic and moral value of popular culture, allusion and identification in popular culture, and special problems posed by the interpretation of popular culture. Popular art forms considered include: movies, television shows, comic books, children's stories, photographs, and rock songs