Jorge J. E. Gracia

What does make texts the same? Three types of sameness are distinguished: achronic, synchronic and diachronic. The latter two involve time and so are more restrictive; thus I concentrate on achronic sameness. After examining various possible views I reach the conclusion that there are three conditions which, taken together, constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions of the achronic sameness of texts and hence explain their identity: sameness of meaning, of syntactical arrangement and of type-sign composition. We can thus understand how different copies of a book are the same text, for they have the same meaning and they are composed of the same type signs arranged in the same way. Thus, in spite of the many differences that characterize them, they are still to be regarded as copies of the same text

HISPANIC PHILOSOPHY. The notion of Hispanic philosophy is a useful one for trying to understand certain historical phenomena related to the philosophy developed in the Iberian peninsula, the Iberian colonies in the New World, and the countries that those colonies eventually came to form. It is useful for two reasons. First, it focuses attention on the close relations among the philosophers in these geographical areas; and second, other historical denominations and categorizations do not do justice to such relations. This becomes clear when one examines the standard general categorizations according to which the philosophical thought of the mentioned geographical areas is divided and studied: Spanish philosophy, Portuguese philosophy, Catalan philosophy, Latin American philosophy, Spanish-American philosophy, and Ibero-American philosophy.

This article claims that communication within the same culture in the present and with the past and communication across cultures pose serious methodological challenges for philosophers. These challenges are particularly obvious when we engage in comparative philosophy between East and West. However, if (1) we understand philosophy as a discipline involved in problem solving, and (2) we use the Framework Approach advocated in this article, such communication does not seem impossible. Of course, this approach may not help us with the challenges posed by the kind of philosophy that does not deal with problems.

This book is the latest step in the development of a scholarly program whose origin goes back at least twenty years to the publication of Henry's The "De Grammatico" of St. Anselm: The Theory of Paronymy. Other major steps in the same direction are the publications of The Logic of St. Anselm, Medieval Logic and Metaphysics, and Commentary on "De Grammatico". The program involves two general theses: the demonstration of the value of medieval contributions to both metaphysics and logic, and the claim that the best way to appreciate and interpret such contributions is through the use of a precise logical language which Henry identifies with that created by Stanislaw Lesniewski and further developed by Czeslaw Lejewski. It also involves a more specific thesis elaborated in greater detail in the latest book: that there is a close interrelation between metaphysics and grammar such that "an analytical exploration of the logical structure of propositions in general, and of medieval metaphysical propositions in particular, may itself have a metaphysical basis". The logical language proposed by Henry becomes the contemporary counterpart of the metaphysical foundations of medieval philosophy.

IF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY studies ideas from the past, as is generally accepted, then historians of philosophy face a serious problem concerning their object of study for two reasons. In the first place, like all history, the history of philosophy is concerned with the past and we can never have direct empirical access to the past unless that past is close to us and we have taken part in it. In order to know the past in which we have not participated we must rely on the testimony of those who had direct access to it and left records of what they witnessed. In the second place, the problem arises because the specific object that the history of philosophy studies is ideas and ideas are not things, events, or facts for which we can have direct empirical evidence even if we are contemporaneous with them. The most we can have is indirect empirical evidence. We do not perceive ideas; what we perceive are certain phenomena that suggest to us certain ideas. If I ask you, for example, "Do you approve of what the President did?" and you frown in return, I conclude that you do not. But it is altogether possible that you do in fact approve of the President's action, although you wish me to think that you do not and thus mislead me by making the frown. My conclusion that you do not, then, can be taken only as an interpretation of what you are thinking based on certain empirical evidence that is only indirectly related to what you think. Thus the study of the history of philosophy is very difficult, more difficult than the study of the type of history that relies on events for which there can be direct empirical evidence; for not only is direct access to the past impossible for historians of philosophy from the present, but even if they had it they would not have direct access to the ideas which are supposed to be the object of their study.

The presence and impact of Hispanics/Latinos in the United States cannot be ignored. Already the largest minority group, by 2050 their numbers will exceed all the other minority groups in the United States combined. The diversity of this population is often understated, but the people differ in terms of their origin, race. language, custom, religion, political affiliation, education and economic status. The heterogeneity of the Hispanic/Latino population raises questions about their identity and their rights: do they really constitute a group? That is, do they have rights as a group, or just as individuals? This volume, addresses these concerns through a varied and interdisciplinary approach