Jorge J. E. Gracia

This article argues for two theses. The first is that many of the sociological factors endemic in the philosophical community function as barriers to the recruitment of members of minority groups in the profession and to their functioning as public intellectuals. The division into familial groups, the fights for security and success, and the weakness of the federal organization of the American Philosophical Association all contribute to these barriers. The second is that sociology has a place in philosophy, even though it should not be confused with it. This means that philosophers need to consider social phenomena.

The discussion of the relation of levels of reality to categories is important because categories have often been interpreted as constituting levels of reality. This article explores whether this view is correct, and argues it is not. Categories as such should not be understood to constitute levels of reality, although particular categories may. The article begins with a discussion of levels of reality and then turns to specific questions about categories and how they are related to these levels.

INDIVIDUALITY has given philosophers considerable trouble. There are conflicting views as to how to understand it and even as to its intelligibility in spite of what appears to be its fundamental character in our experience. For, on the one hand, we seem to experience the world in terms of individuals, but when we try to explain what their individuality is we run into difficulties. Indeed, even a view which at first sight appears quite innocuous, defining individuality formally as a feature which characterizes individuals as individuals, is strongly rejected by many. They argue that individuality cannot be a feature at all in the strict sense of the word, since its being a feature would presuppose that something else could share on it or have it, and that seems to contradict the very notion of individuality. At any rate, this is of no concern to us presently since it is an issue which pertains to the ontological status of individuality rather than its intension. It suffices to point out for the moment that there is ample disagreement concerning the proper understanding of individuality.