Jorge J. E. Gracia

The scope of Philosophy in Multiple Voices provides the reader with eight philosophical streams of thought-African-American, Afro-Caribbean, Asian-American, Feminist, Latin-American, Lesbian, Native-American and Queer-that introduce readers to alternative, complex philosophical questions concerning gendered, sexed, racial and ethnic identities, canon formation, and meta-philosophy. The overriding theme of the text is that philosophy is pluralistic in voice, rich in diversity, and ought to valorize democratic intellectual spaces of philosophical engagement

This book is the latest step in the development of a scholarly program whose origin goes back at least twenty years to the publication of Henry's The "De Grammatico" of St. Anselm: The Theory of Paronymy. Other major steps in the same direction are the publications of The Logic of St. Anselm, Medieval Logic and Metaphysics, and Commentary on "De Grammatico". The program involves two general theses: the demonstration of the value of medieval contributions to both metaphysics and logic, and the claim that the best way to appreciate and interpret such contributions is through the use of a precise logical language which Henry identifies with that created by Stanislaw Lesniewski and further developed by Czeslaw Lejewski. It also involves a more specific thesis elaborated in greater detail in the latest book: that there is a close interrelation between metaphysics and grammar such that "an analytical exploration of the logical structure of propositions in general, and of medieval metaphysical propositions in particular, may itself have a metaphysical basis". The logical language proposed by Henry becomes the contemporary counterpart of the metaphysical foundations of medieval philosophy.

The presence and impact of Hispanics/Latinos in the United States cannot be ignored. Already the largest minority group, by 2050 their numbers will exceed all the other minority groups in the United States combined. The diversity of this population is often understated, but the people differ in terms of their origin, race. language, custom, religion, political affiliation, education and economic status. The heterogeneity of the Hispanic/Latino population raises questions about their identity and their rights: do they really constitute a group? That is, do they have rights as a group, or just as individuals? This volume, addresses these concerns through a varied and interdisciplinary approach

IF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY studies ideas from the past, as is generally accepted, then historians of philosophy face a serious problem concerning their object of study for two reasons. In the first place, like all history, the history of philosophy is concerned with the past and we can never have direct empirical access to the past unless that past is close to us and we have taken part in it. In order to know the past in which we have not participated we must rely on the testimony of those who had direct access to it and left records of what they witnessed. In the second place, the problem arises because the specific object that the history of philosophy studies is ideas and ideas are not things, events, or facts for which we can have direct empirical evidence even if we are contemporaneous with them. The most we can have is indirect empirical evidence. We do not perceive ideas; what we perceive are certain phenomena that suggest to us certain ideas. If I ask you, for example, "Do you approve of what the President did?" and you frown in return, I conclude that you do not. But it is altogether possible that you do in fact approve of the President's action, although you wish me to think that you do not and thus mislead me by making the frown. My conclusion that you do not, then, can be taken only as an interpretation of what you are thinking based on certain empirical evidence that is only indirectly related to what you think. Thus the study of the history of philosophy is very difficult, more difficult than the study of the type of history that relies on events for which there can be direct empirical evidence; for not only is direct access to the past impossible for historians of philosophy from the present, but even if they had it they would not have direct access to the ideas which are supposed to be the object of their study.

This article argues for two theses. The first is that many of the sociological factors endemic in the philosophical community function as barriers to the recruitment of members of minority groups in the profession and to their functioning as public intellectuals. The division into familial groups, the fights for security and success, and the weakness of the federal organization of the American Philosophical Association all contribute to these barriers. The second is that sociology has a place in philosophy, even though it should not be confused with it. This means that philosophers need to consider social phenomena.

The discussion of the relation of levels of reality to categories is important because categories have often been interpreted as constituting levels of reality. This article explores whether this view is correct, and argues it is not. Categories as such should not be understood to constitute levels of reality, although particular categories may. The article begins with a discussion of levels of reality and then turns to specific questions about categories and how they are related to these levels.

INDIVIDUALITY has given philosophers considerable trouble. There are conflicting views as to how to understand it and even as to its intelligibility in spite of what appears to be its fundamental character in our experience. For, on the one hand, we seem to experience the world in terms of individuals, but when we try to explain what their individuality is we run into difficulties. Indeed, even a view which at first sight appears quite innocuous, defining individuality formally as a feature which characterizes individuals as individuals, is strongly rejected by many. They argue that individuality cannot be a feature at all in the strict sense of the word, since its being a feature would presuppose that something else could share on it or have it, and that seems to contradict the very notion of individuality. At any rate, this is of no concern to us presently since it is an issue which pertains to the ontological status of individuality rather than its intension. It suffices to point out for the moment that there is ample disagreement concerning the proper understanding of individuality.