Jorge J. E. Gracia

IN A PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS I believe the speaker is allowed more latitude than in a more ordinary speech. There is more freedom to explore and perhaps even preach. So I am going to do a bit of both. My chapter and verse, some of you will be surprised to know, is a passage from the preface to Foucault’s The Order of Things, in which he argues that categories are a matter of invention. This text has had enormous impact on the issue I wish to address today, and in many ways has helped to define it and to establish as definitive, in the minds of many of our contemporaries, the view that categories are invented.

INDIVIDUALITY has given philosophers considerable trouble. There are conflicting views as to how to understand it and even as to its intelligibility in spite of what appears to be its fundamental character in our experience. For, on the one hand, we seem to experience the world in terms of individuals, but when we try to explain what their individuality is we run into difficulties. Indeed, even a view which at first sight appears quite innocuous, defining individuality formally as a feature which characterizes individuals as individuals, is strongly rejected by many. They argue that individuality cannot be a feature at all in the strict sense of the word, since its being a feature would presuppose that something else could share on it or have it, and that seems to contradict the very notion of individuality. At any rate, this is of no concern to us presently since it is an issue which pertains to the ontological status of individuality rather than its intension. It suffices to point out for the moment that there is ample disagreement concerning the proper understanding of individuality.

For many years I have maintained that I learned to philosophize by translating Francisco Suárez’s Metaphysical Disputation V from Latin into English. This surely is a claim that must sound extraordinary to the members of this audience or even to most twentieth century philosophers. Who reads Suárez these days? And what could I learn from a sixteenth century scholastic writer that would help me in the twentieth century? I would certainly be surprised if one were to find any references to some of Suárez’s works in any of the works of twentieth-century major philosophers. One of the reasons for my claim is the great difficulty I had in figuring out what Suárez’s text means and how to render it understandable to English readers. Translating the text forced me to think in ways that were quite different from those I was used to think in Spanish, my native tongue, or English, my adoptive tongue. In fact, the translation I produced after having completed many drafts continued, and still continues to this day, to appear to me unsatisfactory, and that dissatisfaction was the key to understanding things I had understood very differently before. I hope to make clear why in what follows. The thesis that I defend is that semantic equivalence between texts of philosophy in different languages is difficult, if not impossible in some cases, to achieve and, therefore, that it is a mistake to restrict doing analytic philosophy to English, as Gustavo Rodríguez-Pereyra argues we should do in a recent article (2013).

This article argues for two theses. The first is that many of the sociological factors endemic in the philosophical community function as barriers to the recruitment of members of minority groups in the profession and to their functioning as public intellectuals. The division into familial groups, the fights for security and success, and the weakness of the federal organization of the American Philosophical Association all contribute to these barriers. The second is that sociology has a place in philosophy, even though it should not be confused with it. This means that philosophers need to consider social phenomena.

My focus here is on two questions: Does philosophy have a place in contemporary American public life? and should philosophy have a place in American public life? Because my answer to the first question is negative, I also will discuss some of the reasons why I believe philosophy does not play a role in American public life. I suggest that philosophers have been excluded from the public conversation in part because the work of philosophy entails criticism and challenge—activities best accomplished from “outside” of the structures of power. This means that we have a role in public life, but it is an indirect role, as teachers and critics, not as advisers and active participants.

Philosophy and Literature in Latin America presents a unique and original view of the current state of development in Latin America of two disciplines that are at the core of the humanities. Divided into two parts, each section explores the contributions of distinguished American and Latin American experts and authors. The section on literature includes the literary activities of Latin Americans working in the United States, an area in which very little research has been demonstrated and, for that reason, will add an interesting new dimension to the field of Latin American studies.

A first-of-its-kind book that seriously and profoundly examines what it means philosophically to be Latino and where Latinos fit in American society. Offers a fresh perspective and clearer understanding of Latin American thought and culture, rejecting answers based on stereotypes and fear Takes an interdisciplinary approach to the philosophical, social, and political elements of Hispanic/Latino identity, touching upon anthropology, history, cultural studies and sociology, as well as philosophy Written by Jorge J. E. Gracia, one of the most influential thinkers of Hispanic/Latino descent

This volume explores the relationship between rationality and happiness from ancient Greek philosophy to early Latin medieval philosophy. What connection is there between human rationality and happiness? This issue was uppermost in the minds of the Ancient Greek philosophers and continued to be of importance during the entire early medieval period. Starting with theSocrates of Plato's early dialogues, who is regarded as having initiated the eudaimonistic ethical tradition, the present volume looks at Plato, Aristotle, the Skeptics, Seneca [Stoicism], Epicurus, Plotinus [neo-Platonism], Augustine, Boethius, Anselm, and ends with Abelard, the final major figure in early medieval philosophy. Special efforts are made to reveal and trace the continuity and development of the views on rationality and happiness among these major thinkers within this period. The book's approach is historical, but the topics it treats are relevant to many discussions pursued in contemporary philosophical circles. Specifically, the book aims to make two major contributions to the ongoing development of virtue ethics. First, contemporary virtue ethics often draws distinctions between ancient Greek ethics and modern moral philosophy [mainly utilitarianism and Kantianism], and seeks to model ethics on ancient ethics. In doing so, however, contemporary virtue ethics often ignores the transition from Greek ethics to the early Latin medieval tradition. Second, contemporary virtue-based ethics, in its efforts to seek insights from ancient ethics, centers on virtue. In contrast, in ancient and medieval ethics, virtue is pursued for the sake of happiness [eudaimonia], and virtue is conceived as excellence of rationality. Hence, the relationship between rationality and happiness provides the framework for ethical inquiry within which the discussion of virtue takes place. Contributors: JULIA ANNAS, RICHARD BETT, JORGE J.E. GRACIA, BRAD INWOOD, WILLIAM MANN, JOHN MARENBON, GARETH B. MATTHEWS, MARK L. McPHERRAN, DONALD MORRISON, C.C.W. TAYLOR, JONATHAN SANFORD, JIYUAN YU. Jiyuan Yu is Assistant Professor of Ancient Philosophy at the State University of New York at Buffalo. Jorge J. E. Gracia is Samuel P. Capen Chair and SUNY Distinguised Professor in the Departments of Philosophy and Comparative Literature at the State University of New York at Buffalo.