Jan Wolenski

Józef M. Bocheński began his philosophical career as an eclectic philosopher, then switched to Thomism and finally became a representative of the analytic school. As a Thomist he wanted to reform this orientation by the resources of modern formal logic. This tendency culminated in the establishment of the Cracow Circle (established in 1936) whose members were Bocheński, Jan F. Drewnowski, Jan Salamucha, and Bolesław Sobociński. However, the program of the Cracow Circle was rejected by most Thomists who considered traditional logic as an entirely sufficient device of philosophy. Bocheński was very disappointed by this attitude of his Thomist fellows. His evolution toward analytic philosophy, free of any ideological pressure, can be regarded as his reaction to the conservatism of Thomism

Chociaż rozróżnienie sądów analitycznych i syntetycznych pojawiło się po raz pierwszy u Kanta, to pokrewne pojęcia można odnaleźć już u Hume’a i Leibniza. Autor zestawia i analizuje różne definicje i charakterystyki pojęcia analityczności, jakie proponowali m. in.: Kant, pozytywiści, Frege, Carnap, Strawson i Quine. Wskazuje się, że w badaniach nad zagadnieniem analityczności często odwoływano się do takich pojęć metalogicznych, jak: prawdziwość, niesprzeczność czy dowiedlność, a te z kolei zostały scharakteryzowane na gruncie metamatematyki przez tzw. twierdzenia limitacyjne, w szczególności przez twierdzenia Godła o niezupełności i twierdzenie Churcha o nierozstrzygalności. W związku z tym referowano dyskusję nad związkiem ww. twierdzeń z zagadnieniem rozstrzygalności prowadzoną przez samego Godła, a także przez Turquette'a, Copiego, Kemeny’ego, Borkowskiego i in.

The debates on semantics and its philosophical significance that took place at the 1935 Paris Congress for Scientific Philosophy are of particular historical interest for two reasons. Firstly, they are generally recognized as one of the major events to have taken place at the Congress. Secondly, and more substantially, they were to play a decisive role in the future of semantics as a field of philosophy. The discussions were initiated by Carnap, who invited Tarski to deliver two lectures in Paris. The two of them, along with Kokoszyńska, were to act as the principal champions of semantics. Neurath, who wrote the summary of the discussion, raised several objections against Tarskian semantics. In particular, he feared that semantics would introduce metaphysics (in the Vienna Circle’s sense) into philosophy. As subsequent developments would prove, it would be the defenders of semantics who would win the argument.