Jan Wolenski

This paper is devoted to analysis of co-called paradox of confirmation formulated by C. G. Hempel in the 1930s. In particular, the author proposes a solution of this puzzle. The proposal consists in refining the concept of confirmation by adding a clause that if A confirms a hypothesis h, the former must be a logical consequence of a latter, eventually derived with the help of additional assumptions. This leads to an additional constraint requiring that confirmations act relatively to sets of reference. Finally, if h and h’ are logically equivalent, a sentence A confirms both to the same degree if and only if related sets of reference are the same

Ancien etudiant de Brentano et de Zimmerman, Kazimierz Twardowski, apres son election a la chaire de philosophie a Lvov en 1895, crea autour de lui un cercle d'etudiants et de collaborateurs exceptionnel, connu aujourd'hui sous le nom d'Ecole de Lvov-Varsovie. A mi-chemin entre Vienne et Cambridge, c'est a Lvov, et puis partiellement a Varsovie, que Jan Lukasiewicz, Stanislaw Lesniewski, Alfred Tarski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Tadeusz Kotarbinski et bien d'autres encore, repenserent dans un esprit d'analyse les questions fondamentales de la philosophie du langage, de la logique, de la philosophie des sciences et des mathematiques. Plus qu'une simple traduction, ce livre est une version revisee de la monographie desormais classique que Jan Wolenski, connu pour ses travaux non seulement en histoire de la philosophie analytique, mais aussi en epistemologie et en theorie de la verite, a consacree a l'Ecole de Lvov-Varsovie.

This paper argues that science is not dependent on philosophical assumption and does not entail philosophical consequences. The concept of dependence and entailment is understood logically, that is, are defined via consequence operation. Speaking more colloquially, the derivation of scientific theorems does not use philosophical statements as premises and one cannot derive philosophical theses from scientific assertions. This does not mean that science and philosophy are completely separated. In particular, sciences leads to some philosophical insights, but it must be preceded by a hermeneutical interpretation

This papers discuss the place, if any, of Convention T (the condition of material adequacy of the proper definition of truth formulated by Tarski) in the truth-makers account offered by Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons and Barry Smith. It is argued that although Tarski’s requirement seems entirely acceptable in the frameworks of truth-makers theories for the first-sight, several doubts arise under a closer inspection. In particular, T-biconditionals have no clear meaning as sentences about truth-makers. Thus, truth-makers theory cannot be considered as the semantic theory of truth enriched by metaphysical (ontological) data. The problem of truth-makers for sentences about future events is discussed at the end of the paper.

This paper examines some problems concerning modalities as operators acting on sentential arguments. At first, formal dependencies between modalities are described. Then, the problem of translations of modalities as operators into modalities as predicates is discussed. The author shows that although some predicates satisfy laws of the logical square for modalities, they cannot be represented by sentences with modal operators in front. The explanation of this fact is proposed by using Czeżowski\'s idea of modi entis and the content of presentations