Frederick Beiser

The Fate of Reason is the first general history devoted to the period between Kant and Fichte, one of the most revolutionary and fertile in modern philosophy. The philosophers of this time broke with the two central tenets of the modem Cartesian tradition: the authority of reason and the primacy of epistemology. They also witnessed the decline of the Aufkldrung, the completion of Kant's philosophy, and the beginnings of post-Kantian idealism. Thanks to Beiser we can newly appreciate the influence of Kant's critics on the development of his philosophy. Beiser brings the controversies, and the personalities who engaged in them, to life and tells a story that has uncanny parallels with the debates of the present.

This book is the first complete intellectual biography of Hermann Cohen and the only work to cover all his major philosophical and Jewish writings. Frederick C. Beiser pays special attention to all phases of Cohen's intellectual development, its breaks and its continuities, throughout seven decades. The guiding goal behind Cohen's intellectual career, he argues, was the development of a radical rationalism, one committed to defending the rights of unending enquiry and unlimited criticism. Cohen's philosophy was therefore an attempt to defend and revive the Enlightenment belief in the authority of reason; his critical idealism an attempt to justify this belief and to establish a purely rational worldview. According to this interpretation, Cohen's thought is resolutely opposed to any form of irrationalism or mysticism because these would impose arbitrary and artificial limits on criticism and enquiry. It is therefore critical of those interpretations which see Cohen's philosophy as a species of proto-existentialism or Jewish mysticism. Hermann Cohen: An Intellectual Biography attempts to unify the two sides of Cohen's thought, his philosophy and his Judaism. Maintaining that Cohen's Judaism was not a limit to his radical rationalism but a consistent development of it, Beiser contends that his religion was one of reason. He concludes that most critical interpretations have failed to appreciate the philosophical depth and sophistication of his Judaism, a religion which committed the believer to the unending search for truth and the striving to achieve the cosmopolitan ideals of reason.

This book is an account of the philosophical movement named Lebensphilosophie, which flourished at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. There many philosophers who participated in the movement, but this book concentrates on the three most important: Friedrich Nietzsche, Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Simmel. The movement was called Lebensphilosophie—literally, philosophy of life—because its main interest was not life as a biological phenomenon but life as it is lived by human beings. They regarded human life and experience as the fundamental reality, the basis of all knowledge and value, and disputed the relevance of any supernatural realm transcending human experience. The purpose of life was therefore life itself. Lebensphilosophie was the first modern philosophical movement in the Western tradition. It was “modern” in the sense that it was entirely humanist and secular, deriving all values from a non-religious perspective. Nietzsche, Dilthey and Simmel were either atheists or agnostics; they denied the relevance of any transcendent reality or being for human life. They abjured the traditional Christian concern with salvation and immortality. They also disputed the existence of natural law, teleology or a providential order; human beings created their own values and they did not conform to any made by nature. In anticipation of later existentialism, the Lebensphilosophen maintained that human beings are the makers of their own fate. Contrary to pessimism, they affirmed the great value of life while still acknowledging its frequent tragedy. The Lebensphilosophen were champions of an individualist ethics, which maintained that the highest good for a human being was self-realization, the development of a persons’s unique individuality. Their ethics was neither utilitarian nor de-ontological: it was not utilitarian because it did not regard the highest good as pleasure; self-realization could be a very unpleasant experience; and it was not de-ontological because it grounded moral norms upon the facts of human development and experience. The Lebensphilosophen were major advocates of historicism. They believed that human experience is formed by history, and that its horizons and limits are historical. Just as it was impossible to transcend human experience, so it was impossible to transcend history. All values and norms were therefore historical. In attempting to describe historical experience, the Lebensphilosophen developed the discipline of hermeneutics. They refused to accept mechanical explanation as a paradigm of explanation. This book attempts to describe and analyze the fundamental aspects of Lebensphilosophie by looking in detail at the views of its three leading figures. It examines their ethics, their religious background, their responses to pessimism and relativism, and their contributions to hermeneutics and historicism.

It is a tale often told, and one that has never lost much in the retelling. Scholars never cease to ponder the Schiller-Kant relationship, which continues to be controversial. It is not hard to see why. Schiller once said that he only wanted to follow the spirit of Kant’s philosophy, even if, on a few minor points, he would depart from its letter. But he also did not hesitate to contradict Kant explicitly on major points, attempting, for example, to build an objective aesthetics in direct conflict with Kant’s teaching about the subjectivity of aesthetic judgment. How can we bring both these points together to form an intelligible account of the Kant-Schiller relationship? Scholars have been working on this for generations. There is no simple solution.

This article argues for understanding Schiller’s humanism in the tradition of the philosophical anthropology of the Karlschule. Examining Schiller’s Kantianism and the concepts of religious humanism, autonomy, providence, immanence and transcendence, we arrive at the general conclusion that he was among the first humanists in the German tradition to remove the religious dimension of ethics. In this regard, Schiller was the father of the radicals who came after him, of David Friedrich Strauβ, Ludwig Feuerbach, and Friedrich Nietzsche.

David Friedrich Strauss is a central figure in 19th century intellectual history. The first major source for the loss of faith in Christianity in Germany, his work Das Leben Jesu was the most scandalous publication in Germany during his time. His book was a critique of the claims to historical truth of the New Testament, which had been the mainstay of Protestantism since the Reformation. As the father of unbelief, his critique of Christianity preceded that of Nietzsche, Marx, Feuerbach, and Schopenhauer. His views imposed a harsh fate upon him - he was persecuted for his beliefs by religious and political authorities and was denied employment in the university and government, forcing him to live as a free-lance writer. He led a wandering and isolated life as an outcast. Here, Frederick C. Beiser studies the intellectual development of Strauss and recounts his fate, which began in faith as a young man but finally ended in unbelief.

"This book is an intellectual biography of Johann Friedrich, who was one of the most famous philosophers in early 19th century Germany. Herbart was trained in the German idealist tradition under Fichte, but he eventually broke with Fichte and major idealist doctrines. His own philosophy was opposed to the idealist tradition in important respects: he defended a dualism between the factual and normative; he was an ontological pluralist rather than monist; and he accepted crucial Kantian dualisms that had been rejected by the idealists. While Herbart still retained elements of idealism, he was more realistic than his idealistic counterparts, maintaining that elements of the sensible manifold were given rather than posited by the mind. Herbart was also an important forerunner of analytic philosophy, first in breaking with the idealist tradition, and second in insisting that the proper method of philosophy is the analysis of concepts rather than speculation about the universe as a whole"--

Felsefedeki normal dönemler felsefenin belirlenmiş ve uzlaşılmış bir tanımının olduğu filozofların kendi disiplinlerinin ve onun içerdiği görevlerin doğası hakkında genel bir mutabakata sahip oldukları zamanlardır Devrimci zamanlar ise böyle bir tanımın olmadığı felsefeye ilişkin çelişen kavramsallaştırmaların olduğu zamanlardır Bu tanımlara göre geç on sekizinci erken on dokuzuncu ve geç yirminci yüzyıllar normal zamanlardı Bununla birlikte on dokuzuncu yüzyılın ikinci yarısı devrimciydi Çünkü bu dönem belirlenmiş ya da uzlaşılmış bir felsefe tanımının olmadığı disipline ilişkin çelişik birçok kavramsallaştırmanın olduğu bir dönemdi Filozoflar kendilerine kendi disiplinleriyle ilgili en temel soruları sordular Felsefe nedir Ampirik bilimlerden nasıl farklılaşır Neden felsefe yapmalıyız İdealizm çağının Hegelin ölümüyle sona ermesinden sonra on dokuzuncu yüzyılın ikinci yarısındaki Alman felsefesinin bir gerileme ve durgunluk dönemine girdiğini iddia eden hakim görüşe karşı Frederick Beiser döneme has anlaşmazlık ve çatışma ortamının yüzyılın ikinci yarısını ilk yarısından daha ilginç kıldığını somut örneklerle gözler önüne seriyor Elinizdeki kitap açık ve canlı bir üslupla yazılmış Hegel sonrası Alman felsefesine dair her düzeyden okur için temel bir kaynak",

ABSTRACT Herbart and Hegel were contemporaries and both became famous, in their time and thereafter. It would be interesting therefore to know what they thought of one another. We could easily answer this question if they reviewed one another. Hegel never reviewed Herbart; but Herbart did review Hegel. Though in his later years Herbart protested that he did not want to engage with Hegel, he had already written, in 1822, one of his longest and most important reviews, which was of Hegel’s Philosophie des Rechts. Herbart maintained that there is a Spinozistic element to Hegel’s political philosophy which equates right with might. Hegel tried to avoid the implications of this equation by bringing Kantian transcendental freedom into his system, which for him boiled down to the idea of dialectical development. But Herbart rejected the fundamental idea behind dialectical development: that the ego posits the opposite of itself. Herbart then criticized Hegel’s attempt to revive natural law and his theory of the state. Herbart contended that reason cannot prove the fundamental principles of natural law, that reason by itself is an abstract and formal power and as such cannot demonstrate any principle having substantive content. And Herbart criticized Hegel’s doctrine that the individual finds his identity only in the state. Much more liberal than Hegel, Herbart stressed the importance of individuality outside the state.

Histories of German philosophy in the nineteenth century typically focus on its first half--when Hegel, idealism, and Romanticism dominated. By contrast, the remainder of the century, after Hegel's death, has been relatively neglected because it has been seen as a period of stagnation and decline. But Frederick Beiser argues that the second half of the century was in fact one of the most revolutionary periods in modern philosophy because the nature of philosophy itself was up for grabs and the very absence of certainty led to creativity and the start of a new era. In this innovative concise history of German philosophy from 1840 to 1900, Beiser focuses not on themes or individual thinkers but rather on the period's five great debates: the identity crisis of philosophy, the materialism controversy, the methods and limits of history, the pessimism controversy, and the Ignorabimusstreit. Schopenhauer and Wilhelm Dilthey play important roles in these controversies but so do many neglected figures, including Ludwig Büchner, Eugen Dühring, Eduard von Hartmann, Julius Fraunstaedt, Hermann Lotze, Adolf Trendelenburg, and two women, Agnes Taubert and Olga Pluemacher, who have been completely forgotten in histories of philosophy. The result is a wide-ranging, original, and surprising new account of German philosophy in the critical period between Hegel and the twentieth century.

This article attempts to expose an unwarranted narrowness in the study of idealism in nineteenth century philosophy, and to show that the field of idealism is much wider than usually assumed. This narrowness stems from the influence of Hegel’s history of philosophy, which saw the idealist tradition as beginning in Kant, passing through Fichte and Schelling, and then culminating in his own system. This conception of history has been disseminated by Hegel’s followers and still prevails today. I argue that this conception is too narrow for several reasons. First, it ignores the romantic idealists (Hölderlin, Novalis, Schlegel); second, it excludes the opposing tradition of idealism of Herbart, Fries and Beneke, which affirmed (against Schelling and Hegel) transcendental idealism, an empiricist epistemology, the existence of the thing-in-itself and the value of the Kantian dualisms; and, third, it neglects the history of idealism after Hegel later in the nineteenth century, more specifically, the idealism of Trendelenburg, Lotze and Hartmann.

This article defends the paradoxical thesis that neo-Kantianism is better described as neo-Fichteanism rather than neo-Kantianism. It maintains that neo-Kantianism is closer to Fichte than Kant in four fundamental respects: in its nationalism, socialism, activism, and in its dynamic and quantitative conception of the dualism between understanding and sensibility. By contrast, Kant’s philosophy was cosmopolitan, liberal, non-activist quietist and held a static and qualitative view of the dualism between understanding and sensibility. I attempt to explain why it took the neo-Kantians so long to recognize these profound affinities with Fichte: they were influenced by Fries conception of Fichte as a speculative metaphysician. I argue that the hold of Friesian interpretation of Fichte was first broken by Emil Lask in his Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte.

This article treats the conflict between historicism and neo-Kantianism in the late nineteenth century by a careful examination of the writings of Wilhelm Windelband, the leader of the Southwestern neo-Kantians. Historicism was a profound challenge to the fundamental principles of Kant’s philosophy because it seemed to imply that there are no universal and necessary principles of science, ethics or aesthetics. Since all such principles are determined by their social and historical context, they differ with each culture and epoch. Windelband attempted to respond to the challenge of this relativism by either broadening Kantian principles, so that they could accommodate the results of historicism, or by reformulating Kantian principles, so that they were impregnable to historical change. The article examines both aspects of Windelband’s strategy in some detail, noting the many changes and different formulations in his views. A final section considers some of the difficulties of Windelband’s strategy and concludes that, despite its heroic efforts, it was a failure.Keywords: Historicism; Normativity; Weltanschauung; Hegelianism; Relativism; Wilhelm Windelband; Immanuel Kant.

This is the first full study in English of the German historicist tradition. Frederick C. Beiser surveys the major German thinkers on history from the middle of the eighteenth century until the early twentieth century, providing an introduction to each thinker and the main issues in interpreting and appraising his thought. The volume offers new interpretations of well-known philosophers such as Johann Gottfried Herder and Max Weber, and introduces others who are scarcely known at all, including J. A. Chladenius, Justus Möser, Heinrich Rickert, and Emil Lask. Beyond an exploration of the historical and intellectual context of each thinker, Beiser illuminates the sources and reasons for the movement of German historicism—one of the great revolutions in modern Western thought, and the source of our historical understanding of the human world.