-
170Varieties of four dimensionalismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1). 1993.This Article does not have an abstract
-
96Temporal Overlap is Not CoincidenceThe Monist 83 (3): 362-380. 2000.The best reason to believe in temporal parts is to avoid commitment to coincidence—roughly, two objects occupying exactly the same space at exactly the same time. Most anti-coincidence arguments for temporal parts are fission arguments. Gaining some notice, however, are vagueness arguments. One goal of this paper is to clarify the way a temporal-parts ontology avoids coincidence, and another is to clarify the vagueness argument, highlighting the fact that it too is an anti-coincidence argument. …Read more
-
311The immorality of modal realism, or: How I learned to stop worrying and let the children drownPhilosophical Studies 114 (1-2). 2003.
-
192Relevant alternatives and closureAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2). 1999.This Article does not have an abstract
-
48Hobartian voluntarism: Grounding a deontological conceptionof epistemic justificationPacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2). 2000.
-
84The miracle of counterfactuals: Counterexamples to Lewis's world orderingPhilosophical Studies 76 (1). 1994.
-
173The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-Dimensional Hunks of MatterCambridge University Press. 1990.This provocative book attempts to resolve traditional problems of identity over time. It seeks to answer such questions as 'How is it that an object can survive change?' and 'How much change can an object undergo without being destroyed'? To answer these questions Professor Heller presents a theory about the nature of physical objects and about the relationship between our language and the physical world. According to his theory, the only actually existing physical entities are what the author c…Read more
-
17Temporal Overlap is Not CoincidenceThe Monist 83 (3): 362-380. 2000.The best reason to believe in temporal parts is to avoid commitment to coincidence—roughly, two objects occupying exactly the same space at exactly the same time. Most anti-coincidence arguments for temporal parts are fission arguments. Gaining some notice, however, are vagueness arguments. One goal of this paper is to clarify the way a temporal-parts ontology avoids coincidence, and another is to clarify the vagueness argument, highlighting the fact that it too is an anti-coincidence argument. …Read more
-
67The mad scientist meets the robot cats: Compatibilism, kinds, and counterexamplesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2): 333-37. 1996.In 1962 Hilary Putnam forced us to face the possibility of robot cats. More than twenty years later Daniel Dennett found himself doing battle with mad scientists and other “bogeymen.” Though these two examples are employed in different philosophical arena, there is an important connection between them that has not been emphasized. Separating the concept associated with a kind term from the extension of that term, as Putnam and others have urged, raises the possibility of accepting counterexample…Read more
-
73The best candidate approach to diachronic identityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (4). 1987.This Article does not have an abstract
-
55Might-counterfactuals and gratuitous differencesAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1). 1995.This Article does not have an abstract
-
60Metaphysical boundaries: A question of independenceAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (3). 1989.This Article does not have an abstract
-
429Temporal parts of four dimensional objectsPhilosophical Studies 46 (3). 1984.I offer a clear conception of a temporal part that does not make the existence of temporal parts implausible. This can be done if (and only if) we think of physical objects as four dimensional, The fourth dimension being time. Unless we are willing to deny the existence of most spatial parts, Or willing to accept the possibility of coincident entities, Or accept something even more implausible, We should accept the existence of temporal parts
-
232The Donkey ProblemPhilosophical Studies 140 (1): 83-101. 2008.The Donkey Problem (as I am calling it) concerns the relationship between more and less fundamental ontologies. I will claim that the moral to draw from the Donkey Problem is that the less fundamental objects are merely conventional. This conventionalism has consequences for the 3D/4D debate. Four-dimensionalism is motivated by a desire to avoid coinciding objects, but once we accept that the non-fundamental ontology is conventional there is no longer any reason to reject coincidence. I therefor…Read more