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Julia Driver

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  •  Publications
    74
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  • All publications (74)
  • FMRI and ERP correlates of conscious and unconscious vision in parietal extinction patients
    with P. Vullumieur, Martin Eimer, and Geraint Rees
    NeuroImage 14. 2001.
    Neglect and Extinction
  •  1
    Global utilitarianism
    In Ben Eggleston & Dale E. Miller (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism, Cambridge University Press. pp. 166--176. 2014.
  •  69
    From the Editors
    with Connie Rosati
    Ethics 131 (1): 1-3. 2020.
  •  193
    Moral sense and sentimentalism
    In Jed Z. Buchwald & Robert Fox (eds.), The Oxford handbook of the history of physics, Oxford University Press. pp. 358. 2013.
    This chapter focuses on sentimentalism – the view that morality is based on sentiment – in particular, the sentiment of sympathy. Sentimentalism was historically articulated in opposition to two positions: Hobbesian egoism, in which morality is based on self-interest; and Moral Rationalism, which held that morality is based on reason alone. The Sentimentalists challenged both views, arguing that there is more to what motivates human beings than simple self-interest and that reason alone is insuf…Read more
    This chapter focuses on sentimentalism – the view that morality is based on sentiment – in particular, the sentiment of sympathy. Sentimentalism was historically articulated in opposition to two positions: Hobbesian egoism, in which morality is based on self-interest; and Moral Rationalism, which held that morality is based on reason alone. The Sentimentalists challenged both views, arguing that there is more to what motivates human beings than simple self-interest and that reason alone is insufficient to motivate our actions, including our moral actions. The philosophies of Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith are considered. The discussion then turns to sympathy, moral realism, moral virtue, and psychological realism.
    Moral Emotivism and Sentimentalism
  •  61
    From the Editors
    with Connie Rosati
    Ethics 133 (1): 1-4. 2022.
  •  185
    Kvanvig`s The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind
    Informal Logic 15 (1). 1993.
    Informal LogicEpistemic Virtues
  •  208
    Expertise and Evaluation
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1): 220-226. 2021.
  • Ificial etwtc^
    In Christopher Grau (ed.), Philosophers Explore the Matrix, Oxford University Press. pp. 208. 2005.
  • Imaginative resistance and psychological necessity
    In Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Dycus Miller & Jeffrey Paul (eds.), Objectivism, subjectivism, and relativism in ethics, Cambridge University Press. 2008.
    Imaginative Resistance
  •  86
    From the Editors
    with Connie Rosati
    Ethics 132 (1): 1-3. 2021.
  •  108
    Book ReviewsJoel J. Kupperman, Value … and What Follows. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. vi + 168. $35.00 (review)
    Ethics 111 (2): 424-427. 2001.
    Value Theory, Miscellaneous
  • Normative ethical theory in the twentieth century
    In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of The History of Analytic Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2013.
  •  59
    From Morality to Virtue
    Noûs 28 (4): 505. 1994.
  •  88
    An Introduction to Kant'S Ethics
    Philosophical Books 37 (4): 258-260. 1996.
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