Laurence Thomas

Although there are many variations on the theme, so much is made of the good of moral autonomy that it is difficult not to suppose that there is everything to be said for being morally autonomous and nothing at all to be said for being morally nonautonomous. However, this view of moral autonomy cannot be made to square with the well-received fact that most people are morally nonautonomous — not, at any rate, unless one is prepared to maintain that most people are irrational in this respect. I am not. Thus, I reject what I take to be the prevailing view of moral autonomy. I argue that it is false that (1) moral autonomy is such that it is rational for every person to prefer being morally autonomous to being morally nonautonomous, but true that (2) moral autonomy is such that if anyone is morally autonomous, then it is rational for him to prefer being morally autonomous to being morally nonautonomous.

It is generally agreed that Kant went too far in his claim that it is wrong to lie even if doing so will save an individual's life. The question remains whether it is morally permissible to tell a lie even if this does not involve saving the life of another individual. In this essay, I seek to answer this question affirmatively while at the same time setting strong constraints for when a lie (not involving saving a life) is morally permissible. I argue that lying is morally permissible in the face of what I call an egregious morally infelicitous question. Further, in some cases, lying is not only morally permissible but even reflects an unmistakable instance of considerable self-sacrifice. Needless to say, lies that constitute an instance of self-sacrifice are extremely rare. However, this possibility brings into sharp relief the truth that a lie need not stem from unsavory moral motives; it is upon this truth that the argument that it is morally permissible to lie in the face of an egregious morally infelicitous question relies. This essay ends with the quite poignant observation that there is nothing stable about out a society in which, owing to an unfailing duty to tell the truth, a person can obtain the truth merely by asking an egregious morally infelicitous question

UTONOMY IS VERY HIGHLY PRAISED as something that it is always good to have, and always good to have more of rather than less of.1 The idea seems to be that persons should be autonomous whatever else they might be, and that should act autonomously whatever else it is that they might do. Kantians are fond of saying that a person is autonomous if she or he chooses to live in accordance with the dictates of reason. This, in turn, directly links autonomy to morality, which for Kantians is an ineliminable aspect of reason. I shall discuss this view in Section II. Of course, it is also the case that autonomy is widely heralded as a good by those who do not accept Kant’s philosophical moorings. For instance, to say that women should be more autonomous is not thereby to say that they should be more embracing of this or that moral set of principles. In fact, it is not clear that this assertion pertains to acting morally at all. Autonomy, like liberty, seems to be regarded as a good whatever the philosophical leanings of people might be. In either case, the more the better

This essay is part of a symposium on affirmative action that took place at the University of Cincinnati with the distinguished legal scholar Ronald Dworkin. I argue against affirmative action. And I discuss at length the votes of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and the dissent of Justice Clarence Thomas. I develop the idea of idiosyncratic excellence; and I argue that diversity is a weakness insofar as it (a) an excuse for social myopia and (b)an impediment to individuals seeing beyond their differences and affirming the excellences that they witness. The expected publication date, Univ of Cinn Law Review, is March 2004.

In this important and engaging volume, international scholars present opposing viewpoints to debate ten of the most important issues in contemporary social philosophy. Provides an original analysis of some of society’s most pressing issues Written by an outstanding cast of international scholars Issues covered include the nature of freedom, the limits of religious tolerance, affirmative action, parenting, the death penalty, privacy, violence, world hunger, social diversity, homosexuality, and abortion Invites the reader to participate in the exchange of arguments.

This work has a most resounding virtue: It is an essay in moral philosophy written about the ordinary life. Care’s point of departure is a life that is flawed and troubled—one that is dulled to numerous moral considerations, one that is far from capable of just willing itself back on any track, moral or otherwise. And as the book’s title suggests, the question that he is concerned to answer is, How does that kind of person get on with living a morally respectable life? How is it possible for that person to have what Care calls Hume-Falk peace of mind, since that person’s life will never, in view of the damage caused to others, pass satisfactory review.