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21Prosopagnosia, conscious awareness and the interactive brainBehavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1): 84-85. 1994.
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Nonreduction, consciousness and physical causationJournal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11): 41-49. 2002.
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56What if phenomenal consciousness admits of degrees?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6): 528-529. 2007.If the phenomenality of consciousness admits of degrees and can be partial and indeterminate, then Block's inference to the best explanation may need to be revaluated both in terms of the supposed data on phenomenal overflow and the range of alternatives against which his view is compared
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The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: MetaphysicsBowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr. 1999.
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18Rationality and the anomalous nature of the mentalPhilosophy Research Archives 7 1404. 1980.Donald Davidson's argument for the nonlawlike nature of psycho-physical generalizations is discussed and refuted. It is shown that his appeals to the rational and holistic character of intentional description do not support his conclusion of anomalism. An alternative methodological role is suggested for the concept of rationality in application to current empirical research in cognitive psychology.
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31Beautiful red squaresBehavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1): 50-51. 2003.The reflectance types that Byrne & Hilbert identify with colors count as types only in a way that is more dependent on, and more relative to color perceivers, than their account suggests. Their account of perceptual content may be overly focused on input conditions and distal causes.
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1Outing the MindIn Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. pp. 255--284. 2004.
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Metaphysical arguments for internalism and why they don't workIn Stuart Silvers (ed.), Representation: Readings In The Philosophy Of Mental Representation, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1988.
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154How should we understand the relation between intentionality and phenomenal consciousnessPhilosophical Perspectives 9 271-89. 1995.
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5FunctionalismIn Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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33Still room for representationsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5): 1007-1008. 2001.One can support O'Regan & Noë's (O&N's) commitment to the active nature of vision and the importance of sensorimotor contingencies without joining them in rejecting any significant role for neurally realized visual representations in the process.
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14Closing the gap?Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4): 93-97. 2000.[opening paragraph]: Nicholas Humphrey's ambitiously titled paper falls into two main parts. In the first, he offers a diagnosis of the current state of the mind-body debate and a general prescription for how to go about seeking its solution. In the second, he aims to fill that prescription with a specific proposal that he regards as bringing us much closer to a resolution of the underlying problem. Though I will take issue below with a few important details, I largely agree with his diagnosis o…Read more
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Peer commentary on are there neural correlates of consciousness: Neural correlates and the diversity of contentJournal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1): 82-86. 2004.
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84Are beliefs brain states? And if they are what might that explain?Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3): 205-15. 1994.
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2Nonreductive materialism and the nature of intertheoretical constraintIn Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, De Gruyter. 1992.
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39Is the higher order of linguistic thought model of feeling adequate?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2): 218-219. 2000.Despite its explanatory value, the “higher order linguistic thought” model comes up short as an account of the felt aspect of motivational states.
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88What would count as explaining consciousness?In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Ferdinand Schoningh. 1995.
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29Understanding the phenomenal mind: Are we all just armadillosIn Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: psychological and philosophical essays, Blackwell. 1993.
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20Drugs, mental instruments, and self-controlBehavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (6): 325-326. 2011.The instrumental model offered by Müller & Schumann (M&S) is broadened to apply not only to drugs, but also to other methods of self-control, including the use of mental constructs to produce adaptive changes in behavior with the possibility of synergistic interactions between various instruments
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575Reduction, emergence and other recent options on the mind/body problem: A philosophic overviewJournal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10): 1-34. 2001.Though most contemporary philosophers and scientists accept a physicalist view of mind, the recent surge of interest in the problem of consciousness has put the mind /body problem back into play. The physicalists' lack of success in dispelling the air of residual mystery that surrounds the question of how consciousness might be physically explained has led to a proliferation of options. Some offer alternative formulations of physicalism, but others forgo physicalism in favour of views that are m…Read more
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97Conceiving beyond our means: The limits of thought experimentsIn S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak & David Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness III: The Third Tucson Discussions and Debates, Mit Press. pp. 13. 1999.
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130On the Supposed Inconceivability of Absent Qualia Functional Duplicates—a Reply to TyePhilosophical Review 121 (2): 277-284. 2012.In “Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem,” Michael Tye (2006) presents an argument by which he claims to show the inconceivability of beings that are functionally equivalent to phenomenally conscious beings but lack any qualia. On that basis, he concludes that qualia can be fully defined in functional terms. The argument does not suffice to establish the claimed results. In particular it does not show that such absent qualia cases are inconceivable. Tye’s argument relies on a principle P acco…Read more
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97Mirror, mirror -- is that all?In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Mit Press. 2006.Consciousness and self-awareness seem intuitively linked, but how they intertwine is less than clear. Must one be self-aware in order to be consciousness? Indeed, is consciousness just a special type of self-awareness? Or perhaps it is the other way round: Is being self-aware a special way of being conscious? Discerning their connections is complicated by the fact that both the main relata themselves admit of many diverse forms and levels. One might be conscious or self- aware in many different …Read more
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42Has the case been made against the ecumenical view of connectionism?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1): 57-58. 1988.
Syracuse, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Consciousness |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |