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67Functionalism and qualiaIn Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Blackwell. 2007.Functionalism, in one form or another, is probably at present the most commonly held position concerning the nature of mental states among philosophers. Functionalists all accept the basic thesis that mental kinds are functional kinds, and that what makes a mental item an item of a given mental type is the functional role it plays within a relevantly organized system. This chapter considers arguments meant to show that various forms of functionalism are unable to accommodate or explain some of t…Read more
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Qualia, functional equivalence and computationIn Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1988.
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13And the Knowledge ArgumentIn Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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100Out of sight but not out of mind: Isomorphism and absent qualiaBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6): 974-974. 1999.The isomorphism constraint places plausible limits on the use of third-person evidence to explain color experience but poses no difficulty for functionalists; they themselves argue for just such limits. Palmer's absent qualia claim is supported by neither the Color Machine nor Color Room examples. The nature of color experience depends on relations external to the color space, as well as internal to it.
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35Vehicles, processes, and neo-classical revivalBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1): 170-171. 1999.O'Brien & Opie unfairly restrict the classicist's range of options for explaining phenomenal consciousness. Alternative approaches that rely upon differences among representation types offer better prospects of success. The authors rely upon two distinctions: one between symbol processing and connectionist models, the other between process and vehicle models. In this context, neither distinction may be as clear as they assume.
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46Higher-order global states (HOGS) An alternative higher-order modelIn Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology, John Benjamins. pp. 67. 2004.
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372So many ways of saying no to MaryIn Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument, Mit Press. 2004.
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Explaining Consciousness: What Would Count?In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Ferdinand Schoningh. 1995.
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Consciousness, intrinsic intentionality, and self-understanding machinesIn Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science, Oxford University Press. 1988.
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20Prosopagnosia, conscious awareness and the interactive brainBehavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1): 84-85. 1994.
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Nonreduction, consciousness and physical causationJournal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11): 41-49. 2002.
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56What if phenomenal consciousness admits of degrees?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6): 528-529. 2007.If the phenomenality of consciousness admits of degrees and can be partial and indeterminate, then Block's inference to the best explanation may need to be revaluated both in terms of the supposed data on phenomenal overflow and the range of alternatives against which his view is compared
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The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: MetaphysicsBowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr. 1999.
Syracuse, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Consciousness |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |