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567Reduction, emergence and other recent options on the mind/body problem: A philosophic overviewJournal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10): 1-34. 2001.Though most contemporary philosophers and scientists accept a physicalist view of mind, the recent surge of interest in the problem of consciousness has put the mind /body problem back into play. The physicalists' lack of success in dispelling the air of residual mystery that surrounds the question of how consciousness might be physically explained has led to a proliferation of options. Some offer alternative formulations of physicalism, but others forgo physicalism in favour of views that are m…Read more
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93Conceiving beyond our means: The limits of thought experimentsIn Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & David J. Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness Iii, Mit Press. pp. 13. 1999.
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128On the Supposed Inconceivability of Absent Qualia Functional Duplicates—a Reply to TyePhilosophical Review 121 (2): 277-284. 2012.In “Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem,” Michael Tye (2006) presents an argument by which he claims to show the inconceivability of beings that are functionally equivalent to phenomenally conscious beings but lack any qualia. On that basis, he concludes that qualia can be fully defined in functional terms. The argument does not suffice to establish the claimed results. In particular it does not show that such absent qualia cases are inconceivable. Tye’s argument relies on a principle P acco…Read more
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97Mirror, mirror -- is that all?In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Mit Press. 2006.Consciousness and self-awareness seem intuitively linked, but how they intertwine is less than clear. Must one be self-aware in order to be consciousness? Indeed, is consciousness just a special type of self-awareness? Or perhaps it is the other way round: Is being self-aware a special way of being conscious? Discerning their connections is complicated by the fact that both the main relata themselves admit of many diverse forms and levels. One might be conscious or self- aware in many different …Read more
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40Has the case been made against the ecumenical view of connectionism?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1): 57-58. 1988.
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19Functionalism as a Theory of MindPhilosophy Research Archives 8 185-204. 1982.A general characterization of functionalist theories of mind is offered and a number of issues are discussed which allow for alternative versions of functionalism. Some issues, such as the distinction between the implicit definition and partial specification views are of a general nature, while others raise questions more specific to functionalism, such as whether the relation between psychological and physiological properties is one of identity or instantiation. Section II attempts to undermine…Read more
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128Phenomenal Unity, Representation and the SelfPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1): 209-214. 2013.
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18Analytical isomorphism and Marilyn MonroeBehavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6): 776-777. 1998.Pessoa, Thompson & Noë present compelling evidence in support of their central claims about the diversity of filling-in, but they embed those claims within a larger framework that rejects analytical isomorphism and uses the personal/subpersonal distinction to challenge the explanatory importance of filling-in. The latter views seem more problematic.
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90Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Teleo-Pragmatic Theory of MindPhilosophia Naturalis 48 (1): 103-124. 2011.
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16Jackson's change of mind: representationalism, a priorism and the knowledge argumentIn Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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227Higher-order global states : An alternative higher-order model of consciousnessIn Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology, John Benjamins. 2004.
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9Understanding the phenomenal mind: Are we all just armadillos? Part I: Phenomenal knowledge and explanatory gapsIn M. Davies & G. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: A Mind and Language Reader, Blackwell. 1993.
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1Deficit studies and the function of phenomenal consciousnessIn George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology, Mit Press. 1994.
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1Reduction, emergence, and the mind/body problemIn Nancey C. Murphy & William R. Stoeger (eds.), Evolution and emergence: systems, organisms, persons, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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66Functionalism and qualiaIn Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Blackwell. 2007.Functionalism, in one form or another, is probably at present the most commonly held position concerning the nature of mental states among philosophers. Functionalists all accept the basic thesis that mental kinds are functional kinds, and that what makes a mental item an item of a given mental type is the functional role it plays within a relevantly organized system. This chapter considers arguments meant to show that various forms of functionalism are unable to accommodate or explain some of t…Read more
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Qualia, functional equivalence and computationIn Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1988.
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13And the Knowledge ArgumentIn Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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99Out of sight but not out of mind: Isomorphism and absent qualiaBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6): 974-974. 1999.The isomorphism constraint places plausible limits on the use of third-person evidence to explain color experience but poses no difficulty for functionalists; they themselves argue for just such limits. Palmer's absent qualia claim is supported by neither the Color Machine nor Color Room examples. The nature of color experience depends on relations external to the color space, as well as internal to it.
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44Higher-order global states (HOGS) An alternative higher-order modelIn Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology, John Benjamins.. pp. 67. 2004.
Syracuse, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Consciousness |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |