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The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: MetaphysicsBowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr. 1999.
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18Rationality and the anomalous nature of the mentalPhilosophy Research Archives 7 1404. 1980.Donald Davidson's argument for the nonlawlike nature of psycho-physical generalizations is discussed and refuted. It is shown that his appeals to the rational and holistic character of intentional description do not support his conclusion of anomalism. An alternative methodological role is suggested for the concept of rationality in application to current empirical research in cognitive psychology.
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1Outing the MindIn Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. pp. 255--284. 2004.
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31Beautiful red squaresBehavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1): 50-51. 2003.The reflectance types that Byrne & Hilbert identify with colors count as types only in a way that is more dependent on, and more relative to color perceivers, than their account suggests. Their account of perceptual content may be overly focused on input conditions and distal causes.
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Metaphysical arguments for internalism and why they don't workIn Stuart Silvers (ed.), ReRepresentation, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1989.
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153How should we understand the relation between intentionality and phenomenal consciousnessPhilosophical Perspectives 9 271-89. 1995.
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33Still room for representationsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5): 1007-1008. 2001.One can support O'Regan & Noë's (O&N's) commitment to the active nature of vision and the importance of sensorimotor contingencies without joining them in rejecting any significant role for neurally realized visual representations in the process.
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5FunctionalismIn Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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Peer commentary on are there neural correlates of consciousness: Neural correlates and the diversity of contentJournal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1): 82-86. 2004.
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14Closing the gap?Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4): 93-97. 2000.[opening paragraph]: Nicholas Humphrey's ambitiously titled paper falls into two main parts. In the first, he offers a diagnosis of the current state of the mind-body debate and a general prescription for how to go about seeking its solution. In the second, he aims to fill that prescription with a specific proposal that he regards as bringing us much closer to a resolution of the underlying problem. Though I will take issue below with a few important details, I largely agree with his diagnosis o…Read more
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2Nonreductive materialism and the nature of intertheoretical constraintIn Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, De Gruyter. 1992.
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84Are beliefs brain states? And if they are what might that explain?Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3): 205-15. 1994.
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88What would count as explaining consciousness?In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Imprint Academic. 1995.
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39Is the higher order of linguistic thought model of feeling adequate?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2): 218-219. 2000.Despite its explanatory value, the “higher order linguistic thought” model comes up short as an account of the felt aspect of motivational states.
Syracuse, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Consciousness |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |