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57Rationality and the anomalous nature of the mentalPhilosophy Research Archives 7 1404. 1980.Donald Davidson's argument for the nonlawlike nature of psycho-physical generalizations is discussed and refuted. It is shown that his appeals to the rational and holistic character of intentional description do not support his conclusion of anomalism. An alternative methodological role is suggested for the concept of rationality in application to current empirical research in cognitive psychology.
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15And the Knowledge ArgumentIn Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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98Still room for representationsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5): 1007-1008. 2001.One can support O'Regan & Noë's (O&N's) commitment to the active nature of vision and the importance of sensorimotor contingencies without joining them in rejecting any significant role for neurally realized visual representations in the process.
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5FunctionalismIn Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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70Is the higher order of linguistic thought model of feeling adequate?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2): 218-219. 2000.Despite its explanatory value, the “higher order linguistic thought” model comes up short as an account of the felt aspect of motivational states.
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43Understanding the phenomenal mind: Are we all just armadillosIn Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Philosophical and Psychological Essays, Blackwell. 1993.
Syracuse, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
| Philosophy of Consciousness |
Areas of Interest
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Philosophy of Cognitive Science |