-
39Is the higher order of linguistic thought model of feeling adequate?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2): 218-219. 2000.Despite its explanatory value, the “higher order linguistic thought” model comes up short as an account of the felt aspect of motivational states.
-
35Vehicles, processes, and neo-classical revivalBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1): 170-171. 1999.O'Brien & Opie unfairly restrict the classicist's range of options for explaining phenomenal consciousness. Alternative approaches that rely upon differences among representation types offer better prospects of success. The authors rely upon two distinctions: one between symbol processing and connectionist models, the other between process and vehicle models. In this context, neither distinction may be as clear as they assume.
-
33Still room for representationsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5): 1007-1008. 2001.One can support O'Regan & Noë's (O&N's) commitment to the active nature of vision and the importance of sensorimotor contingencies without joining them in rejecting any significant role for neurally realized visual representations in the process.
-
30Beautiful red squaresBehavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1): 50-51. 2003.The reflectance types that Byrne & Hilbert identify with colors count as types only in a way that is more dependent on, and more relative to color perceivers, than their account suggests. Their account of perceptual content may be overly focused on input conditions and distal causes.
-
29Understanding the phenomenal mind: Are we all just armadillosIn Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays, Blackwell. 1993.
-
28How Should We Understand the Relation between Intentionality and Phenomenal Consciousness?Philosophical Perspectives 9. 1995.
-
20Prosopagnosia, conscious awareness and the interactive brainBehavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1): 84-85. 1994.
-
20Drugs, mental instruments, and self-controlBehavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (6): 325-326. 2011.The instrumental model offered by Müller & Schumann (M&S) is broadened to apply not only to drugs, but also to other methods of self-control, including the use of mental constructs to produce adaptive changes in behavior with the possibility of synergistic interactions between various instruments
-
19Functionalism as a Theory of MindPhilosophy Research Archives 8 185-204. 1982.A general characterization of functionalist theories of mind is offered and a number of issues are discussed which allow for alternative versions of functionalism. Some issues, such as the distinction between the implicit definition and partial specification views are of a general nature, while others raise questions more specific to functionalism, such as whether the relation between psychological and physiological properties is one of identity or instantiation. Section II attempts to undermine…Read more
-
18Rationality and the anomalous nature of the mentalPhilosophy Research Archives 7 1404. 1980.Donald Davidson's argument for the nonlawlike nature of psycho-physical generalizations is discussed and refuted. It is shown that his appeals to the rational and holistic character of intentional description do not support his conclusion of anomalism. An alternative methodological role is suggested for the concept of rationality in application to current empirical research in cognitive psychology.
-
18Analytical isomorphism and Marilyn MonroeBehavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6): 776-777. 1998.Pessoa, Thompson & Noë present compelling evidence in support of their central claims about the diversity of filling-in, but they embed those claims within a larger framework that rejects analytical isomorphism and uses the personal/subpersonal distinction to challenge the explanatory importance of filling-in. The latter views seem more problematic.
-
17Jackson's change of mind: representationalism, a priorism and the knowledge argumentIn Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. 2009.
-
16John Searle and His Critics (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 1991.ROBERT A. COOKE, CPA, has owned or co-owned three successful small businesses and is the author of six books, including Doing Business Tax-Free and How to Start Your Own S Corporation, Second Edition, both from Wiley.
-
15Taking a step back from the gapIn The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Bowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr. pp. 123-133. 1999.In this paper, I reflect on the assumptions implicit in the psychophysical explanatory gap metaphor. There are clearly gaps in our current understanding of the psycho-physical link, but how great are they? Are they different in kind from other gaps in our understanding of the world that cause us less metaphysical and epistemological distress? Further, why are we supposed to regard the gaps in our psychological understanding differently? Rather than assess such theories of why a special gap exist…Read more
-
14Closing the gap?Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4): 93-97. 2000.[opening paragraph]: Nicholas Humphrey's ambitiously titled paper falls into two main parts. In the first, he offers a diagnosis of the current state of the mind-body debate and a general prescription for how to go about seeking its solution. In the second, he aims to fill that prescription with a specific proposal that he regards as bringing us much closer to a resolution of the underlying problem. Though I will take issue below with a few important details, I largely agree with his diagnosis o…Read more
-
14Rival Views of Consciousness and Self-AwarenessJournal of Consciousness Studies 20 (11-12): 51-68. 2013.
-
13And the Knowledge ArgumentIn Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. 2009.
-
9Are Beliefs Brain-States? And If They Are What Might That Explain?Philosophical Studies 76 (2/3). 1994.
-
9Understanding the phenomenal mind: Are we all just armadillos? Part I: Phenomenal knowledge and explanatory gapsIn M. Davies & G. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: A Mind and Language Reader, Blackwell. 1993.
-
5FunctionalismIn Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. 2009.
Syracuse, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Consciousness |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |