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1Outing the MindIn Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. pp. 255--284. 2004.
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Metaphysical arguments for internalism and why they don't workIn Stuart Silvers (ed.), ReRepresentation, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1989.
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153How should we understand the relation between intentionality and phenomenal consciousnessPhilosophical Perspectives 9 271-89. 1995.
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5FunctionalismIn Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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33Still room for representationsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5): 1007-1008. 2001.One can support O'Regan & Noë's (O&N's) commitment to the active nature of vision and the importance of sensorimotor contingencies without joining them in rejecting any significant role for neurally realized visual representations in the process.
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14Closing the gap?Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4): 93-97. 2000.[opening paragraph]: Nicholas Humphrey's ambitiously titled paper falls into two main parts. In the first, he offers a diagnosis of the current state of the mind-body debate and a general prescription for how to go about seeking its solution. In the second, he aims to fill that prescription with a specific proposal that he regards as bringing us much closer to a resolution of the underlying problem. Though I will take issue below with a few important details, I largely agree with his diagnosis o…Read more
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Peer commentary on are there neural correlates of consciousness: Neural correlates and the diversity of contentJournal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1): 82-86. 2004.
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2Nonreductive materialism and the nature of intertheoretical constraintIn Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, De Gruyter. 1992.
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84Are beliefs brain states? And if they are what might that explain?Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3): 205-15. 1994.
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39Is the higher order of linguistic thought model of feeling adequate?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2): 218-219. 2000.Despite its explanatory value, the “higher order linguistic thought” model comes up short as an account of the felt aspect of motivational states.
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87What would count as explaining consciousness?In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Imprint Academic. 1995.
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29Understanding the phenomenal mind: Are we all just armadillosIn Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays, Blackwell. 1993.
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20Drugs, mental instruments, and self-controlBehavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (6): 325-326. 2011.The instrumental model offered by Müller & Schumann (M&S) is broadened to apply not only to drugs, but also to other methods of self-control, including the use of mental constructs to produce adaptive changes in behavior with the possibility of synergistic interactions between various instruments
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570Reduction, emergence and other recent options on the mind/body problem: A philosophic overviewJournal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10): 1-34. 2001.Though most contemporary philosophers and scientists accept a physicalist view of mind, the recent surge of interest in the problem of consciousness has put the mind /body problem back into play. The physicalists' lack of success in dispelling the air of residual mystery that surrounds the question of how consciousness might be physically explained has led to a proliferation of options. Some offer alternative formulations of physicalism, but others forgo physicalism in favour of views that are m…Read more
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97Conceiving beyond our means: The limits of thought experimentsIn Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & David J. Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness Iii, Mit Press. pp. 13. 1999.
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128On the Supposed Inconceivability of Absent Qualia Functional Duplicates—a Reply to TyePhilosophical Review 121 (2): 277-284. 2012.In “Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem,” Michael Tye (2006) presents an argument by which he claims to show the inconceivability of beings that are functionally equivalent to phenomenally conscious beings but lack any qualia. On that basis, he concludes that qualia can be fully defined in functional terms. The argument does not suffice to establish the claimed results. In particular it does not show that such absent qualia cases are inconceivable. Tye’s argument relies on a principle P acco…Read more
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97Mirror, mirror -- is that all?In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Mit Press. 2006.Consciousness and self-awareness seem intuitively linked, but how they intertwine is less than clear. Must one be self-aware in order to be consciousness? Indeed, is consciousness just a special type of self-awareness? Or perhaps it is the other way round: Is being self-aware a special way of being conscious? Discerning their connections is complicated by the fact that both the main relata themselves admit of many diverse forms and levels. One might be conscious or self- aware in many different …Read more
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40Has the case been made against the ecumenical view of connectionism?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1): 57-58. 1988.
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19Functionalism as a Theory of MindPhilosophy Research Archives 8 185-204. 1982.A general characterization of functionalist theories of mind is offered and a number of issues are discussed which allow for alternative versions of functionalism. Some issues, such as the distinction between the implicit definition and partial specification views are of a general nature, while others raise questions more specific to functionalism, such as whether the relation between psychological and physiological properties is one of identity or instantiation. Section II attempts to undermine…Read more
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128Phenomenal Unity, Representation and the SelfPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1): 209-214. 2013.
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18Analytical isomorphism and Marilyn MonroeBehavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6): 776-777. 1998.Pessoa, Thompson & Noë present compelling evidence in support of their central claims about the diversity of filling-in, but they embed those claims within a larger framework that rejects analytical isomorphism and uses the personal/subpersonal distinction to challenge the explanatory importance of filling-in. The latter views seem more problematic.
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91Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Teleo-Pragmatic Theory of MindPhilosophia Naturalis 48 (1): 103-124. 2011.
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17Jackson's change of mind: representationalism, a priorism and the knowledge argumentIn Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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228Higher-order global states : An alternative higher-order model of consciousnessIn Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology, John Benjamins. 2004.
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9Understanding the phenomenal mind: Are we all just armadillos? Part I: Phenomenal knowledge and explanatory gapsIn M. Davies & G. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: A Mind and Language Reader, Blackwell. 1993.
Syracuse, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Consciousness |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |