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18Analytical isomorphism and Marilyn MonroeBehavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6): 776-777. 1998.Pessoa, Thompson & Noë present compelling evidence in support of their central claims about the diversity of filling-in, but they embed those claims within a larger framework that rejects analytical isomorphism and uses the personal/subpersonal distinction to challenge the explanatory importance of filling-in. The latter views seem more problematic.
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17Jackson's change of mind: representationalism, a priorism and the knowledge argumentIn Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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9Understanding the phenomenal mind: Are we all just armadillos? Part I: Phenomenal knowledge and explanatory gapsIn M. Davies & G. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: A Mind and Language Reader, Blackwell. 1993.
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228Higher-order global states : An alternative higher-order model of consciousnessIn Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology, John Benjamins. 2004.
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1Reduction, emergence, and the mind/body problemIn Nancey C. Murphy & William R. Stoeger (eds.), Evolution and emergence: systems, organisms, persons, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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1Deficit studies and the function of phenomenal consciousnessIn George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology, Mit Press. 1994.
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67Functionalism and qualiaIn Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Blackwell. 2007.Functionalism, in one form or another, is probably at present the most commonly held position concerning the nature of mental states among philosophers. Functionalists all accept the basic thesis that mental kinds are functional kinds, and that what makes a mental item an item of a given mental type is the functional role it plays within a relevantly organized system. This chapter considers arguments meant to show that various forms of functionalism are unable to accommodate or explain some of t…Read more
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Qualia, functional equivalence and computationIn Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1988.
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100Out of sight but not out of mind: Isomorphism and absent qualiaBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6): 974-974. 1999.The isomorphism constraint places plausible limits on the use of third-person evidence to explain color experience but poses no difficulty for functionalists; they themselves argue for just such limits. Palmer's absent qualia claim is supported by neither the Color Machine nor Color Room examples. The nature of color experience depends on relations external to the color space, as well as internal to it.
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13And the Knowledge ArgumentIn Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. 2009.
Syracuse, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Consciousness |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |