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35Vehicles, processes, and neo-classical revivalBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1): 170-171. 1999.O'Brien & Opie unfairly restrict the classicist's range of options for explaining phenomenal consciousness. Alternative approaches that rely upon differences among representation types offer better prospects of success. The authors rely upon two distinctions: one between symbol processing and connectionist models, the other between process and vehicle models. In this context, neither distinction may be as clear as they assume.
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Explaining Consciousness: What Would Count?In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Ferdinand Schoningh. 1995.
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371So many ways of saying no to MaryIn Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument, Mit Press. 2004.
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Consciousness, intrinsic intentionality, and self-understanding machinesIn Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science, Oxford University Press. 1988.
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20Prosopagnosia, conscious awareness and the interactive brainBehavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1): 84-85. 1994.
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Nonreduction, consciousness and physical causationJournal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11): 41-49. 2002.
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56What if phenomenal consciousness admits of degrees?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6): 528-529. 2007.If the phenomenality of consciousness admits of degrees and can be partial and indeterminate, then Block's inference to the best explanation may need to be revaluated both in terms of the supposed data on phenomenal overflow and the range of alternatives against which his view is compared
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The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: MetaphysicsBowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr. 1999.
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18Rationality and the anomalous nature of the mentalPhilosophy Research Archives 7 1404. 1980.Donald Davidson's argument for the nonlawlike nature of psycho-physical generalizations is discussed and refuted. It is shown that his appeals to the rational and holistic character of intentional description do not support his conclusion of anomalism. An alternative methodological role is suggested for the concept of rationality in application to current empirical research in cognitive psychology.
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30Beautiful red squaresBehavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1): 50-51. 2003.The reflectance types that Byrne & Hilbert identify with colors count as types only in a way that is more dependent on, and more relative to color perceivers, than their account suggests. Their account of perceptual content may be overly focused on input conditions and distal causes.
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1Outing the MindIn Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. pp. 255--284. 2004.
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Metaphysical arguments for internalism and why they don't workIn Stuart Silvers (ed.), ReRepresentation, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1989.
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153How should we understand the relation between intentionality and phenomenal consciousnessPhilosophical Perspectives 9 271-89. 1995.
Syracuse, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Consciousness |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |