Emmanuel Ofuasia

Hitherto, the African intellect had been decimated by notable European scholars such as David Hume, Charles Darwin, Friedrich Hegel, Lucien Levy-Bruhl to name a few. The common denominator among these male scholars is that the African intellect is not yet developed to the extent that it can accommodate logical reasoning. Whereas notable African scholars have responded to these charges as misleading whilst exploring ways of coming up with a logic system that can mediate the theory, thought and practice peculiar to Africans yet applicable in other climes, the role of women in this journey has usually been downplayed. This research thereby seeks to fill this void by making a case for the contribution of the Australian Helen Verran who did not engage in armchair scholarship as most of her European male counterparts who deny the African the ability to reason logically, but journeyed to Nigeria to perform some experiments with the Yorùbá numerical system. She is persuaded that through the traditional Yorùbá numerical pattern, an underlying logic system is implied. Even when her conclusions are questionable on several fronts, this research concludes that her role in instilling confidence in the development of artificial logic in Africa must not go unmentioned.

When early European sociologists, anthropologists, missionaries and ethnographers arrived in Africa and assessed African religious beliefs and practices, later referred to as African Traditional Religions (ATRs, hereafter), most concluded that the most suitable term, which captures the belief system is, polytheism. Whereas some conclude that African religions are best captured as paganism, other scholars take an ambivalent stance concerning the capacity of Africans to conceptualise or imagine divinity. Foremost African theologians and philosophers found these ‘ratifications’ as an uncharitable but structured misrepresentation of Afro-religious cultures. Against the outlook of polytheism, John Mbiti argues that African religions or ATRs are not only monotheistic but a praeparatio evangelica for the dissemination of the Gospel in Africa. Similarly, the renowned Bolaji Idowu submits that the nature of divinity is best expressed via “diffused monotheism.” Monotheism is the conclusion of Omotade Adegbindin and Akintola Adebowale. Against these proposals, I propose panentheism as most applicable, after disagreeing with the finding of Motsamai Molefe and Thaddeus Metz who concede that African religions constitute a “neglected form of monotheism.” Although this is not the first time that I argue for panentheism as a concept for describing the relationship of the African Supreme Being with the world among Afro-religious cultures, this research takes a historical approach culminating into the grouping of scholarship on the subject into three theses, before I signal once again, why and how panentheism offers itself as an improved platform. Given the quarrel that the appropriate concept for the proper description in African philosophy of religion has generated among scholars, the paper offers enhanced illumination to the squabble, as it also unpacks the tandem between divinity in African theology and process theology.

This book offers a bold re-examination of how African spirituality and religion are understood, challenging centuries of misrepresentation shaped by colonial and Abrahamic thought. It argues that describing African religions through any form of modified monotheism, whether “implicit,” “diffused,” or “accommodated”, distorts their true nature and philosophical depth. Critiquing both colonial and postcolonial scholarship, the author shows how figures such as John Mbiti, Bolaji Idowu, John Bewaji, Thaddeus Metz, Motsamai Molefe, and Kirk Lougheed remain confined by Abrahamic categories that obscure African metaphysical perspectives. Drawing on the ritual systems and spiritual knowledge of six major Afro-religious traditions (Kemet, Yorùbá, Anlo-Ewe, Igbo, Akan, and Shona) the book advances panentheism, a non-Abrahamic monotheistic framework, as the most accurate model for understanding African religions. Combining philosophical analysis with ethnographic insight, it redefines the conceptual vocabulary for African religious scholarship, resolving long-standing debates and demonstrating the value of thick description for studying African religiosity. An original contribution to African philosophy, religious studies, and decolonial theory, this book reshapes how African spirituality is to be studied and understood.

This book articulates how African metaphysics (characterized by force) and process metaphysics (characterized by becoming) are similar on several fronts. On the one hand, the vitalist and relational characters of African metaphysics have engrossed researchers as unique and original to Africa, but they have yet to articulate where this leads – processism. On the other hand, the becoming or event underpinning of process metaphysics which has been the focus of Anglo-American processism, has not courted deserving academic attention, due chiefly to the influence wielded by substance metaphysics. This is the primary research gap which the present book magnifies, and then addresses, while contending for intellectual exchange(s) among specialists in processism, irrespective of the philosophic tradition. To accomplish this, this book admits intercultural philosophy for assessing the principal claims of some African and process philosophers and to bring them into a conversation, with an alternative system of logic in Ezumezu, to mediate thought, theory, and method. This effort assists in addressing the history of misrepresentation and distortion which process metaphysics, as an under-explored tradition, has suffered and endured.

In the last few decades, African philosophy has emerged as an independent global intellectual tradition. African philosophy has decisively divided into specialist fields, thanks to the enormous commitment of African philosophers from all over the world. These specialist fields include metaphysics, ethics, logic, epistemology, socio-political philosophy, philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, aesthetics, existentialism, and philosophy of development. In one form or the other, the various fields of African philosophy are undergirded by metaphysical assumptions and presuppositions derived from traditional African relational-holistic ontology.

When the first attempts at conceptualizing African ontology emerged in the last century, they were riddled with confusions and distortions. When one is reminded that some of these confusions and distortions were not even meant for the African audience in the first place, it becomes worrisome, the extent to which African ontology has been misrepresented and then misunderstood. This misrepresentation is connected to the failure to properly capture the true nature of Being among Africans, as noticeable in the works of Placide Tempels and Emmanuel Edeh. Where Tempels is imposing his Thomistic substance-based outlook on the Bantou, Edeh is using an “unfamiliar” linguistic framework for the Igbo. This chapter reflects that the distortion noticeable in the works of these scholars is connected to their inability to capture the process-relational underpinning of the African reality. Through the method of critical analysis, we establish that African ontology has a process-relational foundation. As a way of demonstrating this finding, the theorizations on African ontology by Ada Agada and Mogobe Ramose are employed as process versions of African ontology even as both of them have not made such open avowal to this metaphysical orientation.

Taking my inspiration from the Hermopolitan and Heliopolitan systems of ancient Egypt, the Yorùbá philosophic sage, Ọ̀rúnmìlà, and the English philosopher of science cum metaphysician, Alfred North Whitehead, I ferment a unique event ontology of duality, which I christen Ìwà. Ìwà translates as character in everyday usage among the Yorùbá. However, when reflecting on an ontological plane, it dovetails into the very important metaphysical concept—“to be” and it is this latter usage that I cling to, for navigating this theory of ontological duality. Unlike other contemporary and emerging African ontological theories, Ìwà openly avows itself as event metaphysics capable of providing a logical, coherent, and relevant interpretation of the African reality. Prominent metaphysical issues such as experience with its ubiquitous character, the nature of the relationship between God and the world, power, and theodicy along with the interconnected feature of reality with implications for modern science are provided rational and coherent attention via Ìwà ontology.

African metaphysics question a variety of issues, ranging from the nature of fundamental reality to the meaning of human existence. African philosophers have introduced groundbreaking metaphysical theories in response to these metaphysical issues and questions. These theories provide uniquely African perspectives that challenge philosophers to look inwards and produce globally competitive ideas instead of exoticising traditional African worldviews for the intellectual entertainment of a non-African audience. This volume advances the field of African metaphysics by critically engaging with key metaphysical ideas and concepts developed by African metaphysical thinkers. The chapters contributed in this volume by established researchers and promising young scholars challenge and modify existing metaphysical theories while proposing novel theories that shape debates in the field. Ada Agada is a leading contemporary African metaphysical thinker and the major proponent of consolationism in African philosophy. He is currently a senior lecturer in the Department of Philosophy, Federal University Otuoke, Nigeria. He is the author of the 2022 landmark work, Consolationism and Comparative African Philosophy. Emmanuel Ofuasia is a Nigerian philosopher and a recipient of local and international grants and scholarships from organisations and institutions such as Birmingham Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham, the John Templeton Foundation, and Institute of African and Diaspora Studies at the University of Lagos. Bruno Yammeluan Ikuli is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy, Federal University Otuoke. He specialises in Political Philosophy and African Philosophy. Until February 2024, he was a member of the University Governing Council. Currently, he is the Chairperson of the Academic Staff Union of Universities of the University.

This chapter opens the contention of this book with the discourse on one of the three impasses militating against an authentic African identity and metaphysics. I limit myself to one of these impasses here as I focus on how the concept, ‘pre-coloniality’ has succeeded in offering an unreliable account of the African past. In order to understand how this ‘sin’ erects itself as a challenge to the comprehension of the African past, I use three essential topics—language, religion and history. I argue that the African is first of all exposed to a language and religion that are foreign to those of their ancestors. By the time the African encounters African historyAfrican history, the term, ‘pre-colonial’ is used to limit or even dictate what aspect of the African past is learned or taught. I disclose how this term offers the prejudiced outlook that African history can only be understood as an appendage to Euro-American presence in Africa. Consequently, no authentic effort is made to go as far back as ancient Egyptancient Egypt to begin an authentic exposition of the African past that signifies Africa’s contribution to world intellectual heritage. Because Ìwà metaphysics seeks to evince a unique system of metaphysics that does not owe allegiance to Greece, this chapter suggests an improved way of understanding the African past outside the straitjacket of the concept, ‘pre-coloniality.’

This chapter considers the second sin that announces itself albeit implicitly, as a factor against authentic African philosophy. The ‘pre-logicality’ sin or thesis offers how African ideas were rejected or even refuted on the grounds that they do not conform to the dominant and influential classical logic with the laws of thought. If Africans have not yet developed the capacity to express their thoughts logically, then it means that they do not count as a subset of the Homo sapiens endowed with intelligence. When phrenologyphrenology entered the discursive fray, intelligence was denied Africans on the basis of cranial mass. As part of the efforts to indicate why such an outlook is incorrect, I consider how African and non-African scholars have not only argued that Africans can articulate their thoughts logically but also considered how classical logic with the traditional laws of thought are inadequate. On this reasoning, it becomes clear that an alternative system of logic is needed to assist with the comprehension of the central thesis of Ìwà metaphysics. This search for an alternative system is pertinent since the fusion of classical logic with the ‘language(s)’ used to codify the African conception of reality is inadequate and serves as a reason for the structured misrepresentation of African metaphysics.African metaphysics.

This chapter uncovers how African metaphysics have been subjected to the wrong mode of assessment via the influential and dominant substance metaphysicssubstance metaphysics. Even when most scholars who have assessed African metaphysics found that it is based on dynamism, nearly all of them have not shied from using the substance-based metaphysical framework for explaining it. In addition to this unreliable approach, classical logic which does not allow for the reconciliation of opposites is also employed. The consequence is the exposure of African metaphysics to the onto-theological warrant where God is confused with Being. It is in this chapter that the sin of ‘pre-coloniality’ and ‘pre-logicality’ combine to contribute to the distortion and misreprensetation which has plagued African metaphysics.African metaphysics. The distortion emanates from the efforts to subjugate a metaphysical framework that is based on becomingbecoming or event to that which is dictated by substance. Five African scholars whose works are guilty of this distortion are discussed in this chapter before exploring the works of another six whose works are redolent of the event ontology unbeknownst to them.

The place of the rights of non-human animals is no longer a contest in the mainstream and dominant academic circle. However, the extension of sentiencesentience or consciousness (with its implications) to non-human animals but not to plant invites critical scrutiny. Moral vegetarianism has been suggested as a template to justify a plant-based diet and condemn flesh-eaters as transgressors of the rights of non-human animals. Although the religious and spiritual significance of the blood of non-human animals have commanded attention among scholars, I limit myself to the argument for moral vegetarianismmoral vegetarianism in this chapter. I argue that: (1) carnivorous non-humans animals inflict pains and eat one another, in line with the ontological order; (2) humans, like other creatures, are omnivorous meaning they are ontologically inclined to consuming flesh and plants; (3) vegetarians are no different from flesh eaters since plants have been shown to possess sentience and consciousness; and (4) If propositions (1), (2) and (3) are valid, then I deduce that both flesh-eaters and vegetarians are morally culpable since this implies that humanities must desist from both consuming plant-based foods and non-human animals for their nourishment. For the arguments marshaled in this chapter, I rely on studies from plant neurobiologyplant neurobiology, the cellular basis of consciousness (CBC) and the metaphysical principles of panexperentialismpanexperentialism and vitalism to reinforce my position.

Theodicy or what is popularly called the problem of evil has commanded so much attention in the mainstream and dominant tradition of philosophy of religion in the global north but without conclusive solution. Through hermeneutical and critical analyses, I argue that long before the problem became widespread among academics of the global north, it had received a deeper understanding and more appropriate attention in the Odù Ifá. I contend that whereas in the mainstream and dominant tradition, the problem of evil focuses only on one dimension of evil—pain and suffering, however, sages whose wisdom are documented in the Odù Ifá not only admit this perspective but added two other dimensions to understanding the problem of evil: (1) unfavourable status quo and (2) impermanenceimpermanence thereby elevating the total dimensions of evil to three. I consider the nature of these three dimensions as disclosed in the Odù Ifá as well as the solution offered by ancient Yorùbá sages with Ìwà metaphysics as framework. I conclude that their solution is still relevant not only for meaningful living but applicable to the philosophy of religion discourse.

After a thorough engagement with reality from the African purview. After a careful analysis of how the African past is distorted through history and logic which in turn affects the African’s articulation of reality. A paradox which this book considers before it comes to a close in this chapter is whether life is meaningful at all. In the first place, I contend that the question of life’s meaningfulness or meaninglessness cannot be a conclusive subject. As humans, not only do we possess fallible faculties but are also primordially defect to arrive at a univocal measure for life’s meaning. After considering various African perspectives concerning the meaning of life, I settle for neutral nihilismneutral nihilism as I contend that it is one thing to be indifferent about the realization that ultimately life has no meaning (nihilism) from the human perspective compare to taking an indifferent position about life itself. I tender that the former is a better disposition.

In the recent times, some works have surfaced to argue for the endorsement of African medicineAfrican medicine to serve as a complement for orthodox medicine. Laudable as this may seem, it is important for African medicine to indicate the reliable metaphysical system which undergirds it. This is where Ìwà comes in to serve as the background framework for understanding the intersection between metaphysics and medicine. Since the human body is made of billions of cells, where each of them is an entity or being, then dis-eases or ailments should not be perceived only from the empirical angle alone. In this chapter, I discuss the three popular divisions of dis-eases in African medicine before indicating how healers function in each of them. As a way of showing the significance of African medicine in a way that is able to complement Western orthodox medicine, this chapter discusses its management of illnsesses that are classed as somatoformsomatoform disorders or those whose aetiologies are unknown in western orthodox medicine. By doing this, this chapter would have offered African medicine its long overdue metaphysical backing whilst also making a case for how African medicine can be relevant in contemporary times.

The general character of scepticism attests and emphasises the folly in the quest toward dogmatic certainties as to finality of statements. In this connection, epistemologists have risen to the sceptical challenge of attempting to refute the proposals and the errors of cognition highlighted by the sceptics in the quest toward knowledge acquisition. In this chapter, I defend the central thesis of external world scepticism as I foray into the domains of the cognitive sciences, quantum and relativity theories, to disinter that nearly all of our cognitions of the actual world are not only unreliable in most cases but also disclose uncharitable misrepresentation concerning how the world works—an affair which is rendered intelligible from the purview of Ìwà metaphysics. From this purview, I submit that indeed scepticism continues to be a relevant domain of knowing whose main thesis ceaselessly calls for caution concerning human cognitive certainties as to the finality of statements regarding the actual world and its modus operandi. In a nutshell, this chapter evinces the fallibility thesis of Ìwà metaphysics.

The third category of Ìwà metaphysics is a combination of Olódùmarè, divinities, spirits, which I refer to as the God-head. This chapter reveals the role that they play in the preservation of the world from descending into chaos. Although they are beings of a higher grade, their ‘potentiality’ is that which affords them to be able to interact with the world as forces. In this chapter, the limited God thesis will be discussed and shown to be more coherent for explaining the reason why evil persists in the world but the God-head is not capable of stopping it. The relevance of persuasive power concerning how the God-head relates with the world is unearthed to reflect that panentheism is the most appropriate concept for this ‘theology.’

Having succeeded in identifying the sins and limitations toward a reliable account of African ontology, this chapter concerns with the origin of Ìwà as an idea that may be traced to KemetKemet. In this chapter, I deduce that the nature of philosophical transactions on Kemet, as indicated in the various mystery schools are suggestive of an event ontology which bears semblance to how the Yorùbá conceive reality. To make bold my claim, I find the concept of NunNun among the ancient Egyptians and the concept of Ìwà among the Yorùbá as a validation of an event ontology which places emphasis on the study of Being as Being where God is not smuggled into the discourse as an equivalent of Being. After exploring the historical narratives aimed at indicating the relationship between Kemet and Yorùbá, I proceed to offer a brief glimpse into the discourse on what is portrayed as nothingnessnothingness in African thought as well as how it can assist with making the Big BangBig Bang theory more relatable.

In order for it to command universal appeal, I deduce two challenges in EzumezuEzumezu logic when applied outside its scope of meaning-making to relationship at the atomic level and offer solutions to them in order to be relevant for my metaphysical system. First, in conversational thinking, between notional solidarity and creative struggle as two ways that two ontological entities interact, the latter is favoured over the former because it is said to yield new ideas and increases our full sweep of knowledge. Whereas I concede that this outlook is valid in the context of interactions among complex ontological entities, I contend that it cannot be sustained in the context of simple ontological entities such as atoms and sub-atomic entities where ‘notional solidarity’ may sometime lead to increase in knowledge. If this challenge is not addressed, the second challenge surfaces—the benoke—the point where entities, after engaging in interactions, retain their individual identities since in Ezumezu, synthesis is anathemaanathema. But entities at the atomic level display synthesis and most times do not retain their individual identities. To overcome these challenges, I invoke the permissibility and context principles of Ezumezu, the logic of conversational thinking as: I coalesce notion solidarity with creative struggle into what I christen ‘event dialecticsevent dialectics’ and argue that the benoke need not be rigid but applied contextually. With these revisions to Ezumezu logic, I fashion a reliable tool that will mediate thought, theory and method in Ìwàevent metaphysicsevent metaphysics.

This chapter unfolds the second category of Ìwà metaphysics. It is the fundamental or central concept that is given attention beyond its normal usage among scholars versed in the discourse on destiny in Yorùbá metaphysics. Whereas in the normal parlance, oríorí metaphysically signifies destiny, pre-ordained life-course, I agree with this usage but move beyond it to let it serve as potentiality. I owe the analysis of orí offered by Moses Makinde as the inspiration for extending the concept beyond the idea of destiny to accommodate the notion of potentiality. With this, I am able to account for the nature of agency that all shades of entities described in the previous chapter engage in. As an important category of Ìwà metaphysics, I take orí as an indicator of the latent potentiality that is primordial to all entities from the simplest to the complex and those entities that not open to human perception or cognition.

Since the alternative system of logic upon which Ìwà metaphysics thrives has been revised away from Chimakonam’s version in the last chapter, the present chapter commences with one of the four categories of the African conception of reality from the perspective of Ìwà with my version of Ezumezu logic fortifying its thought, theory and method. Herein, the nature of entities as beings from the animate to that which appears to humans as inanimate are thoroughly discussed. Hence, this chapter shows how entitites interact from the simplest level to the complex and to the supernatural. This is possible because in Ìwà metaphysics, there is a hierarchy of entities which is more robust and scientifically-informed when compared with the dominant order of beings beginning with God down to plants and animals, in previous metaphysical schemes.

Where previous metaphysical systems, both in the African and non-African philosophical traditions have developed the penchant for positing God as the ultimate category, in my metaphysical system, Ìwà is Being. It is the primordial matter that sparked the origin of experience and the world as we see it. Ìwà is responsible for the totality of reality. It is the Being which has been replaced with God in previous Afro-metaphysical doctrines. This chapter shows the level of coherence of Ìwà as the source that accounts for all other entities that make up the multiversemultiverse.

This book approaches the subject of African metaphysics historically as it connects Ancient Egypt to Yorùbá. It provides a history of African metaphysics from ancient Egypt or Kemet down to John Boakye Danquah and Placide Tempels in the 20th century and then Innocent Asouzu, Ada Agada, and Aribiah David Attoe, in the 21st century. As it surpasses the deductions of these previous works, it moves further to showcase African originality and approaches to studying reality, whilst resisting the temptation to deduce conclusions from Western philosophy. It is the first book in the history of African philosophy to use a process-relational approach to interrogate African metaphysics. It also serves to harmonize and engage prominent African scholars who have written on the subject of African metaphysics. The general scope of this book centers on engaging the history of distortion and misunderstanding of African metaphysics by providing a relevant and reliable process-relational background as well as an alternative trivalent logic system. Unless African metaphysical theories are understood from this perspective, they will remain powerless to overcome these misrepresentations. It appeals to students and researchers internationally actively working in the fields of African philosophy, Intercultural African studies as well as process studies. ______________________________ "This book is one of the valuable contributions to the emerging field of African philosophy, after decades (1970s-1990s) of rather fruitless debates on the status of the discipline. Like many others, the book side-tracks the seemingly unending controversy of whether or not there is such a thing as African philosophy." - Godwin Sogolo, Emerittus Professor of Philosophy, National Open University of Nigeria (NOUN). "In the opening lines of the introduction of this monumental book, Dr. Ofuasia announces: "As you read these lines, the earth in which you live in, as an ontological entity is spinning at an estimate estimated speed of 67, 000 mph. This indicates that the perspective that a thing is not in motion or is at rest is one of the fallacies ever fed to humanity. Nothing rests!" I was awe struck by how this revelation from physics extends to metaphysics. This book is a welcoming addition to African metaphysical scholarship as the process-relational approach used to explore Egyptian and ancient Yorùbá thought system in this work creatively intersects emerging discourses on agency both at the animate and what humans call inanimate, ontology, plant sentience, African medicine, cosmogony, the physical sciences, neutral nihilism and other related metaphysical topics. The eclectic interrogation of classical concepts of Ìwà and Nun from the Yoruba and Egyptian intellectual traditions, respectively, is a trail-blazing contribution. Congratulations on this feat, Dr Ofuasia!" - Ademola Kazeem Fayemi, Queensland Bioethics Center, Australian Catholic University, Brisbane. "Dr Ofuasia's book marries aspects of Egyptian philosophy with ancient Yorùbá metaphysics and process metaphysics, all under the framework of Ezumezu logic, and it works. What has emerged from this marriage is a new and contemporary theory in African metaphysics - Ìwà ontology which is strongly grounded on African thought. This book is recommended for anyone interested in (African) metaphysics." Aribiah David Attoe, University of the Witwatersrand. "Emmanuel Ofuasia's text is engaged, at times even - rightfully - angry. This makes this a lively, energetic contribution. I appreciate that. This passion is often missing in philosophy, but it is much needed, especially in this area of research." - Bjoerne Freter, Hagerstown Community College, Maryland. "In this timely work, Emmanuel Ofuasia throws down a challenge to African philosophers with the claim that process thinking runs through African philosophy from the contested Egyptian past down to contemporary times. His claim culminates in the articulation of Ìwà ontology, which he presents as a contemporary philosophical expression of process metaphysics. This is a bold, insightful, and impressive work that will brighten the ever-expanding horizon of 21st century African philosophy." Ada Agada, Federal University Otuoke.

This contribution will outline some important aspects of Sophie Bọsẹdé Olúwọlés groundbreaking work on Yorùbá oral philosophy. Using the Yorùbá story ‘The Toothless Queen’ as a vehicle, we will outline her understanding of oral philosophy as philosophy proper and investigate her radically inclusive, non-absolutist, anti-nihilist conception of philosophy as well as the fundamental onto-epistemological axioms of Yorùbá thought. We will especially focus on Olúwọlés radical and revolutionary philosophical approach to rationality and rational conjectures. We will finish our paper with Olúwọlés’ reflections on some of the obstacles that must be overcome to make her revolution a reality in the global philosophical community, that is, the pain of letting theories, ideas, and principles dear to us go.

African conceptions of reality have been judged by some African scholars to be starkly different from the mainstream and dominant substance metaphysics that operates in the Euro-American philosophic tradition. These scholars stress relationality and becoming with the understanding that reality is a web of interconnected activities. In addition, some of them also articulate how classical logic and laws of thought are not helpful for properly understanding the concepts of reality in African thought. In this article, I limit my assessment to four of these African scholars: Innocent Asouzu, Mogobe Ramose, Sophie Oluwole, and Ada Agada. I uncover how the two chief contentions among them—emphasis on reality as becoming and the limitations of classical logic—for expressing reality are neither entirely unheard of nor limited to African metaphysics, as these two themes are also present in Alfred North Whitehead's philosophy of organism. But none of these thinkers are familiar with Whitehead and his works. I argue for why process metaphysics and African metaphysics share a similar history of misrepresentation and rejection as well as how an alternative system of logic is central for making sense of the contentions of these traditions.

Some scholars have lauded “decapitation tactics” as a legitimate approach by countries such as Nigeria, the United States of America, and Israel in their struggle against the expansion and influence of terrorist groups. The decapitation tactic implies, basically, three routes: killing, capturing, or capturing and then killing the leader(s) of terrorist cells. Through a critical analysis of the arguments for such a tactic, this article contends that the approach will not stem the proliferation of terrorist groups. The elimination of the leader(s) of terrorist groups does not play a decisive role in mitigating terrorism but has rather contributed to its surge in places with links to cells like Al-Qaeda. Also, the article defends the position that it is morally unjustified to kill terrorist leaders without a fair trial in a competent court of law. Using Boko Haram and Hamas as illustrations, the article contends that targeted killings subvert the existence and essence of the criminal justice system. Taking inspiration from deterrence theory, this article suggests that the decapitation tactic has served as a basis for escalation and proliferation of terrorist groups rather than serving as deterrence against the possibility of recurrence.

Hitherto, the African intellect had been decimated by notable European scholars such as David Hume, Charles Darwin, Friedrich Hegel, Lucien Levy-Bruhl to name a few. The common denominator among these male scholars is that the African intellect is not yet developed to the extent that it can accommodate logical reasoning. Whereas notable African scholars have responded to these charges as misleading whilst exploring ways of coming up with a logic system that can mediate the theory, thought and practice peculiar to Africans yet applicable in other climes, the role of women in this journey has usually been downplayed. This research thereby seeks to fill this void by making a case for the contribution of the Australian Helen Verran who did not engage in armchair scholarship as most of her European male counterparts who deny the African the ability to reason logically, but journeyed to Nigeria to perform some experiments with the Yorùbá numerical system. She is persuaded that through the traditional Yorùbá numerical pattern, an underlying logic system is implied. Even when her conclusions are questionable on several fronts, this research concludes that her role in instilling confidence in the development of artificial logic in Africa must not go unmentioned.

Victoria Harrison’s _Eastern Philosophy of Religion_ is a short book which seeks to guide scholars who are unfamiliar with some of the basic philosophical discourses original to Jainism, Hinduism, Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism. The ‘Eastern,’ in the title of Harrison’s book refers to the philosophic-religious ideas peculiar to these philosophical traditions. I explore the contents of this book as a scholar committed to facilitating intellectual exchanges between philosophers of religion in the African traditions and the ones mentioned earlier. This is because some of these ideas she explores parallel some reflections which hitherto, I assumed to be original to African philosophy of religion. Specifically, I outline how the discourses on personhood, immortality and Jaina perspectival pluralism share similarities and can be more appreciated when assessed from an African perspective. Based on this conviction, I call to divest philosophy of religion away from Christian-and eurocentric assumptions so that it can attain a truly global character.