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590Eliminativism, Dialetheism and Moore's ParadoxTheoria 81 (1): 27-47. 2013.John Turri gives an example that he thinks refutes what he takes to be “G. E. Moore's view” that omissive assertions such as “It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining” are “inherently ‘absurd'”. This is that of Ellie, an eliminativist who makes such assertions. Turri thinks that these are perfectly reasonable and not even absurd. Nor does she seem irrational if the sincerity of her assertion requires her to believe its content. A commissive counterpart of Ellie is Di, a dialetheist …Read more
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356There’s nothing to beat a backward clock: A rejoinder to Adams, Barker and ClarkeLogos and Episteme 7 (3): 363-378. 2016.Neil Sinhababu and I presented Backward Clock, an original counterexample to Robert Nozick’s truth-tracking analysis of propositional knowledge. Fred Adams, John Barker and Murray Clarke argue that Backward Clock is no such counterexample. Their argument fails to nullify Backward Clock which also shows that other tracking analyses, such as Dretske’s and one that Adams et al. may well have in mind, are inadequate.
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159Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical SurveyPhilosophy Compass 10 (1): 24-37. 2015.It is raining but you don’t believe that it is raining. Imagine silently accepting this claim. Then you believe both that it is raining and that you don’t believe that it is raining. This would be an ‘absurd’ thing to believe,yet what you believe might be true. Itmight be raining, while at the same time, you are completely ignorant of the state of the weather. But how can it be absurd of you to believe something about yourself that might be true of you? This is Moore’s paradox as it occurs in th…Read more
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653Moore-paradoxical belief, conscious belief and the epistemic Ramsey testSynthese 188 (2): 231-246. 2012.Chalmers and Hájek argue that on an epistemic reading of Ramsey’s test for the rational acceptability of conditionals, it is faulty. They claim that applying the test to each of a certain pair of conditionals requires one to think that one is omniscient or infallible, unless one forms irrational Moore-paradoxical beliefs. I show that this claim is false. The epistemic Ramsey test is indeed faulty. Applying it requires that one think of anyone as all-believing and if one is rational, to think of …Read more
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213In defence of an argument for Evans's principle: A rejoinder to VahidAnalysis 66 (2). 2006.In (2004) I gave an argument for Evans’s principle Whatever justifies me in believing that p also justifies me in believing that I believe that p Hamid Vahid (2005) raises two objections against this argument. I show that the first is harmless and that the second is a non sequitur.
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Applied Ethics, Miscellaneous |
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Epistemology |
Applied Ethics |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Value Theory |
Knowledge |
Applied Ethics, Miscellaneous |