•  203
    The absurdities of Moore's paradoxes
    Theoria 48 (1): 38-46. 1982.
    The absurdity of (i) and (ii) arises because asserting 'p' normally expresses a belief that p. Normally, when (i) is asserted, what is conjointly expressed and asserted, i.e. a belief that p and a lack of belief that p, is logically impossible, whereas normally, when (ii) is asserted, it is differently absurd, since what is conjointly expressed and asserted, i.e. a belief that p and a belief that -p, is logically possible, but inconsistent. A possible source of confusion between 'impossible' and…Read more
  •  47
    Knowledge Puzzles: An Introduction to Epistemology by Stephen Hertherington (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (4): 562. 1997.
  •  101
    David-Hillel Ruben’s 'Traditions and True Successors': A Critical Reply
    Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (7): 40-45. 2013.
  •  294
    The preface paradox dissolved
    Theoria 53 (2-3): 121-140. 1987.
    The preface paradox strikes us as puzzling because we feel that if a person holds a set of inconsistent beliefs, i.e. beliefs such that at least one of them must be correct, then he should give at least one of them up. Equally, if a person's belief is rational, then he has a right to hold it. Yet the preface example is prima facie a case in which a person holds an inconsistent set of beliefs each of which is rational, and thus a case in which that person has a duty to relinquish what he has a ri…Read more
  •  62
    A central feature of Confucianism is the doctrine that an adult child has, for want of a better word, the ‘duty’ to care for his elderly parents1. Whether this doctrine should be framed in terms of an ethic of duties as opposed to an ethic of virtues is a vexed question. It might be argued that the doctrine is best framed in terms of the behaviour and dispositions appropriate to an agent who is, within the Confucian moral vision, good. Nonetheless, in both popular discourse and in much the secon…Read more