-
302Moore's paradoxes, Evans's principle and self-knowledgeAnalysis 64 (4): 348-353. 2004.I supply an argument for Evans's principle that whatever justifies me in believing that p also justifies me in believing that I believe that p. I show how this principle helps explain how I come to know my own beliefs in a way that normally makes me the best authority on them. Then I show how the principle helps to solve Moore's paradoxes
-
64Inconsistency and contradictionMind 90 (360): 600-602. 1981.Inconsistency and contradiction are important concepts. Unfortunately, they are easily confused. A proposition or belief which is inconsistent is one which is self- contradictory and vice-versa. Moreover two propositions or beliefs which are contradictories are inconsistent with each other. Nonetheless it is a mistake to suppose that inconsistency is the same as contradiction.
-
2541The Backward Clock, Truth-Tracking, and SafetyJournal of Philosophy 112 (1): 46-55. 2015.We present Backward Clock, an original counterexample to Robert Nozick’s truth-tracking analysis of propositional knowledge, which works differently from other putative counterexamples and avoids objections to which they are vulnerable. We then argue that four ways of analysing knowledge in terms of safety, including Duncan Pritchard’s, cannot withstand Backward Clock either.
-
21True Succession and Inheritance of Traditions: Looking Back on the DebateSocial Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3 (9): 15-19. 2014.Starting with my (1988) and largely continued by David Ruben’s instructive (2013a), a lively debate has occurred over how one is to analyze the concepts of true succession and membership of a tradition in order to identify the source of the intractability typically found in disputes in which two groups each claim that it, but not its rival, is in the tradition of some earlier group. This debate was initially between myself (2013a, 2013b) and Ruben (2013b, 2013c) but later involved Samuel Lebens …Read more
-
52Ontological disproof of God's existenceAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (2). 1992.An initial reading of Hume's Principle is that no necessary truth can be denied without contradiction, whereas all existential propositions can. Therefore it is self-contradictory to say,that any existential claim is necessarily true, since it follows that this claim both can and cannot be denied without self-contradiction. Thus any claim of the form 'X necessarily exists' is a self-contradiction, even if X is God
Singapore, Singapore
Areas of Specialization
| Knowledge |
| Applied Ethics, Miscellaneous |
Areas of Interest
1 more
| Epistemology |
| Applied Ethics |
| Metaphysics and Epistemology |
| Value Theory |
| Knowledge |
| Applied Ethics, Miscellaneous |