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27Review: Mark Platts, Reference, Truth and Reality: Essays on the Philosophy of Language (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 48 (1): 208-211. 1983.
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26Introduction: International Relations as Political TheoryCritical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 8 (4): 383-393. 2005.
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25Phenomenal and attentional consciousness may be inextricableBehavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2): 263-264. 1995.In common sense consciousness has a fairly determinate content – the (single) way an experience feels, the (single) line of thought being consciously followed. The determinacy of the object may be achieved by linking Block's two concepts, so that as long as we hold on to the determinacy of content we are unable to separate P and A.
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25Domains of discourse and common-sense metaphysicsIn Charles Travis (ed.), Meaning and interpretation, Blackwell. 1986.a discussion of contextual factors determining the domains of quantifiers. Since the time it was written, much more satisfying work on the topic has been done by Stanley, Williamson, Bach, and Gauker.
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25II—Adam Morton: Emotional AccuracyAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1): 265-275. 2002.
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24A vegetarian argument: We should avoid meat not because we think that animals are like us but because most animals are very different from humans. Most animals are not persons: they think and feel but do not have thoughts and feelings about their thoughts and feelings. With persons the obligation to prevent suffering, and indeed the obligation to preserve life, can be over-ridden by mutual agreement. I'll risk my life and welfare to protect your children if you do the same for mine. And even whe…Read more
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23The inevitability of folk psychologyIn R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense: Philosophical Essays on Common Sense Psychology, Cambridge University Press. 1991.
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20This paper connects Turiel's discovery that small children distinguish between moral and conventional norms with the theory of mind debate and with contemporary work in moral philosophy. My aim is to explain both why pre-schoolers can easily make a moral/conventional distinction, and why at some later age it becomes harder to grasp such a distinction. My answer, in a nutshell, is that there is a simple moral/conventional distinction that is well within the capabilities of very small children, bu…Read more
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20II—Adam Morton: Emotional AccuracyAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1): 265-275. 2002.
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18Orders and procedures: Comments on Boltanski and ThévenotPhilosophical Explorations 3 (3). 2000.I give a simplified model of Boltanski & Thévenot's account of justice, which no doubt omits some important aspects of what they say. Using this model I explain how some properties of their account can be accounted for, and suggest that it is not clear that some others really are features of justice as described by them. My negative claims should not be taken as criticisms of their account, but rather as challenges to specify the features that are ignored by my simple model.
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17What is rank?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4): 585-585. 1998.The concept of rank is not a very clear one. Claims that two concepts occupy the same rank in different domains are in danger of being unintelligible. Examples show how hard it is to understand Atran's claim that the most significant concepts in folk biology occur at a higher level than nonbiological concepts. A reformulation preserves some of what Atran wants to claim.
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17But what is the intentional schema?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1): 133-134. 1996.The intentional schema may not be sufficiently characterized to make questions about its role in individual and species development intelligible. The idea of metarepresentation may perhaps give it enough content. The importance of metarepresentation itself, however, can be called into question.
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13John L. Pollock. Language and thought. Princeton University Press, Princeton 1982, xii + 297 pp (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (1): 252. 1985.
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10Hume’s Skeptical Crisis (review)International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (3): 229-231. 2013.
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9Reasoning: A Social Picture (review)Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253): 843-846. 2013.The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 63, Issue 253, Page 843-846, October 2013.