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2466II—Adam Morton: Emotional AccuracyAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1): 265-275. 2002.This is a reply to de Sousa's 'Emotional Truth', in which he argues that emotions can be objective, as propositional truths are. I say that it is better to distinguish between truth and accuracy, and agree with de Sousa to the extent of arguing that emotions can be more or less accurate, that is, based on the facts as they are.
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815Can Edgington Gibbard counterfactuals?Mind 106 (421): 101-105. 1997.A criticism of Dorothy Edgington's attempt to make Gibbard's problem for indicative conditionals apply to counterfactuals.
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722I identify two components in the perception of musical pitches, which make pitch perception more like colour perception than it is usually taken to be. To back up this implausible claim I describe a programme whereby individuals can learn to identify the components in musical tones. I also claim that following this programme can affect one's pitch-recognition capacities
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1409Emotional TruthAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 247-275. 2002.[Ronald de Sousa] Taking literally the concept of emotional truth requires breaking the monopoly on truth of belief-like states. To this end, I look to perceptions for a model of non-propositional states that might be true or false, and to desires for a model of propositional attitudes the norm of which is other than the semantic satisfaction of their propositional object. Those models inspire a conception of generic truth, which can admit of degrees for analogue representations such as emotions…Read more
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689Heuristics all the way up?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5): 758-759. 2000.I investigate whether heuristics similar to those studied by Gigerenzer and his co-authors can apply to the problem of finding a suitable heuristic for a given problem. I argue that not only can heuristics of a very similar kind apply but they have the added advantage that they need not incorporate specific trade-off parameters for balancing the different desiderata of a good decision-procedure.
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96Review: Mark Platts, Reference, Truth and Reality: Essays on the Philosophy of Language (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 48 (1): 208-211. 1983.
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852Against the Ramsey testAnalysis 64 (4): 294-299. 2004.I argue against the Ramsey test connecting indicative conditionals with conditional probability, by means of examples in which conditional probability is high but the conditional is intuitively implausible. At the end of the paper, I connect these issues to patterns of belief revision.
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881The Theory of Knowledge: Saving Epistemology from the EpistemologistsIn Peter Clark & Katherine Hawley (eds.), Philosophy of science today, Oxford University Press. pp. 39. 2003.
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796Feelings of being: Phenomenology, psychiatry and the sense of reality – Matthew RatcliffePhilosophical Quarterly 60 (240): 661-662. 2010.No Abstract
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154Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume II, by Ernest Sosa.: Book ReviewsMind 119 (475): 856-860. 2010.(No abstract is available for this citation)
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94The Matter of Chance. By D. H. Mellor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Toronto, Macmillan of Canada. 1971. Pp. xiii, 190. $12.95 (review)Dialogue 12 (1): 154-156. 1973.review of Mellor's *The Matter of Chance*
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1231Denying the doctrine and changing the subjectJournal of Philosophy 70 (15): 503-510. 1973.I discuss Quine's claim that anyone denying what we now take to be a logical truth would be using logical words in a novel way. I trace this to a confusions between outright denial and failure to assert, and assertion of a negation. (This abstract is written from memory decades after the article.)
