•  34
    Who Am I?
    Cogito 4 (3): 186-191. 1990.
    This is a popularisation of ideas current when it was written, on personal identity and the concept of a person, making a link with problems about 'knowing who' on the border of epistemology and the philosophy of language.
  •  490
    Human bounds: rationality for our species
    Synthese 176 (1). 2010.
    Is there such a thing as bounded rationality? I first try to make sense of the question, and then to suggest which of the disambiguated versions might have answers. We need an account of bounded rationality that takes account of detailed contingent facts about the ways in which human beings fail to perform as we might ideally want to. But we should not think in terms of rules or norms which define good responses to an individual's limitations, but rather in terms of desiderata, situations that l…Read more
  •  414
    Review of Yablo *Aboutness* (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2014-09-14). 2014.
    expanded version of NDPR review of Yablo's Abpoutness
  •  32
    Teaching Philosophy
    Cogito 8 (1): 73-79. 1994.
    I discuss techniques for group discussion in a large class.
  •  611
    Folk psychology does not exist
    In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed, Springer Press. pp. 211--221. 2007.
    I discuss the possibility that there is no intrinsic unity to the capacities which are bundled under the label "folk psychology". Cooperative skills, attributional skills, and predictive skills may be scattered as parts of other non--psychological capacities. I discuss how some forms of social life bring these different skills together. I end with some remarks on how abilities that are not unified in their essential mechanisms may still form a rough practical unity. (Remark: the paper is conject…Read more
  •  170
    Review (review)
    Economics and Philosophy 12 (1): 101-104. 1996.
    Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-being, Jon Elster and John E. Roemer The Quality of Life, Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen
  •  1157
    Emotional truth: Emotional accuracy: Adam Morton
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1). 2002.
    This is a reply to de Sousa's 'Emotional Truth', in which he argues that emotions can be objective, as propositional truths are. I say that it is better to distinguish between truth and accuracy, and agree with de Sousa to the extent of arguing that emotions can be more or less accurate, that is, based on the facts as they are.
  • No Title available: Reviews
    Economics and Philosophy 12 (1): 101-104. 1996.
  •  524
    Wilson argued that since for continuants such as people a predicate and a time determine a place, natural language *can* specify just, e,.g. "a is dyspeptic at t" leaving the location of a's dyspepsia unstated. From this he concludes that language *must* leave the location unstated. I query the transition from *may* to *must*.
  •  444
    Talk About Beliefs
    Philosophical Books 35 (1): 47-49. 1994.
    review of Mark Crimmins' *Talk about Beliefs*
  •  181
    Deviant Logic (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 74 (5): 308-311. 1977.
    review of Susan Haack's *Deviant Logic*
  •  33
    Lore-Abiding People
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 32 (3): 601-606. 2001.
    I evaluate Kusch's arguments that everyday and scientific psychological beliefs are made true by the institutional facts about the people to whom they are applied. I conclude that institutional facts are among the truth-makers of such beliefs, and that this is a very significant point to have made, but that they are unlikely to be the sole such truth-makers.
  •  15
    (No abstract is available for this citation)
  •  770
    Complex individuals and multigrade relations
    Noûs 9 (3): 309-318. 1975.
    I relate plural quantification, and predicate logic where predicates do not need a fixed number of argument places, to the part-whole relation. For more on these themes see later work by Boolos, Lewis, and Oliver & Smiley.
  •  35
    The reality of the symbolic and subsymbolic systems
    with Andrew Woodfield
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1): 58-58. 1988.
  •  484
    review of Ruth Chang's collection in which I argue that the apparent agreements between the authors disguise underlying important differences.
  •  352
    Review of McGinn *Ethics, Evil, and Fiction* (review)
    The Times Literary Supplement (4946): 28-29. 1998.
    I try to distinguish McGinn's separation of evil from mere wrong from his aesthetic theory of morality. I argue that the combination is dangeroous.
  •  7
    Scotomas and the visual field
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3): 456. 1983.
  •  752
    Comparatives and Degrees
    Analysis 44 (1). 1984.
    I describe a way of handling comparative adjectives "a is P-er than b", in terms of degrees "a has P to degree d". I defend this approach against attacks due to C J F Williams in an article in the same issue of *Analysis*, by tracing his objections to the assumption that degrees must be linearly ordered. Since this abstract is written years later, I can mention that some of the ideas were taken further in my Hypercomparatives. Synthese 111, 1997, 97-114 .
  •  191
    The Variety of Rationality
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 59 (1): 139-176. 1985.
    I discuss the connections between rationality and intentional action, emphasising that different kinds of action are rational an intentional in different ways.
  •  315
    Hypercomparatives
    Synthese 111 (1): 97-114. 1997.
    In natural language we rarely use relation-words with more than three argument places. This paper studies one systematic device, rooted in natural language, by which relations of greater adicity can be expressed. It is based on a higher-order relation between 1-place, 2-place, and 4-place relations (and so on) of which the relation between the positive and comparative degrees of a predicate is a special case. Two formal languages are presented in this connection, one of which represents the lang…Read more
  •  345
    The Presidential Address: Where Demonstratives Meet Vagueness: Possible Languages
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1). 1999.
    I present three invented languages, in order to support a claim that vagueness and demonstrativity are related. One of them handles vagueness like English handles demonstratives, the second handles demonstratives like English handles vagueness, and the third combines the resources of the first two. The argument depends on the claim that all three can be learned and used by anyone who can speak English.
  •  7
    Freudian commonsense
    In Richard Wollheim & James Hopkins (eds.), Philosophical Essays on Freud, Cambridge University Press. 1982.
    I discuss aspects of Freudian theory that have entered folk psychology
  •  6
    Philosophical Psychology
    Philosophical Books 31 (2): 69-71. 1990.
  •  478
    Because he thought he had insulted him
    Journal of Philosophy 72 (1): 5-15. 1975.
    I compare our idioms for quantifying into belief contexts to our idioms for quantifying into intention contexts. The latter is complicated by the fact that there is always a discrepancy between the action as intended and the action as performed. The article contains - this is written long after it appeared - an early version of a tracking or sensitivity analysis of the relation between a thought and its object.
  •  564
    10 The evolution of strategic thinking
    In Peter Carruthers & Andrew Chamberlain (eds.), Evolution and the Human Mind: Modularity, Language and Meta-Cognition, Cambridge University Press. pp. 218. 2000.
    I discuss ways in which innate human psychology facilitates the quasi-game-theoretical reasoning required for group life.
  •  78
    Emotion and Imagination
    Polity. 2013.
    I argue that on an understanding of imagination that relates it to an individual's environment rather than her mental contents imagination is essential to emotion, and brings together affective, cognitive, and representational aspects to emotion. My examples focus on morally important emotions, especially retrospective emotions such as shame, guilt, and remorse, which require that one imagine points of view on one's own actions. PUBLISHER'S BLURB: Recent years have seen an enormous amount of phi…Read more