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Adam Morton
(1945 - 2020)

PhD: Princeton UniversityLast affiliation: University of British Columbia
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    227
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    • Topics
  •  Events
    2
  •  News and Updates
    184

 More details
  • University of British Columbia
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor (Part-time)
Princeton University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1971
Homepage
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Philosophy of Mind
Abduction and Other Minds
Other Minds, Misc
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Philosophy of Language
General Philosophy of Science
Possible-World Theories of Counterfactuals
Causal Theories of Counterfactuals
Indicative vs Subjunctive Conditionals
Subjunctive Conditionals, Misc
Abduction and Other Minds
Other Minds, Misc
4 more
  • All publications (227)
  •  791
    A note on comparing death and pain
    Bioethics 2 (2). 1988.
    I give ways of comparing the disvalue of death and of pain by comparing each to other evils.
    Biomedical EthicsPainThe Badness of Death
  •  457
    Deviant Logic (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 74 (5): 308-311. 1977.
    review of Susan Haack's *Deviant Logic*
    Logical Pluralism
  •  765
    Imaginary Emotions
    The Monist 96 (4): 505-516. 2013.
    I give grounds for taking seriously the possibility that some of the emotions we ascribe do not exist. I build on the premise that the experience of imagining an emotion resembles that of having one. First a person imagines having an emotion. This is much like an emotion, so the person takes herself to be having the emotion that she imagines, and acts or expects a disposition to act accordingly. The view sketched here contrasts possibly impossible emotions such as disembodied passion, blind rag…Read more
    I give grounds for taking seriously the possibility that some of the emotions we ascribe do not exist. I build on the premise that the experience of imagining an emotion resembles that of having one. First a person imagines having an emotion. This is much like an emotion, so the person takes herself to be having the emotion that she imagines, and acts or expects a disposition to act accordingly. The view sketched here contrasts possibly impossible emotions such as disembodied passion, blind rage, and Quixotic courage with real ones such as affection, anger, and bravery. Both these real emotions and the states of imagining impossible ones are things that really happen to us.
    Emotions
  •  622
    Review: If (review)
    Mind 115 (458): 409-412. 2006.
    review of Evans & Over *ifs*, a book on the psychology of conditionals.
    PsychologyConditionals, Misc
  •  35
    The inevitability of folk psychology
    In Radu J. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense: Philosophical Essays on Common Sense Psychology, Cambridge University Press. 1991.
    The Nature of Folk Psychology
  •  1426
    Complex individuals and multigrade relations
    Noûs 9 (3): 309-318. 1975.
    I relate plural quantification, and predicate logic where predicates do not need a fixed number of argument places, to the part-whole relation. For more on these themes see later work by Boolos, Lewis, and Oliver & Smiley.
    Nonclassical LogicsPlural Quantification
  •  1131
    Indicative versus subjunctive in future conditionals
    Analysis 64 (4): 289-293. 2004.
    I give cases where the contrast between "if Shakespeare had not written Hamlet someone else would have" and "if Shakespeare did not write Hamlet and someone else did"is found in future tense sentences. This is often denied.
    Indicative Conditionals, MiscSubjunctive Conditionals, MiscIndicative vs Subjunctive Conditionals
  •  544
    Acting to Know
    In Abrol Fairweather (ed.), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Synthese Library, Vol. 366,, Springer. pp. 195-207. 2014.
    Experiments are actions, performed in order to gain information. Like other acts, there are virtues of performing them well. I discuss one virtue of experimentation, that of knowing how to trade its information-gaining potential against other goods.
    Experimentation in ScienceEpistemic VirtuesTheoretical Virtues, Misc
  •  898
    Talk About Beliefs
    Philosophical Books 35 (1): 47-49. 1994.
    review of Mark Crimmins' *Talk about Beliefs*
    De Re Belief
  •  109
    The reality of the symbolic and subsymbolic systems
    with Andrew Woodfield
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1): 58-58. 1988.
  •  978
    Human bounds: rationality for our species
    Synthese 176 (1). 2010.
    Is there such a thing as bounded rationality? I first try to make sense of the question, and then to suggest which of the disambiguated versions might have answers. We need an account of bounded rationality that takes account of detailed contingent facts about the ways in which human beings fail to perform as we might ideally want to. But we should not think in terms of rules or norms which define good responses to an individual's limitations, but rather in terms of desiderata, situations that l…Read more
    Is there such a thing as bounded rationality? I first try to make sense of the question, and then to suggest which of the disambiguated versions might have answers. We need an account of bounded rationality that takes account of detailed contingent facts about the ways in which human beings fail to perform as we might ideally want to. But we should not think in terms of rules or norms which define good responses to an individual's limitations, but rather in terms of desiderata, situations that limited agents can hope to achieve, and corresponding virtues of achieving them. We should not take formal theories defining optimal behavior in watered-down bounded form, even though they can impose enormous computational or cognitive demands
    RationalityHope
  •  51
    Scotomas and the visual field
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3): 456. 1983.
  •  571
    Colour appearances and the colour solid
    In Andrew Harrison (ed.), Philosophy And The Visual Arts, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1987.
    Color
  •  884
    The Variety of Rationality
    with David Holdcroft
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 59 (1): 139-176. 1985.
    I discuss the connections between rationality and intentional action, emphasising that different kinds of action are rational an intentional in different ways.
    RationalityRationality and Cognitive Science
  •  1555
    Folk Psychology
    In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. 2007.
    I survey the previous 20 years work on the nature of folk psychology, with particular emphasis on the original debate between theory theorists and simulation theorists, and the positions that have emerged from this debate.
    Epistemology of Mind, MiscThe Nature of Folk Psychology
  •  1
    Review of Bratman *Acting Together* (review)
    Agency, Misc
  •  108
    Benacerraf and His Critics (edited book)
    with Stephen P. Stich
    Blackwell. 1996.
    a collection of articles by philosophers of mathematics on themes associated with the work of Paul Benacceraf
    Philosophy of Mathematics, General Works
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