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25Cutting the Gordian Knot of DemarcationInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (3): 237-243. 2009.A definition of pseudoscience is proposed, according to which a statement is pseudoscientific if and only if it (1) pertains to an issue within the domains of science, (2) is not epistemically warranted, and (3) is part of a doctrine whose major proponents try to create the impression that it is epistemically warranted. This approach has the advantage of separating the definition of pseudoscience from the justification of the claim that science represents the most epistemically warranted stateme…Read more
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16Descriptor RevisionStudia Logica 102 (5): 955-980. 2014.A descriptor is a set of sentences that are truth-functional combinations of expressions of the form \ , where \ is a metalinguistic belief predicate and p a sentence in the object language in which beliefs are expressed. Descriptor revision ) is an operation of belief change that takes us from a belief set K to a new belief set \ where \ is a descriptor representing the success condition. Previously studied operations of belief change are special cases of descriptor revision, hence sentential r…Read more
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5Coherence in Epistemology and Belief RevisionPhilosophical Studies 128 (1): 93-108. 2006.A general theory of coherence is proposed, in which systemic and relational coherence are shown to be interdefinable. When this theory is applied to sets of sentences, it turns out that logical closure obscures the distinctions that are needed for a meaningful analysis of coherence. It is concluded that references to “all beliefs” in coherentist phrases such as “all beliefs support each other” have to be modified so that merely derived beliefs are excluded. Therefore, in order to avoid absurd co…Read more
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3Do we Need a Special Ethics for Research?Science and Engineering Ethics 17 (1): 21-29. 2011.Research is subject to more stringent ethical requirements than most other human activities, and a procedure that is otherwise allowed may be forbidden in research. Hence, risk-taking is more restricted in scientific research than in most non-research contexts, and privacy is better protected in scientific questionnaires than in marketing surveys. Potential arguments for this difference are scrutinized. The case in its favour appears to be weak. A stronger case can be made in favour of a differe…Read more
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David Makinson on Classical Methods for Non-Classical Problems (Outstanding Contributions to Logic, Vol. 3) (edited book)Springer. 2014.
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4Changing the Scientific CorpusIn Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science, Springer. pp. 43. 2011.
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6Changes of disjunctively closed basesJournal of Logic, Language and Information 2 (4): 255-284. 1993.An operator of contraction for a belief set (a theory) can be obtained by assigning to it a belief base and an operator of partial meet contraction for that base. It is argued that closure of the base under disjunction is an intuitively reasonable condition. Axiomatic characterizations are given of the contractions of belief sets that can be generated by (various types of) partial meet contraction on disjunctively closed bases. The corresponding revision operators are also characterized. Finally…Read more
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7Decision theoretic foundations for axioms of rational preferenceSynthese 109 (3). 1996.Rationality postulates for preferences are developed from two basic decision theoretic principles, namely: (1) the logic of preference is determined by paradigmatic cases in which preferences are choice-guiding, and (2) excessive comparison costs should be avoided. It is shown how the logical requirements on preferences depend on the structure of comparison costs. The preference postulates necessary for choice guidance in a single decision problem are much weaker than completeness and transitivi…Read more
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5Do we need second-order probabilities?Dialectica 62 (4): 525-533. 2008.Although it has often been claimed that all the information contained in second-order probabilities can be contained in first-order probabilities, no practical recipe for the elimination of second-order probabilities without loss of information seems to have been presented. Here, such an elimination method is introduced for repeatable events. However, its application comes at the price of losses in cognitive realism. In spite of their technical eliminability, second-order probabilities are usefu…Read more
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7Coping with the Unpredictable Effects of Future TechnologiesPhilosophy and Technology 24 (2): 137-149. 2011.Available methods such as technology assessment and risk analysis have failed to predict the effects of technological choices. We need to give up the futile predictive ambitions of previous approaches and instead base decisions on systematic studies of alternative future developments. It will then be necessary to cope with mere possibility arguments, i.e., arguments in which a conclusion is drawn from a mere possibility that a course of action may have certain consequences. A five-step procedure…Read more
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3Defining technical functionStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (1): 19-22. 2006.
Areas of Specialization
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Areas of Interest
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