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John Bishop

University of Auckland
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    67
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 More details
  • University of Auckland
    Department of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty
Cambridge University
Faculty of Philosophy
PhD, 1978
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action
Philosophy of Religion
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Philosophy of Action
Philosophy of Religion
  • All publications (67)
  •  224
    Is agent-causality a conceptal primitive?
    Synthese 67 (2): 225-47. 1986.
    Agent Causation
  •  329
    Compatibilism and the free will defense
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2): 104-20. 1993.
    Compatibilism
  •  155
    Secular Spirituality and the Logic of Giving Thanks
    Sophia 49 (4): 523-534. 2010.
    Some atheists are attracted to the idea of a secular spirituality that carries no commitment to the existence of God or anything similar. Is this a coherent possibility? This paper seeks to define what we mean by a ‘spirituality’ by examining Robert C. Solomon’s defence of spirituality for the religious skeptic, and pursues the question of its coherence by reflecting on what is implied by taking thankfulness to be a proper response to our existence.
    Philosophy of ReligionScience and Religion
  •  3
    Natural Agency
    Mind 100 (2): 287-290. 1989.
    The Will
  •  101
    Exercising control in practical reasoning: Problems for naturalism about agency
    Philosophical Issues 22 (1): 53-72. 2012.
    Mental Actions
  •  374
    The normatively relativised logical argument from evil
    with Ken Perszyk
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (2): 109-126. 2011.
    It is widely agreed that the ‘Logical’ Argument from Evil (LAFE) is bankrupt. We aim to rehabilitate the LAFE, in the form of what we call the Normatively Relativised Logical Argument from Evil (NRLAFE). There are many different versions of a NRLAFE. We aim to show that one version, what we call the ‘right relationship’ NRLAFE, poses a significant threat to personal-omniGod-theism—understood as requiring the belief that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good person who has created ou…Read more
    It is widely agreed that the ‘Logical’ Argument from Evil (LAFE) is bankrupt. We aim to rehabilitate the LAFE, in the form of what we call the Normatively Relativised Logical Argument from Evil (NRLAFE). There are many different versions of a NRLAFE. We aim to show that one version, what we call the ‘right relationship’ NRLAFE, poses a significant threat to personal-omniGod-theism—understood as requiring the belief that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good person who has created our world—because it appeals to value commitments theists themselves are likely to endorse. The ultimate success of this NRLAFE will rest on developing a theological ethics of right relationship that rejects as morally flawed the exercise of omnipotence first to sustain horrors and then to redeem them. Yet a vindicated NRLAFE of this sort need not require atheism, but only rejection of the standard conception of God as a personal omniGod.
    Divine GoodnessThe Argument from EvilDivine OmnipotenceDivine Omniscience, Misc
  •  137
    Sensitive and insensitive responses to deviant action
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (4). 1987.
    Action Theory, MiscThe Structure of ActionAgencyPhilosophy of Action, MiscCausal Theory of Action
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