•  374
    The normatively relativised logical argument from evil
    with Ken Perszyk
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (2): 109-126. 2011.
    It is widely agreed that the ‘Logical’ Argument from Evil (LAFE) is bankrupt. We aim to rehabilitate the LAFE, in the form of what we call the Normatively Relativised Logical Argument from Evil (NRLAFE). There are many different versions of a NRLAFE. We aim to show that one version, what we call the ‘right relationship’ NRLAFE, poses a significant threat to personal-omniGod-theism—understood as requiring the belief that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good person who has created ou…Read more
  • MILLIGAN, D.: "Reasoning and the Explanation of Actions" (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (n/a): 114. 1983.
  •  240
    Faith as doxastic venture
    Religious Studies 38 (4): 471-487. 2002.
    A ‘doxastic venture’ model of faith – according to which having faith involves believing beyond what is rationally justifiable – can be defended only on condition that such venturesome believing is both possible and ethically acceptable. I show how a development of the position argued by William James in ‘The will to believe’ can succeed in meeting these conditions. A Jamesian defence of doxastic venture is, however, open to the objection that decision theory teaches us that there can be no circ…Read more