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14Theism, morality and the 'Why should I be moral?' questionInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 17 (1/2): 3. 1985.
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32Knowledge of God, by Alvin Plantinga and Michael TooleyMind 118 (472): 1163-1168. 2009.(No abstract is available for this citation)
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172How a Modest Fideism may Constrain Theistic Commitments: Exploring an Alternative to Classical TheismPhilosophia 35 (3-4): 387-402. 2007.On the assumption that theistic religious commitment takes place in the face of evidential ambiguity, the question arises under what conditions it is permissible to make a doxastic venture beyond oneâs evidence in favour of a religious proposition. In this paper I explore the implications for orthodox theistic commitment of adopting, in answer to that question, a modest, moral coherentist, fideism. This extended Jamesian fideism crucially requires positive ethical evaluation of both the motiva…Read more
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258Compatibilism and the free will defenseAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2): 104-20. 1993.This Article does not have an abstract
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SCHICK, R.: "Having Reasons, An Essay on Rationality and Sociality"Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (n/a): 238. 1986.
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61Deciding to believe: The ethics and rationality of religious beliefSophia 34 (1): 9-31. 1995.A Jamesian defence of a moderate fideism which holds that acceptance of (religious) belief beyond, though not contrary to, the evidence is morally permissible--though only under quite tight conditions, which, I argue, include the requirement that the "passional basis" for such acceptance must itself be morally admirable. The claim that "suprarational" faith is virtuous thus remains open, even though vindicated against the objection that believing beyond the evidence is always vicious. I also exp…Read more
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46Theism, morality and the 'why should I be moral?' QuestionInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (3). 1984.
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33Review of Berent en, How We Act: Causes, Reasons and Intentions (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (9). 2004.
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78Secular Spirituality and the Logic of Giving ThanksSophia 49 (4): 523-534. 2010.Some atheists are attracted to the idea of a secular spirituality that carries no commitment to the existence of God or anything similar. Is this a coherent possibility? This paper seeks to define what we mean by a ‘spirituality’ by examining Robert C. Solomon’s defence of spirituality for the religious skeptic, and pursues the question of its coherence by reflecting on what is implied by taking thankfulness to be a proper response to our existence
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63Exercising control in practical reasoning: Problems for naturalism about agencyPhilosophical Issues 22 (1): 53-72. 2012.
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251The normatively relativised logical argument from evilInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (2): 109-126. 2011.It is widely agreed that the ‘Logical’ Argument from Evil (LAFE) is bankrupt. We aim to rehabilitate the LAFE, in the form of what we call the Normatively Relativised Logical Argument from Evil (NRLAFE). There are many different versions of a NRLAFE. We aim to show that one version, what we call the ‘right relationship’ NRLAFE, poses a significant threat to personal-omniGod-theism—understood as requiring the belief that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good person who has created ou…Read more
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61Sensitive and insensitive responses to deviant actionAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (4). 1987.This Article does not have an abstract
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MILLIGAN, D.: "Reasoning and the Explanation of Actions" (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (n/a): 114. 1983.
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98On the Prospects for a Naturalistic Incompatibilist Metaphysics of AgencyAnalysis 75 (4): 655-661. 2015.
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124Faith as doxastic ventureReligious Studies 38 (4): 471-487. 2002.A ‘doxastic venture’ model of faith – according to which having faith involves believing beyond what is rationally justifiable – can be defended only on condition that such venturesome believing is both possible and ethically acceptable. I show how a development of the position argued by William James in ‘The will to believe’ can succeed in meeting these conditions. A Jamesian defence of doxastic venture is, however, open to the objection that decision theory teaches us that there can be no circ…Read more
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66Searle on natural agencyAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (3). 1990.This Article does not have an abstract
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115The analogy theory of thinkingAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (3): 222-238. 1980.This Article does not have an abstract
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Religion |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Religion |