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2Realism and DialetheismIn Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction, Clarendon Press. 2004.
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31On a Moorean solution to instability puzzlesAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (4). 1990.This Article does not have an abstract
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66Intentional Objects, Pretence, and the Quasi-Relational Nature of Mental Phenomena: A New Look at Brentano on IntentionalityInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3): 377-393. 2013.Brentano famously changed his mind about intentionality between the 1874 and 1911 editions of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (PES). The 1911 edition repudiates the 1874 view that to think about something is to stand in a relation to something that is within in the mind, and holds instead that intentionality is only like a relation (it is ‘quasi-relational’). Despite this, Brentano still insists that mental activity involves ‘the reference to something as an object’, much as he did in th…Read more
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101Theoretical terms and the causal view of referenceAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (2). 1985.This Article does not have an abstract
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58Phenomenal Intentionality and the Role of Intentional ObjectsIn Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality, Oup Usa. pp. 137. 2013.
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296Make-believe and fictional referenceJournal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52 (2): 207-214. 1994.
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96The problem of 'Jonah': How not to argue for the causal theory of referencePhilosophical Studies 43 (2). 1983.
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112Rationality and epistemic paradoxSynthese 94 (3). 1993.This paper provides a new solution to the epistemic paradox of belief-instability, a problem of rational choice which has recently received considerable attention (versions of the problem have been discussed by — among others — Tyler Burge, Earl Conee, and Roy Sorensen). The problem involves an ideally rational agent who has good reason to believe the truth of something of the form:[Ap] p if and only if it is not the case that I accept or believe p.
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142Belief about Nothing in ParticularIn Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics, Clarendon Press. pp. 178. 2005.
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86On Pretending that Things Do Not Exist: Evans, Existence, and ExistentialsDialogue 42 (2): 235-. 2003.Attempts to analyze negative existential statements face the following familiar problem. If a negative existential statement—say, “Hamlet does not exist” or “the golden mountain does not exist”—is true, its subject term must lack an object of reference. But, absent such an object, it seems that nothing true or false can be said about “it.” In particular, if there is no Hamlet to talk about, we surely cannot truthfully say that “he” does not exist. Hence, the truth of true negative existentials—a…Read more
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University of AucklandDepartment of Philosophy
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
General Philosophy of Science |