Frederick Kroon

Identity claims often look nonsensical because they apparently declare distinct things to be identical. I argue that this appearance is not just an artefact of grammar. We should be fictionalists about such claims, seeing them against the background of speakers' pretense that their words secure reference to a plurality of objects that are then declared to be identical from within the pretense. I argue that it is the resulting interpretative tension – arising from the fact that two things can never be identical – that allows us to understand the real point of such statements. This view also offers a new solution to Fege's puzzle of the informativeness of identity statements.

We argue that computation via quantum mechanical processes is irrelevant to explaining how brains produce thought, contrary to the ongoing speculations of many theorists. First, quantum effects do not have the temporal properties required for neural information processing. Second, there are substantial physical obstacles to any organic instantiation of quantum computation. Third, there is no psychological evidence that such mental phenomena as consciousness and mathematical thinking require explanation via quantum theory. We conclude that understanding brain function is unlikely to require quantum computation or similar mechanisms.

This paper presents a theory and computational model of the role of emotions in group decision making. After reviewing the role of emotions in individual decision making, it describes social and psychological mechanisms by which emotional and other information is transmitted between individuals. The processes by which these mechanisms can contribute to group consensus are modeled computationally using a program, HOTCO 3, which has been used to simulate simple cases of emotion-based group decision making

EXISTENTIALISM IN PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC IS THE DOCTRINE THAT STATES OF AFFAIRS, PROPOSITIONS AND PROPERTIES INVOLVING OBJECTS INCLUDE THESE OBJECTS AS DIRECT CONSTITUENTS IN AT LEAST THE SENSE THAT THE NONEXISTENCE IN A WORLD w OF SOCRATES, SAY, IMPLIES THE NONEXISTENCE IN w OF SOCRATES' BEING SNUB-NOSED. JOHN POLLOCK HAS RECENTLY ARGUED (IN "THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHILOSOPHICAL SEMANTICS") THAT SUCH AN EXISTENTIALISM HARBOURS AN INCONSISTENCY. THE PRESENT PAPER REBUTS POLLOCK'S ARGUMENT BY ARGUING THAT IT DEPENDS ON A CHARACTERIZATION OF EXISTENTIALISM THAT EXISTENTIALISTS HAVE NO REASON TO ACCEPT, AND, INDEED, GOOD REASON TO REJECT

This paper deals with a philosophical question that arises within the theory of computational complexity: how to understand the notion of INTRINSIC complexity or difficulty, as opposed to notions of difficulty that depend on the particular computational model used. The paper uses ideas from Blum's abstract approach to complexity theory to develop an extensional approach to this question. Among other things, it shows how such an approach gives detailed confirmation of the view that subrecursive hierarchies tend to rank functions in terms of their intrinsic, and not just their model-dependent, difficulty, and it shows how the approach allows us to model the idea that intrinsic difficulty is a fuzzy concept.

Let g E(m, n)=o mean that n is the Gödel-number of the shortest derivation from E of an equation of the form (m)=k. Hao Wang suggests that the condition for general recursiveness mn(g E(m, n)=o) can be proved constructively if one can find a speedfunction s s, with s(m) bounding the number of steps for getting a value of (m), such that mn s(m) s.t. g E(m, n)=o. This idea, he thinks, yields a constructivist notion of an effectively computable function, one that doesn't get us into a vicious circle since we intuitively know, to begin with, that certain proofs are constructive and certain functions effectively computable. This paper gives a broad possibility proof for the existence of such classes of effectively computable functions, with Wang's idea of effective computability generalized along a number of dimensions.

This paper begins with a puzzle about certain temporal expressions: phrases like ‘Jones as he was ten years ago’ and ‘the Jones of ten years ago’. There are reasons to take these as substantival, to be interpreted as terms for temporal parts. But it seems that the same reifying strategy would also force us to countenance a host of less attractive posits, among them fictional counterparts of real things (to correspond to such phrases as ‘Garrison as he was in the movie JFK') and much more. I argue that there is a better way: we need only the idea of pretense or make‐believe to make sense of claims embedding such phrases, leaving us with no reason, so far, to accept an ontology of temporal parts.

In this paper I argue against the usual interpretation of\nMeinong's argument for nonexistent objects, an\ninterpretation according to which Meinong imported\nnonexistent objects like "the golden mountain" to account\ndirectly for the truth of statements like the golden\nmountain is golden'. I claim instead (using evidence from\nMeinong's "On Assumptions") that his argument really\ninvolves an ineliminable appeal to the notion of pretense.\nThis appeal nearly convinced Meinong at one stage that he\ncould do without nonexistent objects. The reason, I argue,\nwhy he nonetheless embraced an ontology of nonexistents has\nto do with the phenomenology of representation, and not\nwith semantics