Jasper Doomen

Militant democracy is an attempt to defend democracy against totalitarian parties that would use democratic procedures to rise to power. This article is focused on the consistency of the concept of ‘militant democracy’. I argue that what militant democracy defends is not the democratic procedure itself but rather certain rights and the rule of law, and that those elements may in fact be compromised by democracy. This applies both if the democratic procedure is concerned and if democracy is interpreted as a reflection of the will of the people. Those elements may be upheld, but democracy is to be mitigated rather than fortified in order to do so.

Spinoza is known for his radical views on freedom. In this article, it is explored to what extent this reputation is justified. He integrates human actions in the necessary development of the universe and seems to leave no room for human freedom. The position of God is relevant, since it is Spinoza's starting-point in general and appears to require an intricate conception of freedom; it may be demanded whether this can be clarified. In the case of man, the difficulty lies primarily in the degree to which Spinoza takes his own characterization of necessity seriously; there seems to be an inconsistency here. The final section provides a possible way out of this conundrum, by focusing on the possible basis of an action.

This article discusses whether animal rights may be defended from a natural rights or an ethical perspective. Both options fail. The same analysis applies in the case of humankind. ‘Humankind’ does not bring with it the acknowledgement of rights, nor does a focus on what is arguably characteristic of humankind, reason. Reason is decisive, though, in another respect: the fact that reasonable beings can claim and lay down rights. It does not follow from this that animals should have no rights, since human beings may be motivated to constitute such rights, while this provides the most solid basis for them.

In this article, it is inquired which reasons are decisive for acting in accordance with divine commands, and whether these can be regarded as moral reasons; the emphasis lies on Christianity. To this effect, the position of God as a—basic—lawgiver is expounded, with special attention to the role His power plays. By means of an account of the grounds given (in the Bible) to obey God, the selfish motives in this respect are brought to light. It is questioned whether any other elements can be discerned, particularly from a meta-ethical perspective.

Athlete Caster Semenya's successes have, in conjunction with her appearance, led to an inquiry. She appeared to have high levels of testosterone; it was decided that she had to reduce them if she wanted to race against other women. I argue that the recognition of the difference between Caster Semenya and her competitors should not result in this outcome: similar differences exist, which are accepted as such. It would be inconsistent to focus on this advantage if one disregards others, while the alternative to realize an outcome in which all differences are removed would yield absurd results.Export citation.

In this article, Adam Smith’s ethics are explored; it is demanded how tenable some of his conclusions are. § 1 is focused on Smith’s treatment of selfish and non-selfish acts. In § 2, the consequences of the conclusions presented in § 1 for ethics are dealt with, describing Smith’s position and the problems it entails. § 2.3 consists of an attempt to present an alternative for Smith’s theory, in which some of Hobbes’s thoughts are helpful. It appears that Smith’s method is commendable, but some of the consequences of his theory are problematical.

The task to reshape governments in the countries confronted with the Arab Spring prompts the question whether there are necessary conditions to realize a stable society that simultaneously seeks to eliminate the elements that have led to the uprisings. Acknowledging some constitutional rights seems indispensable in such a process. I argue that such a state of affairs is indeed the case, at least now that the ‘old’ justifications to differentiate between people do not suffice anymore. That is not to say that the countries involved will have identical laws in each respect, but merely that a common basis has to be realized, manifested in political and legal equality, so this given does not derogate from the fact that each country’s specific legislation needs to be shaped in the light of its own history. Such a basis has no ‘moral’ character, but is a necessary condition to prevent sedition.

Blasfemie in de huidige context In this article, we inquire the merits of criminalizing blasphemy. We argue that religious views do not warrant a separate treatment compared to nonreligious ones. In addition, freedom of speech must be balanced against the interest of those who may be aggrieved by blasphemous remarks. We conclude that penalizing blasphemy is undesirable. It is fortunate, in that light, that acts of blasphemy have recently been decriminalized in The Netherlands by removing blasphemy as an offense from the Criminal Code. Still, other provisions appear to leave enough room to reach the same result, making the removal a possibly virtually aesthetic change. In the international context, it would be regrettable for The Netherlands to forgo the opportunity to take a leading role.

As a ubiquitous principle for legislation, › dignity‹ has proved to be successful in providing a principle that is supposed to unite people with different religious and ethical beliefs. Whether such a principle can withstand scrutiny is another matter. If ›dignity‹ is based on one or more characteristics, it is difficult to uphold, while the alternative of abstracting from such characteristics is even more problematic, since finding a basis is in that case all but illusory. Forgoing ›dignity‹ altogether is, in that light, not as unattractive as may at first sight seem to be the case. The burden of justification is lower, while the freedom of citizens to disagree with legislation that binds them is afforded the proper room.

‘Sacred’ may be defined in various ways, depending on one’s worldview. In a pluralistic society, a single perspective from which to decide what is sacred seems absent. Yet certain elements are taken to be sacred such that they transcend individual worldviews. Their inviolability entails blasphemy laws, where ‘blasphemy’ extends beyond what is traditionally considered religious, since ‘religion’ itself is not clearly demarcated either. The interests of the sacred may be protected by blasphemy laws, but the downside of such laws is that the freedom of expression is compromised. A balanced view is necessary to accommodate these conflicting interests.