Jasper Doomen

Militant democracy is an attempt to defend democracy against totalitarian parties that would use democratic procedures to rise to power. This article is focused on the consistency of the concept of ‘militant democracy’. I argue that what militant democracy defends is not the democratic procedure itself but rather certain rights and the rule of law, and that those elements may in fact be compromised by democracy. This applies both if the democratic procedure is concerned and if democracy is interpreted as a reflection of the will of the people. Those elements may be upheld, but democracy is to be mitigated rather than fortified in order to do so.

The task to reshape governments in the countries confronted with the Arab Spring prompts the question whether there are necessary conditions to realize a stable society that simultaneously seeks to eliminate the elements that have led to the uprisings. Acknowledging some constitutional rights seems indispensable in such a process. I argue that such a state of affairs is indeed the case, at least now that the ‘old’ justifications to differentiate between people do not suffice anymore. That is not to say that the countries involved will have identical laws in each respect, but merely that a common basis has to be realized, manifested in political and legal equality, so this given does not derogate from the fact that each country’s specific legislation needs to be shaped in the light of its own history. Such a basis has no ‘moral’ character, but is a necessary condition to prevent sedition.

As a ubiquitous principle for legislation, › dignity‹ has proved to be successful in providing a principle that is supposed to unite people with different religious and ethical beliefs. Whether such a principle can withstand scrutiny is another matter. If ›dignity‹ is based on one or more characteristics, it is difficult to uphold, while the alternative of abstracting from such characteristics is even more problematic, since finding a basis is in that case all but illusory. Forgoing ›dignity‹ altogether is, in that light, not as unattractive as may at first sight seem to be the case. The burden of justification is lower, while the freedom of citizens to disagree with legislation that binds them is afforded the proper room.

‘Sacred’ may be defined in various ways, depending on one’s worldview. In a pluralistic society, a single perspective from which to decide what is sacred seems absent. Yet certain elements are taken to be sacred such that they transcend individual worldviews. Their inviolability entails blasphemy laws, where ‘blasphemy’ extends beyond what is traditionally considered religious, since ‘religion’ itself is not clearly demarcated either. The interests of the sacred may be protected by blasphemy laws, but the downside of such laws is that the freedom of expression is compromised. A balanced view is necessary to accommodate these conflicting interests.