•  21
    Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4): 538-540. 2002.
    Book Information Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin. Edited by Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xii + 316. Hardback, £35.
  •  131
    The Moral Demands of Affluence
    Oxford University Press on Demand. 2004.
    Given that there is a forceful case for thinking that the affluent are morally required to devote a substantial proportion of what they have to helping the poor, Garrett Cullity examines, refines and defends an argument of this form. He then identifies its limits.
  •  4723
    Beneficence
    In Angus Dawson Richard Ashcroft & John McMillan Heather Draper (eds.), Principles of Health Care Ethics, Wiley. pp. 19-26. 2007.
    Garrett Cullity.
  •  63
    Sympathy, discernment, and reasons
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1). 2004.
    According to "the argument from discernment", sympathetic motivation is morally faulty, because it is morally undiscriminating. Sympathy can incline you to do the right thing, but it can also incline you to do the wrong thing. And if so, it is no better as a reason for doing something than any other morally arbitrary consideration. The only truly morally good form of motivation--because the only morally non-arbitrary one--involves treating an action's rightness as your reason for performing it. …Read more
  •  251
    Demandingness, "Ought", and Self-Shaping
    In Michael Kuhler Marcel van Ackeren (ed.), The Limits of Moral Obligation: Moral Demandingness and Ought Implies Can, Routledge. pp. 147-62. 2016.
    Morality, it is commonly argued, cannot be extreme in the demands it makes of us, because “ought” implies “can”, and normal human psychology places limits on the extent to which most of us are capable of devoting our lives to the service of others. To evaluate this argument, we need to distinguish different uses of “ought” and “can”. Having distinguished these uses, we find that there is more than one defensible version of the principle that “ought” implies “can”. However, these distinctions can…Read more
  •  103
    Pyrrhic pyrrhonism (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233): 720-731. 2008.
    Journal compilation © 20098 The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly
  •  1
    The Iteration Problem'
    with Moral Character
    Utilitas 7 (2). 1995.
  •  436
    Asking Too Much
    The Monist 86 (3). 2003.
    Most of us think that it can be wrong not to help someone in chronic need — someone whose life you could easily save, say. And many of us find it hard to see how the remoteness of needy people, either physical, social or psychological, should make a difference to this. Maybe it makes a difference to how wrong it is not to help, but it is hard to see how it can make a difference to whether not helping is wrong.