Garrett Cullity

Three things often recognized as central to morality are concern for others’ welfare, respect for their self-expression, and cooperation in worthwhile collective activity. When philosophers have proposed theories of the substance of morality, they have typically looked to one of these three sources to provide a single, fundamental principle of morality—or they have tried to formulate a master-principle for morality that combines these three ideas in some way. This book views them instead as three independently important foundations of morality. It sets out a plural-foundation moral theory with affinities to that of W. D. Ross. There are major differences: the account of the foundations of morality differs from Ross’s, and there is a more elaborate explanation of how the rest of morality derives from them. However, the overall aim is similar. This is to illuminate the structure of morality by showing how its complex content is generated from a relatively simple set of underlying elements—the complexity results from the various ways in which one part of morality can derive from another, and the various ways in which the derived parts of morality can interact. Plural-foundation moral theories are sometimes criticized for having nothing helpful to say about cases in which their fundamental norms conflict. Responding to this, the book concludes with three detailed applications of the theory: to the questions surrounding paternalism, the use of others as means, and our moral responsibilities as consumers.

According to “the argument from discernment”, sympathetic motivation is morally faulty, because it is morally undiscriminating. Sympathy can incline you to do the right thing, but it can also incline you to do the wrong thing. And if so, it is no better as a reason for doing something than any other morally arbitrary consideration. The only truly morally good form of motivation–because the only morally non‐arbitrary one–involves treating an action's lightness as your reason for performing it. This paper attacks the argument from discernment and argues against its conclusion.

In general, otherwise permissible actions do not become wrong when agents act on bad attitudes. But cases of discrimination can be exceptions to this generalization. It could “be morally permissible for someone to rent her house to any one of several prospective tenants but not morally permissible to refuse to rent it to one of those people because of his race” (Scanlon 2008: 71). These two claims are plausible and widely accepted, but they call for explanation. Why is it that in some cases of discrimination, agents' bad attitudes make otherwise permissible actions wrong? Why doesn't this imply that otherwise permissible actions generally become impermissible when agents act on bad attitudes?? Together, these questions produce a puzzle which existing accounts of wrongful discrimination have not solved. We argue that the solution comes from appreciating how the manifestation of bad attitudes in action is a central constituent in the unjust social condition to which discrimination subjects members of subordinated groups: the deprivation of positive moral standing.

This Perspective describes the various dimensions of Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) durability and interprets them in the context of current policy making. Durability – together with scalability and sustainability – is an essential condition of CDR. It depends on (i) the duration of CO2 storage and (ii) the risk of reversing such storage. The risk profile of durability varies widely across CDR methods. Because engineered, novel CDR methods involve more stable forms of CO2 storage than nature-based CDR, these methods are often promoted as a priority for CDR mitigation investments. However, shorter-term CDR plays an essential role in balancing sources and sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century. Decision makers must also consider CDR policies in a larger context that takes into account readiness and feasibility, policy alignment and co-benefits of different CDR methods. They must also address durability in CDR policies and contracts, which tend to span much shorter timeframes than those contemplated by science when discussing durability. We argue that nature-based conventional CDR and novel engineered CDR that show complementary timing and risk profiles can be deployed in synergistic CDR portfoliosto balance the conditions of durability, feasibility and social and environmental sustainability.

States and other climate actors now commonly set ‘net zero’ targets – pledging that, by a certain date, they will put no more carbon into the atmosphere than they take out. However, there is controversy over what exactly should count as attaining such targets. The method of emissions accounting that states currently use – territorial emissions accounting – is often criticized as problematic, but a fully satisfactory explanation of the problem is needed. We argue that the key both to understanding the problem and to solving it is that there is a specific kind of cooperative contribution – a mereological contribution – that a national net zero commitment needs to make to global climate action in order to meet the standards that global citizens should hold states to. On this basis, we propose an alternative method – Contributory Value-Chain Accounting – showing how it can be qualified to reflect trade relationships between net-zero-aligned countries, and defending it against the objections that it involves double counting, is infeasible and too informationally demanding, and that it would send the wrong incentive signals.

T.M. Scanlon’s contractualism holds that an action is morally wrong when and because it is ruled out by any set of principles for the general regulation of behaviour that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general agreement. This Contractualist Thesis offers a powerful normative ethical theory. Yet Scanlon’s case for it also comes from its help in answering a question that is more naturally classified as metaethical: what account can we give of what wrongness is that explains its reason-giving force? Scanlon initially formulated his contractualist answer to that question as a reductive property-identification: the property of wrongness just is the property of being ruled out by principles for the general regulation of behaviour that no one could reasonably reject. In later work, he abandons the property-identification, while continuing to maintain that his contractualism supplies an “account of wrongness” that best explains its distinctive reason-giving force. But once a property-reduction is ruled out, what kind of claim could a contractualist “account of wrongness” be making that could indeed explain its reason-giving force? We distinguish four candidates and point out problems with three of them. We then offer a proposal for developing the fourth into a form that can address those problems. We argue that this provides the best prospect for a contractualist view that speaks to the concerns behind Scanlon’s question. But it does not deliver everything Scanlon is after; in particular, it falls short of a vindication of the Contractualist Thesis itself.

This chapter examines the distinction that is sometimes drawn between neutral and relative attributions of value. It asks whether a plausible interpretation can be found for claims about relative value; whether an interpretation can be found for claims about neutral value which best captures the thoughts that people express by using this distinction; whether the distinction can be used to produce a satisfactory way of formulating a relative-value consequentialist theory; and whether a theory of that kind is plausible. A positive answer is given to the first three questions, but a negative one to the fourth.

We have an argument for rejecting an iterative but not an aggregative approach to the life-saving analogy. This means that, while Chs 7–9 show that certain forms of personal spending are morally defensible, the life-saving analogy still supplies us with grounds for thinking that other forms of personal spending are not. Some of the main practical implications of the resulting view are spelled out. The resulting view is not puritanical, but is still demanding in the constraints it places on living a morally good life.

The final chapter explains the relationship between the two parts of the book: it explains how Part II has refuted the iterative argument for the Extreme Demand in Part I. It also explains the qualified nature of the conclusion that has been reached: it is a conclusion about the requirements of beneficence, not justice; and it is not the conclusion that morality can never demand extreme personal sacrifices. The implications for direct life-saving action are discussed, and the main strengths of the book’s argument are surveyed.

Much of the work of aid agencies aims to prevent threats to life, rather than to save lives. And even when an aid agency’s activity does save life, it might be doubted whether my contribution to an agency’s pool of funds will itself benefit anyone significantly. However, whether or not that is true, an argument from the life-saving analogy will still support a collective requirement of beneficence on us as a group; and fairness will require me to contribute to discharging that requirement. The collective activity to which I should contribute includes both preventing threats and saving lives.

How far do the demands generated by the life-saving analogy extend? Although the requirement on me to give money to aid agencies is a requirement that I contribute to what we all ought to be doing, that does not mean that, when others are not complying, I am required to do no more than my ‘fair share’. Two further approaches to the life-saving analogy need to be considered: an iterative or an aggregative approach. A case can be given for favouring the iterative approach. But the conclusion to which this leads – the Extreme Demand – allows each of us to spend practically no time or money on sources of personal fulfilment.

How far can the argument against the Extreme Demand be extended? If living one kind of life, or pursuing one kind of good, is better than the alternatives in a significant enough way to ground requirements of beneficence on others to help me, it cannot be wrong for me to refuse to forgo it to help others. Moreover, there are some kinds of lives, and some kinds of goods, that are morally defensible even when there are alternatives that would be no worse for me. This generates neither an ultra-permissive nor an ultra-ascetic view.

ABSTRACT Glen Pettigrove’s ‘What Virtue Adds to Value’ maintains that sometimes virtue is fundamental in the order of value, and that we should reject the general thesis that the value of our responses depends on their proportionality to the value of the objects toward which they are directed. He argues that this view is needed to account for the moral phenomena surrounding love, forgiveness and ambition. I object that his view is unable to explain the forms of discrimination that distinguish the good kinds of love, forgiveness and ambition from the bad ones; and that explaining this requires a version of the proportionality thesis he opposes.

There is a difference between acting with a probability of making a difference to who is harmed, and worsening someone’s prospect. This difference is relevant to debates about the ethics of offsetting, since it means that showing that emitting-and-offsetting has the first feature is not a way of showing that it has the second feature. In an earlier paper, we illustrate this difference with an example of a lottery in which you shake the bag from which a ball will be drawn to determine the identity of the person who will suffer a harm. Here, we reply to Stefansson and Willners’ criticism of that example, explaining how their reply makes a mistake about the point of the example.

In _Paradise Lost_, Satan’s first sight of Eve in Eden renders him “Stupidly good”: his state is one of admirable yet inarticulate responsiveness to reasons. Turning from fiction to real life, this chapter argues that stupid goodness is an important moral phenomenon, but one that has limits. The chapter examines three questions about the relation between having a reason and saying what it is—between normativity and articulacy. Is it possible to have and respond to morally relevant reasons without being able to articulate them? Can moral inarticulacy be good, and if so, what is the value of moral articulacy? And, thirdly, can moral philosophy help us to be good? The chapter argues that morality has an inarticulacy-accepting part, an articulacy-encouraging part, an articulacy-surpassing part, and an articulacy-discouraging part. Along the way, an account is proposed of what it is to respond to the reasons that make up the substance of morality.

A familiar part of ordinary moral thought is this idea: when other people are doing something worthwhile together, there is a reason for you to join in on the same terms as them. Morality does not tell you that you must always do this; but it exerts some pressure on you to join in. Suppose we take this idea seriously: just how should it be developed and applied? More particularly, just which groups and which actions are the ones with respect to which you have participatory moral reasons? And just when is it wrong not to join in? I present answers to these questions, and discuss the implications—including for joint action on a very large scale, like global efforts to address climate change or fight a pandemic.

What is the relation between moral reasons and reasons of “political necessity”? Does the authority of morality extend across political decision-making; or are there “reasons of state” which somehow either stand outside the reach of morality or override it, justifying actions that are morally wrong? This chapter argues that attempts to claim a contra-moral justification for political action typically suffer from a fundamental confusion – a confusion about the nature and expression of practical justification. The author aims to bring two new things to the debate. A first aim is to show how light can be shed on this issue by examining a question that philosophers have discussed in isolation from it: the question of the relationship between moral reasons and reasons pertaining to personal well-being. This gives us a better appreciation of the range of available views about the relation of the moral to the political; more importantly, it helps to explain the fundamental challenge to the idea that there could be contra-moral justification of political action. However, it also provides us with guidance for thinking about the ways in which that challenge might be answered. There is, after all, a case to be made for thinking that some political actions can be justified even though they remain morally wrong. And those actions are of great importance to national and international politics today.