•  9
    Conflicts of interest in divisions of general practice
    with N. Palmer, A. Braunack-Mayer, W. Rogers, and C. Provis
    Journal of Medical Ethics 32 (12): 715-717. 2006.
    Community-based healthcare organisations manage competing, and often conflicting, priorities. These conflicts can arise from the multiple roles these organisations take up, and from the diverse range of stakeholders to whom they must be responsive. Often such conflicts may be titled conflicts of interest; however, what precisely constitutes such conflicts and what should be done about them is not always clear. Clarity about the duties owed by organisations and the roles they assume can help iden…Read more
  •  5
    The Moral Demands of Affluence
    Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 67 (3): 598-600. 2005.
    Garrett Cullity.
  •  38
    A theory of virtue: Excellence in being for the good
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4). 2008.
    © 2008 Informa plc
  •  7
    Sympathy, Discernment, and Reasons
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1): 37-62. 2004.
    According to “the argument from discernment”, sympathetic motivation is morally faulty, because it is morally undiscriminating. Sympathy can incline you to do the right thing, but it can also incline you to do the wrong thing. And if so, it is no better as a reason for doing something than any other morally arbitrary consideration. The only truly morally good form of motivation-because the only morally non-arbitrary one-involves treating an action's rightness as your reason for performing it. Th…Read more
  •  108
    with Berys Gaut
    In Garrett Cullity Berys Gaut (ed.), Ethics and Practical Reason, Oxford University Press. pp. 1-27. 1997.
  •  2
    Practical Theory
    In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason, Oxford University Press. pp. 101--24. 1997.
    Garrett Cullity
  •  59
    Particularism and moral theory: Particularism and presumptive reasons: Garrett Cullity
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1). 2002.
    Weak particularism about reasons is the view that the normative valency of some descriptive considerations varies, while others have an invariant normative valency. A defence of this view needs to respond to arguments that a consideration cannot count in favour of any action unless it counts in favour of every action. But it cannot resort to a global holism about reasons, if it claims that there are some examples of invariant valency. This paper argues for weak particularism, and presents a fram…Read more
  •  16
    Ethics and Practical Reason
    with Berys Gaut
    Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197): 537-539. 1999.
  •  2
    Williams, B.-Making Sense of Humanity
    Philosophical Books 39 91-104. 1998.
    This critical notice discusses five main themes of Williams's collection: (1) The “morality system” and blame: our ethical thought both misconceives and overemphasizes the practice of blaming. (2) The theorist’s predicament: how can a theorist of human practice coherently relate her theory to her own practice? (3) Psychological realism: a central constraint on a defensible ethical outlook is that it takes account of us as we are. (4) Culture and explanation: there is no culturally neutral fo…Read more
  •  98
    Beneficence, rights and citizenship
    Australian Journal of Human Rights 9 85-105. 2006.
    What are we morally required to do for strangers? To answer this question – a question about the scope of requirements to aid strangers – we must first answer a question about justification: why are we required to aid them (when we are)? The main paper focuses largely on answering the question about justification, but does so in order to arrive at an answer to the question about scope. Three main issues are discussed. First, to what extent should requirements of beneficence – requirements to be…Read more
  •  66
    Many writers have followed Peter Singer in drawing an analogy between assisting needy people at a distance and saving someone’s life directly. Arguments based on this analogy can take either a subsumptive or a non-subsumptive form. Such arguments face a serious methodological challenge.
  • Agency and Policy
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1): 317-327. 2004.
    The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com.
  •  20
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-3, Ahead of Print
  •  41
    Public Goods
    In Lawrence C. Becker Charlotte B. Becker (ed.), Encyclopedia of Ethics, Vol. III, Routledge. pp. 1413-16. 2007.
    Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Books, Inc.
  •  26
    Describing rationality
    Philosophical Studies 173 (12): 3399-3411. 2016.
    This critical study of John Broome’s Rationality Through Reasoning raises some questions about the various requirements of rationality Broome formulates, pointing out some apparent gaps and counterexamples; proposes a general description of rationality that is broadly consistent with Broome’s requirements while providing them with a unifying justification, filling the gaps, and removing the counterexamples; and presents two objections to the book’s broader argument concerning the nature and impo…Read more
  •  72
    The Moral, the Personal and the Political
    In Igor Primoratz (ed.), Politics and Morality, Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 54-75. 2008.
    What is the relation between moral reasons and reasons of “political necessity”? Does the authority of morality extend across political decision-making; or are there “reasons of state” which somehow either stand outside the reach of morality or override it, justifying actions that are morally wrong? This chapter argues that attempts to claim a contra-moral justification for political action typically suffer from a fundamental confusion – a confusion about the nature and expression of practical …Read more
  •  33
    What is the significance of empirical work on moral judgement for moral philosophy? Although the more radical conclusions that some writers have attempted to draw from this work are overstated, few areas of moral philosophy can remain unaffected by it. The most important question it raises is in moral epistemology. Given the explanation of our moral experience, how far can we trust it? Responding to this, the view defended here emphasizes the interrelatedness of moral psychology and moral episte…Read more
  •  43
    The Context-Undermining of Practical Reasons
    Ethics 124 (1): 8-34. 2013.
    Can one fact deprive another of the status of a reason for action—a status the second fact would have had, but for the presence of the first? Claims of this kind are often made, but they face substantial obstacles. This article sets out those obstacles but then argues that there are at least three different ways in which this does happen
  •  126
    Demandingness, "Ought", and Self-Shaping
    In Marcel van Ackeren Michael Kuhler (ed.), The Limits of Moral Obligation: Moral Demandingness and Ought Implies Can, Routledge. pp. 147-62. 2016.
    Morality, it is commonly argued, cannot be extreme in the demands it makes of us, because “ought” implies “can”, and normal human psychology places limits on the extent to which most of us are capable of devoting our lives to the service of others. To evaluate this argument, we need to distinguish different uses of “ought” and “can”. Having distinguished these uses, we find that there is more than one defensible version of the principle that “ought” implies “can”. However, these distinctions can…Read more
  •  21
    Book Information Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin. Edited by Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xii + 316. Hardback, £35.
  • Particularism and Moral Theory: Particularism and Presumptive Reasons: Garrett Cullity
    Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1): 169-190. 2002.
  •  206
    International aid and the scope of kindness
    Ethics 105 (1): 99-127. 1994.
    This paper argues that it is morally wrong for the affluent not to contribute money or time to famine relief. It begins by endorsing an important methodological line of objection against the most prominent philosophical advocate of this claim, Peter Singer. This objection attacks his strategy of invoking a principle the acceptability of which is apparently based upon its conformity with "intuitive" moral judgements in order to defend a strongly counterintuitive conclusion. However, what follows …Read more
  •  69
    Moral Character and the Iteration Problem
    Utilitas 7 (2): 289. 1995.
    Moral evaluation is concerned with the attribution of values whose distinction into two broad groups has become familiar. On the one hand, there are the most general moral values of lightness, wrongness, goodness, badness, and what ought to be or to be done. On the other, there is a great diversity of more specific moral values which these objects can have: of being a theft, for instance, or a thief; of honesty, reliability or callousness. Within the recent body of work attempting to restore to …Read more
  •  30
    The Limits of Kindness, by Caspar Hare: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. xi + 229, £25.00 (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4): 791-794. 2014.
    Garrett Cullity.
  •  27
    Aretaic Cognitivism
    American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (4). 1995.
    This paper defends the claim that there is deontic knowledge - knowledge of rightness and wrongness - which can be inferred from aretaic knowledge - knowledge of the possession of virtue-attributes. In doing so, it seeks to address two forceful objections, identified at the outset. The first is that the only way of making the claim appear plausible is by assuming a practice of virtue-ascription which actually makes the reverse inference. The second objection is that there is that "aretaic cognit…Read more
  •  4
    Review: Pyrrhic Pyrrhonism (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233). 2008.
  •  142
    Public goods and fairness
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1). 2008.
    To what extent can we as a community legitimately require individuals to contribute to producing public goods? Most of us think that, at least sometimes, refusing to pay for a public good that you have enjoyed can involve a kind of 'free riding' that makes it wrong. But what is less clear is under exactly which circumstances this is wrong. To work out the answer to that, we need to know why it is wrong. I argue that when free riding is wrong, the reason is that it is unfair. That is not itself a…Read more