•  41
    Public Goods
    In Lawrence C. Becker Charlotte B. Becker (ed.), Encyclopedia of Ethics, Vol. III, Routledge. pp. 1413-16. 2007.
    Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Books, Inc.
  •  38
    A theory of virtue: Excellence in being for the good
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4). 2008.
    © 2008 Informa plc
  •  34
    Agency and policy
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3). 2004.
    The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com
  •  33
    What is the significance of empirical work on moral judgement for moral philosophy? Although the more radical conclusions that some writers have attempted to draw from this work are overstated, few areas of moral philosophy can remain unaffected by it. The most important question it raises is in moral epistemology. Given the explanation of our moral experience, how far can we trust it? Responding to this, the view defended here emphasizes the interrelatedness of moral psychology and moral episte…Read more
  •  31
    Conference on ethics and practical reason
    with Berys Gaut
    Journal of Value Inquiry 30 (4): 573-577. 1996.
  •  30
    The Limits of Kindness, by Caspar Hare: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. xi + 229, £25.00 (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4): 791-794. 2014.
    Garrett Cullity.
  •  30
    Concern, Respect, and Cooperation
    Oxford University Press. 2018.
    Three things often recognized as central to morality are concern for others’ welfare, respect for their self-expression, and cooperation in worthwhile collective activity. When philosophers have proposed theories of the substance of morality, they have typically looked to one of these three sources to provide a single, fundamental principle of morality – or they have tried to formulate a master-principle for morality that combines these three ideas in some way. This book views them instead as th…Read more
  •  29
    International Aid and the Scope of Kindness
    Ethics 105 (1): 99-127. 1994.
    Garrett Cullity
  •  27
    Aretaic Cognitivism
    American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (4). 1995.
    This paper defends the claim that there is deontic knowledge - knowledge of rightness and wrongness - which can be inferred from aretaic knowledge - knowledge of the possession of virtue-attributes. In doing so, it seeks to address two forceful objections, identified at the outset. The first is that the only way of making the claim appear plausible is by assuming a practice of virtue-ascription which actually makes the reverse inference. The second objection is that there is that "aretaic cognit…Read more
  •  27
    Climate Harms
    The Monist 102 (1): 22-41. 2019.
    How should we think of the relationship between the climate harms that people will suffer in the future and our current emissions activity? Who does the harming, and what are the moral implications? One way to address these questions appeals to facts about the expected harm associated with one’s own individual energy-consuming activity, and argues that it is morally wrong not to offset one’s own personal carbon emissions. The first half of the article questions the strength of this argument. The…Read more
  •  27
    Demandingness, 'ought', and self-shaping
    In Marcel van Ackeren & Michael Kühler (eds.), The Limits of Moral Obligation, Routledge. 2016.
    Garrett Cullity.
  •  26
    Describing rationality
    Philosophical Studies 173 (12): 3399-3411. 2016.
    This critical study of John Broome’s Rationality Through Reasoning raises some questions about the various requirements of rationality Broome formulates, pointing out some apparent gaps and counterexamples; proposes a general description of rationality that is broadly consistent with Broome’s requirements while providing them with a unifying justification, filling the gaps, and removing the counterexamples; and presents two objections to the book’s broader argument concerning the nature and impo…Read more
  •  22
    Review of John Broome, Weighing Lives (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (12). 2005.
  •  22
    Garrett Cullity.
  •  21
    Thinking how to live – Allan Gibbard
    Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227). 2007.
  •  21
    Book Information Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin. Edited by Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xii + 316. Hardback, £35.
  •  20
    Review of Deen K. Chatterjee (ed.), The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (8). 2005.
    Garrett Cullity
  •  20
    Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4): 538-540. 2002.
    Book Information Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin. Edited by Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xii + 316. Hardback, £35.
  •  20
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-3, Ahead of Print
  •  18
  •  16
    Ethics and Practical Reason
    with Berys Gaut
    Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197): 537-539. 1999.
  •  10
    Liberty, Security, and Fairness
    The Journal of Ethics 25 (2): 141-159. 2021.
    What constraints should be imposed on individual liberty for the sake of protecting our collective security? A helpful approach to answering this question is offered by a theory that grounds political obligation and authority in a moral requirement of fair contribution to mutually beneficial cooperative schemes. This approach encourages us to split the opening question into two—a question of correctness and a question of legitimacy—and generates a detailed set of answers to both subsidiary quest…Read more
  •  9
    Free riding
    In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Wiley. pp. 2220-227. 2013.
    “Free riding,” used as a descriptive term, refers to taking a jointly produced benefit without contributing towards its production. Used as a term of criticism, it refers to the wrongful failure to contribute towards the joint production of benefits that one receives. On either usage, the central interest of moral philosophy in free riding is the same: to specify the conditions under which not contributing towards the joint production of benefits that one receives is wrong, and to explain why.