•  69
    Moral Character and the Iteration Problem
    Utilitas 7 (2): 289. 1995.
    Moral evaluation is concerned with the attribution of values whose distinction into two broad groups has become familiar. On the one hand, there are the most general moral values of lightness, wrongness, goodness, badness, and what ought to be or to be done. On the other, there is a great diversity of more specific moral values which these objects can have: of being a theft, for instance, or a thief; of honesty, reliability or callousness. Within the recent body of work attempting to restore to …Read more
  •  30
    The Limits of Kindness, by Caspar Hare: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. xi + 229, £25.00 (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4): 791-794. 2014.
    Garrett Cullity.
  •  4
    Review: Pyrrhic Pyrrhonism (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233). 2008.
  •  27
    Aretaic Cognitivism
    American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (4). 1995.
    This paper defends the claim that there is deontic knowledge - knowledge of rightness and wrongness - which can be inferred from aretaic knowledge - knowledge of the possession of virtue-attributes. In doing so, it seeks to address two forceful objections, identified at the outset. The first is that the only way of making the claim appear plausible is by assuming a practice of virtue-ascription which actually makes the reverse inference. The second objection is that there is that "aretaic cognit…Read more
  •  142
    Public goods and fairness
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1). 2008.
    To what extent can we as a community legitimately require individuals to contribute to producing public goods? Most of us think that, at least sometimes, refusing to pay for a public good that you have enjoyed can involve a kind of 'free riding' that makes it wrong. But what is less clear is under exactly which circumstances this is wrong. To work out the answer to that, we need to know why it is wrong. I argue that when free riding is wrong, the reason is that it is unfair. That is not itself a…Read more
  •  230
    Decisions, Reasons and Rationality
    Ethics 119 (1): 57-95. 2008.
    What difference do our decisions make to our reasons for action and the rationality of our actions? There are two questions here, and good grounds for answering them differently. However, it still makes sense to discuss them together. By thinking about the relationships that reasons and rationality bear to decisions, we may be able to cast light on the relationship that reasons and rationality bear to each other.
  •  154
    Virtue ethics, theory, and warrant
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3): 277-294. 1999.
    Are there good grounds for thinking that the moral values of action are to be derived from those of character? This virtue ethical claim is sometimes thought of as a kind of normative ethical theory; sometimes as form of opposition to any such theory. However, the best case to be made for it supports neither of these claims. Rather, it leads us to a distinctive view in moral epistemology: the view that my warrant for a particular moral judgement derives from my warrant for believing that I am a …Read more
  •  21
    Thinking how to live – Allan Gibbard
    Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227). 2007.
  •  20
    Review of Deen K. Chatterjee (ed.), The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (8). 2005.
    Garrett Cullity
  •  34
    Agency and policy
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3). 2004.
    The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com
  •  71
    Particularism and presumptive reasons
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 76 169-90. 2006.
    The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com.
  •  5
    I—Garrett Cullity: Particularism and Presumptive Reasons
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1): 169-190. 2002.
  •  20
    Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4): 538-540. 2002.
    Book Information Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin. Edited by Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xii + 316. Hardback, £35.
  •  97
    The Moral Demands of Affluence
    Oxford University Press UK. 2004.
    How much are we morally required to do to help people who are much worse off than us? On any credible moral outlook, other people's pressing need for assistance can ground moral requirements on us to help them---requirements of beneficence. How far do those requirements extend?One way to think about this is by means of a simple analogy: an analogy between joining in efforts to help people at a distance and rescuing a needy person yourself, directly. Part I of Garrett Cullity's book examines this…Read more
  •  51
    Sympathy, discernment, and reasons
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1). 2004.
    According to "the argument from discernment", sympathetic motivation is morally faulty, because it is morally undiscriminating. Sympathy can incline you to do the right thing, but it can also incline you to do the wrong thing. And if so, it is no better as a reason for doing something than any other morally arbitrary consideration. The only truly morally good form of motivation--because the only morally non-arbitrary one--involves treating an action's rightness as your reason for performing it. …Read more
  •  432
    Asking Too Much
    The Monist 86 (3). 2003.
    Most of us think that it can be wrong not to help someone in chronic need — someone whose life you could easily save, say. And many of us find it hard to see how the remoteness of needy people, either physical, social or psychological, should make a difference to this. Maybe it makes a difference to how wrong it is not to help, but it is hard to see how it can make a difference to whether not helping is wrong.
  •  100
    Pyrrhic pyrrhonism (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233): 720-731. 2008.
    Journal compilation © 20098 The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly
  •  200
    Acts, Omissions, Emissions
    In Jeremy Moss (ed.), Climate Change and Justice, Cambridge University Press. pp. 148-64. 2015.
    What requirements does morality impose on us in relation to climate change? This question can be asked of individuals, of the entire global population, and of groups of various sizes in between. Given the case for accepting that we all collectively ought to be causing less climate-affecting pollution than we do, what follows from that about the moral status of the actions of members of the larger group? I examine two main ways in which moral requirements on group members can derive from requirem…Read more
  •  135
    Moral Free Riding
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (1): 3-34. 1995.
    This paper presents a moral philosophical account of free riding, specifying the conditions under which failing to pay for nonrival goods is unfair. These conditions do not include the voluntary acceptance of the goods: this controversial claim is supported on the strength of a characterization of the kind of unfairness displayed in paradigm cases of free riding. Thus a "Principle of Fairness" can potentially serve as a foundation for political obligations. The paper also discusses the relatio…Read more
  •  1325
    In Richard Ashcroft Angus Dawson & Heather Draper John McMillan (eds.), Principles of Health Care Ethics, Wiley. pp. 19-26. 2007.
    Garrett Cullity.
  • The Iteration Problem'
    with Moral Character
    Utilitas 7 (2). 1995.
  •  22
    Review of John Broome, Weighing Lives (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (12). 2005.
  •  5
    Agency and policy
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3): 315-325. 2004.
    The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com.
  •  111
    Pooled beneficence
    In Michael Almeida (ed.), Imperceptible Harms and Benefits, Kluwer. pp. 9-42. 2000.
    There can be situations in which, if I contribute to a pool of resources for helping a large number of people, the difference that my contribution makes to any of the people helped from the pool will be imperceptible at best, and maybe even non-existent. And this can be the case where it is also true that giving the same amount directly to one of the intended beneficiaries of the pool would have made a very large difference to her. Can non-contribution to the pool be morally justified on this gr…Read more