•  43
    The Context-Undermining of Practical Reasons
    Ethics 124 (1): 8-34. 2013.
    Can one fact deprive another of the status of a reason for action—a status the second fact would have had, but for the presence of the first? Claims of this kind are often made, but they face substantial obstacles. This article sets out those obstacles but then argues that there are at least three different ways in which this does happen
  •  126
    Demandingness, "Ought", and Self-Shaping
    In Marcel van Ackeren Michael Kuhler (ed.), The Limits of Moral Obligation: Moral Demandingness and Ought Implies Can, Routledge. pp. 147-62. 2016.
    Morality, it is commonly argued, cannot be extreme in the demands it makes of us, because “ought” implies “can”, and normal human psychology places limits on the extent to which most of us are capable of devoting our lives to the service of others. To evaluate this argument, we need to distinguish different uses of “ought” and “can”. Having distinguished these uses, we find that there is more than one defensible version of the principle that “ought” implies “can”. However, these distinctions can…Read more
  •  21
    Book Information Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin. Edited by Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xii + 316. Hardback, £35.
  • Particularism and Moral Theory: Particularism and Presumptive Reasons: Garrett Cullity
    Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1): 169-190. 2002.
  •  206
    International aid and the scope of kindness
    Ethics 105 (1): 99-127. 1994.
    This paper argues that it is morally wrong for the affluent not to contribute money or time to famine relief. It begins by endorsing an important methodological line of objection against the most prominent philosophical advocate of this claim, Peter Singer. This objection attacks his strategy of invoking a principle the acceptability of which is apparently based upon its conformity with "intuitive" moral judgements in order to defend a strongly counterintuitive conclusion. However, what follows …Read more
  •  69
    Moral Character and the Iteration Problem
    Utilitas 7 (2): 289. 1995.
    Moral evaluation is concerned with the attribution of values whose distinction into two broad groups has become familiar. On the one hand, there are the most general moral values of lightness, wrongness, goodness, badness, and what ought to be or to be done. On the other, there is a great diversity of more specific moral values which these objects can have: of being a theft, for instance, or a thief; of honesty, reliability or callousness. Within the recent body of work attempting to restore to …Read more
  •  30
    The Limits of Kindness, by Caspar Hare: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. xi + 229, £25.00 (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4): 791-794. 2014.
    Garrett Cullity.
  •  27
    Aretaic Cognitivism
    American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (4). 1995.
    This paper defends the claim that there is deontic knowledge - knowledge of rightness and wrongness - which can be inferred from aretaic knowledge - knowledge of the possession of virtue-attributes. In doing so, it seeks to address two forceful objections, identified at the outset. The first is that the only way of making the claim appear plausible is by assuming a practice of virtue-ascription which actually makes the reverse inference. The second objection is that there is that "aretaic cognit…Read more
  •  4
    Review: Pyrrhic Pyrrhonism (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233). 2008.
  •  142
    Public goods and fairness
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1). 2008.
    To what extent can we as a community legitimately require individuals to contribute to producing public goods? Most of us think that, at least sometimes, refusing to pay for a public good that you have enjoyed can involve a kind of 'free riding' that makes it wrong. But what is less clear is under exactly which circumstances this is wrong. To work out the answer to that, we need to know why it is wrong. I argue that when free riding is wrong, the reason is that it is unfair. That is not itself a…Read more
  •  230
    Decisions, Reasons and Rationality
    Ethics 119 (1): 57-95. 2008.
    What difference do our decisions make to our reasons for action and the rationality of our actions? There are two questions here, and good grounds for answering them differently. However, it still makes sense to discuss them together. By thinking about the relationships that reasons and rationality bear to decisions, we may be able to cast light on the relationship that reasons and rationality bear to each other.
  •  154
    Virtue ethics, theory, and warrant
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3): 277-294. 1999.
    Are there good grounds for thinking that the moral values of action are to be derived from those of character? This virtue ethical claim is sometimes thought of as a kind of normative ethical theory; sometimes as form of opposition to any such theory. However, the best case to be made for it supports neither of these claims. Rather, it leads us to a distinctive view in moral epistemology: the view that my warrant for a particular moral judgement derives from my warrant for believing that I am a …Read more
  •  21
    Thinking how to live – Allan Gibbard
    Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227). 2007.
  •  34
    Agency and policy
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3). 2004.
    The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com
  •  20
    Review of Deen K. Chatterjee (ed.), The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (8). 2005.
    Garrett Cullity
  •  71
    Particularism and presumptive reasons
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 76 169-90. 2006.
    The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com.
  •  5
    I—Garrett Cullity: Particularism and Presumptive Reasons
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1): 169-190. 2002.
  •  20
    Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4): 538-540. 2002.
    Book Information Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin. Edited by Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2000. Pp. xii + 316. Hardback, £35.
  •  97
    The Moral Demands of Affluence
    Oxford University Press UK. 2004.
    How much are we morally required to do to help people who are much worse off than us? On any credible moral outlook, other people's pressing need for assistance can ground moral requirements on us to help them---requirements of beneficence. How far do those requirements extend?One way to think about this is by means of a simple analogy: an analogy between joining in efforts to help people at a distance and rescuing a needy person yourself, directly. Part I of Garrett Cullity's book examines this…Read more