Elizabeth Brake

Much intimate partner violence consists in emotional abuse and threats which the legal system does not address. Some reports suggest that emotional abuse can be more harmful than physical abuse. Beyond social policy, how should the law address emotional abuse? Criminalizing emotional abuse would serve the expressive function of expressing disapprobation and acknowledging the wrong to the victim. There are practical reasons not to criminalize emotional abuse—including the likely disproportionate impact on people of color. This chapter focuses on the theoretical question of whether emotional abuse wrongs the victim in the sense relevant to criminal law. A difficulty is that emotional abuse might involve only speech and apparently self-regarding behavior: how do these wrong, in the justice-relevant sense? This chapter considers two approaches. On the harm-based approach to criminal law, emotional abuse is the kind of non-consensual harm relevant to criminal law. On a Kantian approach to criminal law as intervening in certain restrictions on freedom, emotional abuse sometimes involves a justice-relevant wrong: coercion. The chapter argues that emotional abuse (even without physical abuse) coerces the victim by issuing a standing threat of severe emotional harm. Accounting for coercion requires positing a right against severe emotional harm which emotional abuse threatens to violate. This chapter shows how emotional abuse wrongs without implying that permissible self-regarding behavior which causes emotional harm (such as rejecting someone’s romantic advances) also wrongs.

Procreation has costs of a sort that are generally wrong to impose on others. These include costs to the environment and to those waiting to be adopted. Without justification, it appears that procreation is impermissible. A natural thought is that the costs can be justified by the value of the parent-child relationship. However, there are compelling arguments that genetic ties are morally irrelevant to the value of such a relationship, and so cannot justify procreating when adoption is an option. This chapter considers what circumstances would justify procreation. The most plausible justification would likely appeal to reproducing valuable genetically heritable traits of ancestors, partners, or gamete donors. This chapter considers the objections that this justification implies eugenicist rankings and that it rests on uncertain family resemblances.

Caring relationships and material caregiving are politically significant goods that should be distributed according to principles of justice. I argue that, within Rawlsian liberalism, care should be considered a primary good and propose a third principle of justice requiring access to the social and legal supports of caring relationships. I examine what social and legal institutions supporting care might require, with particular attention to allowing the infirm elderly and persons with disabilities access to caring relationships. I propose the formation of a Care Corps, providing access to caring relationships for elderly and housebound citizens. If universally required and compensated, the Care Corps could address two other injustices related to care: the unjust distribution of caring labor between men and women and the relatively low status of caring work.

Do we owe anything to our genetic relatives qua genetic relatives? The philosophical literature has primarily addressed this question in the context of procreation. But genetic matching databases raise the question of whether we owe anything to previously unknown genetic relatives. This article argues that influential philosophical arguments regarding moral claims to know one’s genetic origins (sometimes referred to as a ‘right to know’) in the context of gamete donation have implications for a broader set of claims. First, these arguments imply more than a claim to know the identity of a genetic relative; the interests which they invoke can only be satisfied through a relationship. Second, the scope of the claims is broader than tends to be acknowledged: even if procreators have special obligations towards their offspring, these arguments imply that weighty moral claims can be made against other genetic relatives in many different contexts.

Much stalking consists in behavior which would normally be permissible; indeed, many stalking behaviors are protected liberties. How, then, does the stalker wrong the victim? I consider and reject different answers as failing to identify the essential wrong of stalking: stalking perpetuates gender oppression; it threatens or coerces, disrespects autonomy, or violates privacy. I argue that the stalker forces a personal relationship on the target and that our interest in being able to refuse such relationships is strong enough to ground a right. It is a benefit if my account changes the standards of which intimacy-seeking behaviors we consider permissible.

What, if anything, is wrong with price gouging? Its defenders argue that it increases supply of scarce necessities; critics argue that it is exploitative, inequitable and vicious. In this paper, I argue for its moral wrongness and legal prohibition, without relying on charges of exploitation, inequity or poor character. What is fundamentally wrong with price gouging is that it violates a duty of easy rescue. While legal enforcement of such duties is controversial, a special case can be made for their legal enforcement in this context. This account distinguishes, morally, price gouging by corporations from that of individual entrepreneurs.

What defines family law? Is it an area of law with clean boundaries and unified distinguishing characteristics, or an untidy grouping of disparate rules and doctrines? What values or principles should guide it – and how could it be improved? Indeed, even the scope of family law is contested. Whilst some law schools and textbooks separate family law from children’s law, this is invariably effected without asking what might be gained or lost from treating them together or separately. Should family law and children’s law be distinguished or treated together? One would expect disagreement on these questions in any context. In bringing together theorists from multiple jurisdictions and at least two primary disciplines, we should not be surprised to find deep differences in approach reflecting different methodologies and foundational questions. The tension between them, we hope, can illuminate and enrich discussion on all sides.

Liberal egalitarians face unappreciated challenges in explaining why the state should assist citizens in disaster recovery and why the state should ever assist in rebuilding in high-risk areas. Addressing these challenges and justifying state-funded disaster recovery assistance requires invoking the most politically salient aspect of disasters: their tendency to increase social inequality. A liberal egalitarian principle of equal opportunity justifies assistance in recovery, at least for disadvantaged citizens. But further argument is required to show why the state should ever subsidize rebuilding as opposed to relocation, if citizens can have access to equally good opportunities in a low-risk area. I argue that displacement has costs which matter under equal opportunity – but this rationale for disaster recovery extends to other causes of displacement, such as gentrification.

the issue of liberal neutrality, a topic suggested by the work of Catharine MacKinnon. I discuss two kinds of neutrality: neutrality at the level of justifying liberalism itself, and state neutrality in political decision-making. Both kinds are contentious within liberal theory. Rawls’s argument for justice as fairness has been criticized for non-neutrality at the justificatory level, a problem noted by Rawls himself in Political Liberalism. I will defend a qualified account of neutrality at the justificatory level, taking an epistemic approach to argue for the exclusion of certain doctrines from the justificatory process. I then argue that the justification process I describe offers a justificatory stance supportive of the feminist rejection of state-sponsored gender hierarchy. Further, I argue that liberal neutrality at the level of political decision-making will have surprising implications for gender equality. Once the extent of the state’s involvement in the apparently private spheres of family and civil society is recognized, and the disproportionate influence of a sexist conception of the good on those structures—and concomitant promotion of that ideal—is seen, state neutrality implies substantive change. While—as Susan Moller Okin avowed—Rawls himself may have remained ambiguous on how to address gender inequality, his theory implies that the state must seek to create substantive, not merely formal, equality. I suggest that those substantive changes will not conflict with liberal neutrality but instead be required by it.

All duties are either duties of right (officia iuris), that is, duties for which external lawgiving is possible, or duties of virtue (officia virtutis s. ethica), for which external lawgiving is not possible. – Duties of virtue cannot be subject to external lawgiving simply because they have to do with an end which (or the having of which) is also a duty. No external lawgiving can bring about someone's setting an end for himself (because this is an internal act of the mind), although it may prescribe external actions that lead to an end without the subject making it his end.

Recent defenses of same-sex marriage and polygamy have invoked the liberal doctrines of neutrality and public reason. Such reasoning is generally sound but does not go far enough. This paper traces the full implications of political liberalism for marriage. I argue that the constraints of public reason, applied to marriage law, entail ‘minimal marriage’, the most extensive set of state-determined restrictions on marriage compatible with political liberalism. Minimal marriage sets no principled restrictions on the sex or number of spouses and the nature and purpose of their caring relationships, nor on which marital rights are exchanged, and whether they are exchanged reciprocally or asymmetrically. Minimal marriage supports adult care networks, urban tribes, friendships, and other forms of relationships as well as ‘traditional’ marriages. I provide a publically justifiable rationale for a legal framework supporting non-dependent caring relationships between adults. The argument is that caring relationships are primary goods, and that liberal justice accordingly requires legal frameworks supporting caring relationships. Minimal marriage is one such framework.

My primary aim is to call into question an influential notion of paternal responsibility, namely, that fathers owe support to their children due to their causal responsibility for their existence. I argue that men who impregnate women unintentionally, and despite having taken preventative measures, do not owe child support to their children as a matter of justice; their children have no right against them to support. I argue for this on the basis of plausible principles of responsibility which have been used to defend abortion rights. I then consider the morally relevant differences between men and women, arguing that while in some cases these differences may justify differential treatment, their import should not be overstated - in many cases, the burden of child support will be too great to impose justly on fathers. This conclusion is not as undesirable as it may seem: I suggest feminist considerations in favor of revising the notion of paternal responsibility and considering alternative arrangements of child support.

This paper responds to arguments that polyamorous groups or care networks do not qualify for equal treatment with marriages. It refutes the points that polyamory is inherently hierarchical or unstable, that there are too few people in such arrangements to mount an argument for recognition, that polyamory harms children, and that there are insurmountable legal and practical hurdles to network marriage. Finally, it respond to the charge that extending recognition to polyamorists will devalue the recognition of same-sex marriage.

Wedding vows seem to be promises. So they go: I promise to love, honour, and cherish.... But this poses a problem. Divorce is not widely seen as a serious moral wrong, but breaking a promise is. I first consider, and defend against preliminary objections, a ‘hard-line’ response: divorce is indeed prima facie impermissible promise-breaking. I next consider the ‘hardship’ response—the hardship of failed marriages overrides the prima facie duty to keep promises. However, this would release promisors in far too many cases. I resolve the triad by considering the content of the vows. Vows concerning love are not promises at all. We cannot promise to do acts the performance of which is outside our control, and love involves states of mind outside our control. Vows concerning spousal roles are complicated by diverse social understandings of marriage and the centrality of emotion to the roles.

This paper develops a Kantian account of the moral assessment of institutions. The problem I address is this: while a deontological theory may find that some legal institutions are required by justice, it is not obvious how such a theory can assess institutions not strictly required (or prohibited) by justice. As a starting-point, I consider intuitions that in some cases it is desirable to attribute non-consequentialist moral value to institutions not required by justice. I will argue that neither consequentialist nor virtue-ethical accounts account for these intuitions, suggesting that a distinctive deontological account is needed. The account I give is drawn from Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals; I distinguish it from Kantian views of institutions developed by Barbara Herman and Onora O’Neill. Throughout, I use marriage as an example.

Much of the bioethical literature on parenthood does not address a fact about parenthood which deserves more attention: parental rights and obligations are attached to socially constructed institutional roles. Both the content of these roles, and the way in which they determine who a child’s parents will be, issue from social and legal institutions of parenthood, and this makes a difference to accounts of the moral basis of parenthood. I will argue that this poses a problem for the causal account of parenthood: the variability of parental obligations, and their assignment, underscores the problems the causal account has with defining the relevant notion of cause and with fixing procreative costs. If institutional role obligations arise only through voluntary undertakings, then understanding moral parenthood as an institutional role makes the voluntarist account of parenthood more attractive. However, I must address two questions: whether such role obligations can arise non-voluntarily, and whether the voluntarist account can deal with common cases of parenthood.