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475Recognizing Care: The Case for Friendship and PolyamorySyracuse Law and Civic Engagement Forum 1 (1). 2014.This paper responds to arguments that polyamorous groups or care networks do not qualify for equal treatment with marriages. It refutes the points that polyamory is inherently hierarchical or unstable, that there are too few people in such arrangements to mount an argument for recognition, that polyamory harms children, and that there are insurmountable legal and practical hurdles to network marriage. Finally, it respond to the charge that extending recognition to polyamorists will devalue the r…Read more
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114Review of Rebecca Kukla, Mass Hysteria: Medicine, Culture, and Mothers' Bodies (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (12). 2006.of Rebecca Kukla,, from Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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128Why can’t we be (legally-recognized) friends?Forum for European Philosophy Blog. 2015.The legal benefits of same-sex marriage should be expanded to other relationships, argues Elizabeth Brake.
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145Overall, Christine. Why Have Children? The Ethical Debate.Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012. Pp. 253. $27.95 (review)Ethics 123 (2): 391-396. 2013.
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861Is Divorce Promise-Breaking?Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1): 23-39. 2011.Wedding vows seem to be promises. So they go: I promise to love, honour, and cherish.... But this poses a problem. Divorce is not widely seen as a serious moral wrong, but breaking a promise is. I first consider, and defend against preliminary objections, a ‘hard-line’ response: divorce is indeed prima facie impermissible promise-breaking. I next consider the ‘hardship’ response—the hardship of failed marriages overrides the prima facie duty to keep promises. However, this would release promisor…Read more
University of St. Andrews
PhD, 1999
Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
| Applied Ethics |
| Social and Political Philosophy |
| Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality |
Areas of Interest
| Aesthetics |
| Normative Ethics |
| European Philosophy |