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361Darwin’s solution to the species problemSynthese 175 (3). 2010.Biologists and philosophers that debate the existence of the species category fall into two camps. Some believe that the species category does not exist and the term 'species' should be eliminated from biology. Others believe that with new biological insights or the application of philosophical ideas, we can be confident that the species category exists. This paper offers a different approach to the species problem. We should be skeptical of the species category, but not skeptical of the existen…Read more
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1The Poverty of the Linnaean Hierarchy: A Philosophical Study of Biological TaxonomyJournal of the History of Biology 34 (3): 600-602. 2001.
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281Some problems with the linnaean hierarchyPhilosophy of Science 61 (2): 186-205. 1994.Most biologists use the Linnaean system for constructing classifications of the organic world. The Linnaean system, however, has lost its theoretical basis due to the shift in biology from creationist and essentialist tenets to evolutionary theory. As a result, the Linnaean system is both cumbersome and ontologically vacuous. This paper illustrates the problems facing the Linnaean system, and ends with a brief introduction to an alternative approach to biological classification
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29Names, numbers and indentations: a guide to post-Linnaean taxonomyStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 32 (2): 361-383. 2001.
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98Homology thinkingBiology and Philosophy 27 (3): 381-400. 2012.This paper explores an important type of biological explanation called ‘homology thinking.’ Homology thinking explains the properties of a homologue by citing the history of a homologue. Homology thinking is significant in several ways. First, it offers more detailed explanations of biological phenomena than corresponding analogy explanations. Second, it provides an important explanation of character similarity and difference. Third, homology thinking offers a promising account of multiple reali…Read more
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60Where's the species? Comments on the phylogenetic species conceptsBiology and Philosophy 4 (1): 89-96. 1989.
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11Consilience, Historicity, and the Species ProblemIn R. Paul Thompson & Denis Walsh (eds.), Evolutionary biology: conceptual, ethical, and religious issues, Cambridge University Press. pp. 65-86. 2014.
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26The metaphysics of evolution (review)Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 22 (3): 525-532. 1991.
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119Species, Historicity, and Path DependencyPhilosophy of Science 81 (5): 714-726. 2014.This paper clarifies the historical nature of species by showing that species are path-dependent entities. A species’ identity is not determined by its intrinsic properties or its origin, but by its unique evolutionary path. Seeing that species are path-dependent entities has three implications: it shows that origin essentialism is mistaken, it rebuts two challenges to the species-are-historical-entities thesis, and it demonstrates that the identity of a species during speciation depends on futu…Read more
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191Microbiology and the species problemBiology and Philosophy 25 (4): 553-568. 2010.This paper examines the species problem in microbiology and its implications for the species problem more generally. Given the different meanings of ‘species’ in microbiology, the use of ‘species’ in biology is more multifarious and problematic than commonly recognized. So much so, that recent work in microbial systematics casts doubt on the existence of a prokaryote species category in nature. It also casts doubt on the existence of a general species category for all of life (one that includes …Read more
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372Eliminative pluralismPhilosophy of Science 59 (4): 671-690. 1992.This paper takes up the cause of species pluralism. An argument for species pluralism is provided and standard monist objections to pluralism are answered. A new form of species pluralism is developed and shown to be an improvement over previous forms. This paper also offers a general foundation on which to base a pluralistic approach to biological classification
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83The semantic approach to evolutionary theoryBiology and Philosophy 6 (1): 59-80. 1991.Paul Thompson, John Beatty, and Elisabeth Lloyd argue that attempts to resolve certain conceptual issues within evolutionary biology have failed because of a general adherence to the received view of scientific theories. They maintain that such issues can be clarified and resolved when one adopts a semantic approach to theories. In this paper, I argue that such conceptual issues are just as problematic on a semantic approach. Such issues arise from the complexity involved in providing formal acc…Read more
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104Species, taxonomy, and systematicsIn Michael Ruse (ed.), Philosophy of Biology, Prometheus Books. pp. 403--428. 2007.
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41Pluralism, Normative Naturalism, and Biological TaxonomyPSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994 382-389. 1994.Several authors have argued for taxonomic pluralism in biology -the position that there is a plurality of equally legitimate classifications of the organic world. Others have objected that such pluralism boils down to a position of anything goes. This paper offers a response to the anything goes objection by showing how one can be a discerning pluralist. In particular, methodological standards for choosing taxonomic projects are derived using Laudan's normative naturalism. This paper also sheds …Read more
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40Individuality and Macroevolutionary TheoryPSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988. 1988.A number of authors have argued that the thesis that species are individuals has important implications for macroevolutionary theory. More specifically, some authors claim that the thesis lends support to the Theory of Punctuated Equilibrium and indicates the existence of species selection. In this paper, I argue that the alleged individuality of species is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of that theory or for the existence of species selection. I also argue, contrary to the claim…Read more
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552What's Wrong with the New Biological EssentialismPhilosophy of Science 77 (5): 674-685. 2010.The received view in the philosophy of biology is that biological taxa (species and higher taxa) do not have essences. Recently, some philosophers (Boyd, Devitt, Griffiths, LaPorte, Okasha, and Wilson) have suggested new forms of biological essentialism. They argue that according to these new forms of essentialism, biological taxa do have essences. This article critically evaluates the new biological essentialism. This article’s thesis is that the costs of adopting the new biological essentialism…Read more
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19The metaphysics of evolution: David Hull, , viii + 331 pp., ISBN 0-7914-0211-8 Hardback $73.50, Paperback $24.95. Michael Ruse , What the Philosophy of Biology Is: Essays Dedicated to David Hull , ix + 337 pp., ISBN 90-247-3778-8 Hardback Dfl 180.00/$99.00/£59.00 (review)Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 22 (3): 525-532. 1991.
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160Species, higher taxa, and the units of evolutionPhilosophy of Science 58 (1): 84-101. 1991.A number of authors argue that while species are evolutionary units, individuals and real entities, higher taxa are not. I argue that drawing the divide between species and higher taxa along such lines has not been successful. Common conceptions of evolutionary units either include or exclude both types of taxa. Most species, like all higher taxa, are not individuals, but historical entities. Furthermore, higher taxa are neither more nor less real than species. None of this implies that there is…Read more
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69Darwin offered an intriguing answer to the species problem. He doubted the existence of the species category as a real category in nature, but he did not doubt the existence of those taxa called ‘‘species’’. And despite his scepticism of the species category, Darwin continued using the word ‘‘species’’. Many have said that Darwin did not understand the nature of species. Yet his answer to the species problem is both theoretically sound and practical. On the theoretical side, DarwinÕs answer is co…Read more
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3Elliott Sober, Reconstructing the Past: Parsimony, Evolution, and Inference Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 13 (3): 122-123. 1993.
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227Axiomatics and individuality: A reply to Williams' "species are individuals"Philosophy of Science 55 (3): 427-434. 1988.In her "Species Are Individuals" (1985), Mary Williams offers informal arguments and a sketched proof which allegedly show that species are individuals with respect to evolutionary theory. In this paper, I suggest that her informal arguments are insufficient for showing that clans are not sets and that species are individuals. I also argue that her sketched proof depends on three questionable assumptions
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The Units of Evolution: Essays on the Nature of SpeciesHistory and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 16 (2): 355. 1994.