In an earlier paper, “The Indeterminacy of Republican Policy,” I argued that in an important class of cases, republican political theory, as formulated by Philip Pettit, does not have determinate implications for policy. Pettit has replied that my argument was based on a conception of freedom as nondomination that is not his own. In the present paper, I explore the two ways of understanding republican freedom. I first suggest that they may not, in the end, be very different. I then note that if …
Read moreIn an earlier paper, “The Indeterminacy of Republican Policy,” I argued that in an important class of cases, republican political theory, as formulated by Philip Pettit, does not have determinate implications for policy. Pettit has replied that my argument was based on a conception of freedom as nondomination that is not his own. In the present paper, I explore the two ways of understanding republican freedom. I first suggest that they may not, in the end, be very different. I then note that if a sharp difference is restored, my conception may have some desirable features.
