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223Are intentions reasons?Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (4). 2007.This paper presents an objection to the view that intentions provide reasons and shows how this objection is also inherited by the more commonly accepted Tie-Breaker view, according to which intentions provide reasons only in tie-break situations. The paper also considers and rejects T. M. Scanlon's argument for the Tie-Breaker view and argues that philosophers might be drawn to accept the problematic Tie-Breaker view by confusing it with a very similar, unproblematic view about the relation bet…Read more
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172Review: Mark Schroeder, Explaining the Reasons We Share: Explanation and Expression in Ethics (review)Ethics 126 (1): 238-244. 2015.
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299Consequentialism and the wrong kind of reasons: A reply to LangUtilitas 22 (3): 351-359. 2010.In his article, Gerald Lang formulates the buck-passing account of value so as to resolve the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. I argue against his formulation of buck-passing. Specifically, I argue that his formulation of buck-passing is not compatible with consequentialism (whether direct or indirect), and so it should be rejected.
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272Instrumental Rationality and Carroll's TortoiseEthical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (5): 557-569. 2005.Some philosophers have tried to establish a connection between the normativity of instrumental rationality and the paradox presented by Lewis Carroll in his 1895 paper “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles.” I here examine and argue against accounts of this connection presented by Peter Railton and James Dreier before presenting my own account and discussing its implications for instrumentalism (the view that all there is to practical rationality is instrumental rationality). In my view, the poten…Read more
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1225Rational AkrasiaOrganon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4): 546-566. 2013.It is commonly thought that one is irrationally akratic when one believes one ought to F but does not intend to F. However, some philosophers, following Robert Audi, have argued that it is sometimes rational to have this combination of attitudes. I here consider the question of whether rational akrasia is possible. I argue that those arguments for the possibility of rational akrasia advanced by Audi and others do not succeed. Specifically, I argue that cases in which an akratic agent acts as he …Read more
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285Evolution, altruism and "internal reward" explanationsPhilosophical Forum 33 (4). 2002.Internal rewards are the psychological benefits one receives by performing certain other-regarding actions. Internal rewards include such benefits as the avoidance of guilt, the avoidance of painful memories, and the attainment of warm, fuzzy feelings. Despite the limitations of social psychology, Sober and Wilson believe that evolutionary theory can show that it is more likely for benevolent other-regarding motivational mechanisms to have evolved, thereby supporting the altruist’s claim. Here, …Read more
Lincoln, Nebraska, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
| Value Theory |
| Meta-Ethics |
Areas of Interest
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| Epistemology |
| Philosophy of Action |
| Meta-Ethics |
| Normative Ethics |
| Philosophy of Law |
| Social and Political Philosophy |