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35Morality, Reason, and Management Science: The Rationale of Cost-Benefit AnalysisSocial Philosophy and Policy 2 (2): 128. 1985.The Problem Economic efficiency is naturally thought to be a virtue of social policies and decisions, and cost-benefit analysis is commonly regarded as a technique for measuring economic efficiency. It is not surprising, then, that CB analysis is so widely used in social policy analysis. However, there is a great deal of controversy about CB analysis, including controversy about its underlying philosophical rationale. The rationales that have been proposed fall into three basic, though not mutua…Read more
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128The "possibility" of a categorical imperative: Kant's groundwork, part IIIPhilosophical Perspectives 6 261-284. 1992.
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2The Idea of DemocracyEthics 105 (2): 425-426. 1995.In the wake of the recent expansion of democratic forms of government around the world, political theorists have begun to rethink the nature and justification of this form of government. The essays in this book address a variety of foundational questions about democracy: How effective is it? How stable can it be in a pluralist society? Does it deserve its current popularity? Can it successfully guide a socialist society?
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33Goldman on the goals of democracy (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1). 2002.As practiced by Alvin Goldman, social epistemology addresses the epistemic consequences and requirements of social practices and institutions. Since political institutions have epistemic consequences and requirements, social epistemology has a great deal to offer to political philosophy. Goldman’s work in this area is rich and interesting, and, in his recent book, Knowledge in a Social World, he has much to say that deserves the attention of political philosophers. I highly recommend, for exampl…Read more
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466Defending the principle of alternate possibilities: Blameworthiness and moral responsibilityNoûs 31 (4): 441-456. 1997.According to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), a person is morally responsible for an action only if he could have done otherwise. PAP underlies a familiar argument for the incompatibility of moral responsibility with determinism. I argue that Harry Frankfurt's famous argument against PAP is unsuccessful if PAP is interpreted as a principle about blameworthiness. My argument turns on the maxim that "ought implies can" as well as a "finely-nuanced" view of the object of blame. To re…Read more
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55Reasonable Acceptability and Democratic Legitimacy: Estlund’s Qualified Acceptability RequirementEthics 121 (2): 239-269. 2011.
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University of California, DavisDepartment of Philosophy
Davis, California, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |