Sven Bernecker

This paper examines Quine's dismissal of external world skepticism. Quine maintains that since skeptical doubts are scientific doubts we can neutralize the skeptical challenge empirically without begging the question. On closer inspection, it becomes apparent that Quine's only argument against skepticism is his naturalism. Naturalism states that because we cannot adopt an external perspective onto our beliefs about the world the skeptic's mistake is to demand that we gain an objective understanding of human knowledge. Given naturalism, skeptical challenges, though not incoherent, are idle, artificial, and neurotic. Since Quine's dismissal of skepticism is grounded in his naturalism this raises the question of what motivates naturalism. Quine's main reason for adopting naturalism is his confidence in the natural sciences for which he gives no arguments. Since Quine doesn't justify his naturalistic anti-skepticism he robs himself of the possibility to fully understand the significance of skepticism.

The chapter starts out by explaining the taxonomy of kinds of memory used in analytic philosophy. Following this, it offers a tentative analysis of the kind of memory analytic philosophers discuss the most—propositional memory. The bulk of the chapter is devoted to the discussion of three questions in the epistemology of memory: Is memory a form or a source of knowledge? Is memory merely a preservative source of justification and knowledge or can it also function as a generative source? Do we have reasons to trust our memories? The last section of the chapter deals with the dependence of memory on personal identity through time.

Designed for readers who have had little or no exposure to contemporary theory of knowledge, _Reading Epistemology_ brings together twelve important and influential writings on the subject. Presents twelve influential pieces of writing representing two contrasting views on each of six core topics in epistemology. Each chapter contains an introduction to the topic, introductions to the authors, extensive commentaries on the texts, questions for debate and an annotated bibliography. Includes writings from Robert Nozick, Ernest Sosa, Laurence BonJour, and Fred Dretske. Encourages readers to engage with the texts and to think for themselves.

This article argues that anti-skeptical arguments from semantic externalism fail on their own terms. Examining Hilary Putnam's brain-in-a-vat argument and an analogous argument by Fred Dretske, it shows that such arguments presuppose that we can know non-empirically that we possess beliefs—and thus that we are not zombies. It then argues that, given semantic externalism, we cannot know non-empirically whether we have beliefs at all or are merely zombies. The article closes by drawing out the consequences of this result for Putnam's and Dretske's anti-skeptical arguments.

This paper examines the revisions the Elementary-Philosophy underwent when Reinhold studied Fichte’s Science of Knowledge. The goal is to reconstruct Reinhold’s argument for the primacy of facts of moral consciousness over facts of theoretical consciousness when it comes to establishing the first principle of philosophy, and to relate this argument to his idea that moral enlightenment is a precondition of philosophical enlightenment. I argue that there is an intimate relation between Reinhold’s work as an Elementary-Philosopher and his activity as champion of enlightenment. The doctrine according to which moral enlightenment has priority over philosophical enlightenment corresponds to the revaluation of facts of moral consciousness within the framework of the amended Elementary-Philosophy.

In this paper I argue in favor of the compatibility of semantic externalism with privileged self-knowledge by showing that an argument for incompatibilism from switching scenarios fails. Given the inclusion theory of self-knowledge, the hypothesis according to which I am having twater thoughts while thinking that I have water thoughts simply isn't a (entertainable) possibility. When I am on Earth thinking earthian concepts, I cannot believe that I am thinking that twater is wet for I don't have the concept of twater available; so this concept cannot figure in any of my mental states. Analogously, when I am on Twin Earth, I cannot mistakenly believe that I am entertaining water thoughts. No matter how often I am switched between Earth and Twin Earth, I will never erroneously think that I am having water thoughts while in fact I am having twater thoughts and vice versa. Privileged self-knowledge is therefore immune to skeptical arguments from switching and twinning scenarios.

Incompatibilism is the view that privileged knowledge of our own mental states cannot be reconciled with externalism regarding the content of mental states. Davidson has recently developed two arguments that are supposed to disprove incompatibilism and establish the consistency of privileged access and externalism. One argument criticizes incompatibilism for assuming that externalism conflicts with the mind‐body identity theory. Since mental states supervene on neurological events, Davidson argues, they are partly ‘in the head’ and are knowable just by reflection. Another argument rejects incompatibilism by repudiating the object perception model of introspection. Once extemalism is freed from the internalist idea that thoughts take objects which are inner epistemological intermediaries, Davidson maintains, it poses no threat to privileged self‐knowledge. It is argued that neither of these arguments is successful, since both disprove assumptions irrelevant to incompatibilism. Moreover, it is indicated how Davidson would have to go about defending his positive account of privileged self‐knowledge against the principal incompatibilist arguments.

Epistemology, the philosophy of knowledge, is at the core of many of the central debates and issues in philosophy, interrogating the notions of truth, objectivity, trust, belief and perception. _The Routledge Companion to Epistemology_ provides a comprehensive and the up-to-date survey of epistemology, charting its history, providing a thorough account of its key thinkers and movements, and addressing enduring questions and contemporary research in the field. Organized thematically, the _Companion_ is divided into ten sections: Foundational Issues, The Analysis of Knowledge, The Structure of Knowledge, Kinds of Knowledge, Skepticism, Responses to Skepticism, Knowledge and Knowledge Attributions, Formal Epistemology, The History of Epistemology, and Metaepistemological Issues. Seventy-eight chapters, each between 5000 and 7000 words and written by the world’s leading epistemologists, provide students with an outstanding and accessible guide to the field. Designed to fit the most comprehensive syllabus in the discipline, this text will be an indispensible resource for anyone interested in this central area of philosophy. _The Routledge Companion to Epistemology_ is essential reading for students of philosophy.