Søren Klausen

The epistemology of abstract objects is a somewhat neglected topic in contemporary philosophy. I argue that a satisfactory account of our capacity for knowing abstract objects must consist in more than formal requirements. It must also comprise an investigation of the nature of the relevant processes of belief formation, notably the mental process known as intuition. A promising approach is what I call “constructionism” (not to be confused with antirealist forms of constructivism), the main ideas of which can be found in Kant, Peirce, Husserl and contemporary cognitive scientists like Laird-Johnson and Kosslyn. According to constructionism, we come to know complex abstract objects by carrying out processes of mental construction or performing mental experiments on the contents of lower-order mental acts. I discuss the strengths and limitations of the theory and suggest some possible further developments.

In spite of the booming interest in social epistemology, explicit analyses of group knowledge remain rare. Most existing accounts are based on theories of joint intentionality. I argue that this approach, though not without merit or useful applications, is inadequate both when it comes to accounting for actual group knowledge attributions and for purposes of meliorative social epistemology. As an alternative, I outline a liberal, de-intellectualized account, which allows for the complex distribution of epistemic states typical of most real-world collectives, and makes minimal requirements as to the psychological underpinnings of collective states of knowing and the formal features of groups. The account is inspired by theories of distributed and extended cognition. It is guided by the principle that we should use the same standard when dealing with social and individual epistemology. Careful attention to what is normally required—and, in particular, not required—for attributing knowledge to individuals lends support the more liberal view

The value and function of theoretical knowledge is an important and disputed issue, which has received surprisingly little scholarly attention. I attempt to clarify the notion of theoretical knowledge and examine its general relationship to learning. Theoretical knowledge is not necessarily distinguished by any particular content; the adjective “theoretical” can just as well signify a particular methodological approach or a way of dealing with a topic, including the way it is conceptualized. I further argue that theoretical knowledge can be merely implicit and non-propositional. Though I reject a radical constructivist view, according to which knowledge acquisition consists in socialization, it must be admitted that socialization and the acquisition of theoretical knowledge do turn out to go closely hand in hand, inasmuch as theoretical knowledge is often a precondition of successful socialization. Concepts, principles, models and symbolic systems support the acquisition of both theoretical and other kinds of knowledge, but also help the learner to find her way about in an environment that is already formed by theories and conceptual understandings. Theoretical knowledge is both a learning instrument and a tool for navigation